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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE ANTITRUST
CLEARANCE PROCEDURES'
Uncertainty about the application of antitrust laws2 to business en-
deavors has been an historic concern in both the United States3 and the
I For the purposes of this paper, the term "clearance procedures" includes any procedure by
which a business can voluntarily apply to an antitrust agency to elicit the agency's view about the
legality of an agreement or practice under the system's antitrust laws. Informal oral advice will not
be considered here as a clearance procedure, because there is no established procedure for obtaining
it, and the advice given is only the personal view of the official contacted and not the official position
of the agency itself. The possibility of initiating informal contact with the antitrust agencies,
however, should not be overlooked. The FTC and the European Commission in particular
encourage businesses to seek informal advice, and such advice can help a business decide whether it
should utilize the agency's clearance procedure. Interview with Carl D. Hevener, senior attorney,
Office of Evaluations, Bureau of Competition, FTC. in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 24, 1984); interview
with European Commission officials, in Brussels (Jan. 12, 1984).
To encourage candor, the author agreed in most interviews not to attribute specific views and
information to the person interviewed. Therefore, numerous citations to the interviews will omit the
name of the particular person interviewed.
2 In the EEC, the terms "competition law" or "cartel law" are preferred.
3 See, ag., J. BURNS, ANTrrRusT DE~nMmA: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD MODERNUM THE AN-
TnmRusT LAWS (1969).
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European Economic Community4 (EEC). A widely accepted principle in
both systems5 is that before committing resources to an agreement or
practice, a business should be able to determine with a reasonable6 degree
of certainty that it will not be exposing itself to antitrust liability.7
In order to devise effective methods for combatting the uncertainty
which businesses sometimes face under the antitrust laws, it is first neces-
sary to identify the sources of the uncertainty. In both the United States
and the EEC, the initial and fundamental source of uncertainty is each
system's broadly worded antitrust statutes.' Each system has depended
primarily on its judicial and administrative bodies9 to interpret the word-
4 See, e.g., Ferry, The Repose of Certainty and the Necessity of Uncertainty, INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRuSr FIFTH ANNUAL FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTrruTE (1978).
5 See, e.g., Baker, Antitrust in the Sunshine, 21 ST. LOuis U.L.J. 347, 348 (1977) ("To facilitate
an understanding of what conduct is and is not acceptable should be a major goal of an enforcement
agency."); C. KERSE, EEC ANTrrRusr PROCEDURES 212 (1981) ('The principle of legal certainty
... has an established place as part of the general principles of Community law.").
6 As will be seen during the discussion of the business and legal communities' criticisms of
United States and EEC clearance programs, infra text accompanying notes 163-266 and 404-518,
businesses and lawyers often disagree about what degree of uncertainty is "reasonable." Each sys-
tem must make the difficult threshold determination of what level of uncertainty it will tolerate.
7 Increased antitrust certainty does more than advance the equitable principle that a business
should only be liable for conduct it knows or should know is illegal. It also enables businesses to
forego or modify anticompetitive conduct and, as a result, businesses, the antitrust agencies and the
judiciary are spared the time and expense of complex antitrust litigation. Increased certainty also
contributes to a more competitive and efficient economy, because not only can businesses avoid
anticompetitive behavior, but also they can engage in competitive conduct which they might other-
wise forego or inefficiently modify due to unfounded antitrust fears. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 5, at
148; VON KALINOWSKI, ANTrrRuST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 126.02 (1) (1981).
8 See, eg., Kobak, Three Approaches to the Bureaucratic Dilemma: The Administration and
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws of the United States, France, and the Common Market, 23 ALA. L.
REV. 43, 44, 85 (1970). In the United States, the major antitrust laws include the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982), and the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1982), including the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982). In
the EEC, the major antitrust provisions are Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, which are
comparable to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
9 In the United States, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits concerning the
federal antitrust laws brought by private parties and the Justice Department. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
The FTC adjudicates its own antitrust complaints, with appeal to the federal courts of appeals. 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982).
In the EEC, private actions alleging a violation of EEC antitrust law can only be brought in the
courts of the member states. However, under Article 177 of the Treaty, a member state court may,
and in certain circumstances must, suspend its proceedings and refer questions of community law to
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Once the question has been answered by the Court of
Justice, the national court resumes its proceedings and applies the ruling itself to the facts of the case
before it. Alternatively, private parties may file a complaint with the Commission, and the Commis-
sion itself will bring an action if appropriate. The Commission may also initiate proceedings without
a third-party complaint. Like the FTC the Commission tries the case itself as the court of first
instance, and the defendant may appeal the decision to the Court of Justice. See generally G. BEBR,
DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1981).
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ing of its antitrust laws, and over the years a considerable amount of case
law has been generated which has clarified many of the ambiguities of
those laws. With the aid of these large bodies of legal precedent, private
antitrust counsel in many cases can provide sound advice to businesses
about the antitrust risks of a particular course of conduct, thereby reduc-
ing uncertainty to a tolerable level.
However, such reliance on the judiciary for the interpretation and
development of the antitrust laws brings with it a fair amount of uncer-
tainty which private counsel may not be able to sufficiently relieve.10
There are three major sources of uncertainty for which legal precedent
can provide little solace. First, as in any field of law depending so heavily
on judicial interpretation, fringe issues and gray areas exist under the
antitrust laws, and it often takes a long time for the judicial systems of
the United States and the EEC to remedy this uncertainty.1 Clarification
of a particular ambiguity usually requires a controversy to raise the issue
in litigation, and often the definitive answer must await appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court or the European Court of Justice. Even then, the
uncertainty may persist if the high court's decision is vague or limited to
the facts of the particular case, or if the court avoids answering the issue
altogether.
Secondly, even when the law is relatively clear on a particular issue,
an antitrust suit raising the issue may still be brought against a business
which reasonably believes it is complying with the law. Such suits may
be frivolous,12 or they may be genuine efforts by private plaintiffs or the
10 While no one denies that uncertainty exists under the antitrust laws, the extent of this uncer-
tainty has been debated in both systems. The antitrust agencies in both the United States and the
EEC admit that a limited amount of uncertainty exists. See, eg., Baker, supra note 5, at 348; Ferry,
supra note 4, at 12-14. Many businesses and antitrust lawyers, however, claim that uncertainty is
rampant. See, ,ag., Handler, The Inevitability of Risk Taking, 44 ANTrrRusT LJ. 377, 378 (1975);
Van Bael, EEC Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication as Seen by Defense Counsel, 7 lEvun
SUISSE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE 1, 2-10 (1979). The purpose of this
article is not to quantify the amount of uncertainty but rather to suggest proposals for reducing the
uncertainty that does exist.
11 In the United States and the EEC, for example, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the
application of each system's antitrust laws to joint research and development ventures because of a
lack of case law on the subject See Statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, before the Joint Economic Committee con-
cerning the Need for Joint Research and Development Legislation 1-2 (Nov. 3, 1983); interviews
with private antitrust lawyers, in Brussels (Jan. 3-5, 1984).
12 Strike suits are rarely filed in the EEC, but their use in the United States is increasing because
the threat of treble damages, class actions, liberal discovery and complex antitrust litigation make
defendants willing to settle suits regardless of their lack of merit. See A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE
ANTrrRusT LAWS OF THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA 492 (3d ed. 1980); Schwechter & Shepard,
The Effects of US. Antitrust Laws on the International Operations of.American Firms, 1 Nw. J. INr'L
L. & Bus. 492, 527 n.206 (1979).
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antitrust authorities13 to convince the judiciary to overrule precedent or
to carve out an exemption for the particular circumstances.
Finally, uncertainty is largely unavoidable in any area of the law in
which legality depends upon an evaluation of individual circumstances.14
In both the United States and the EEC, the certainty of per se rules in
many instances has been sacrificed in favor of rules which allow greater
flexibility in order to achieve justice in individual cases."' Under United
States antitrust law, much business conduct is evaluated under a "rule of
reason" analysis.16 In the EEC, a limited rule of reason analysis is used
under Article 85(1). Under Article 85(3) any individual agreement may
be exempted if it satisfies a test similar to a rule of reason analysis but
which takes other factors besides competition into account.' 7 In cases
13 A former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Divi-
sion has noted that:
Mhe Antitrust Division does not view itself as a policeman on the beat enforcing 'the law' in a
mechanical way. Rather, it likes to regard itself as a thoughtful champion of competitive pol-
icy. In some instances, for example, the Division will decline to enforce sweeping Supreme
Court doctrines that make little economic sense. At other times it will seek to extend the law
beyond its present boundaries-as a result of old, ambiguous or simply wrongly decided cases.
Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Rejoinder, 11 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 255, 256 (1978). See
also, Reinsch, The Export Trading Company Act of 1981, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 47, 103
(1982) ('CThe conflict between Justice Department and judicial interpretations of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts amounts to a sentence of perpetual uncertainty for U.S. business").
14 Baker, supra note 5, at 348; Ferry, supra note 4, at 12-13, 23; Handler, supra note 10, at 377-
78.
15 The business community generally favors the flexibility of the rule of reason over perse rules
even though it often results in uncertainty. See J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTI-TRusT
LAWS 120, 121 (rev. ed. 1966) ('The business community appears to register at the primaries for
certainty as a matter of principle but, when forced at the polls to make specific choices in specific
cases, it votes for flexibility."); Foer, The Search for Greater Certainty, TASK-FORCE REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL ANTrrRusT 1 (unpublished report of the FTC obtained by the author through a
Freedom of Information Act request and on file at the Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business).
16 Under the American version of the rule of reason, only restrictions on conduct which "un-
duly" restrain trade are deemed illegal. In applying this test to a particular case, a court must
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, its conditions before and
after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint and its actual effect, the history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, and the end
sought. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
17 For an examination of the EEC's application of a "rule of reason" analysis, see Van Houtte, A
Standard of Reason in EEC Antitrust Law: Some Comments on the Application of Parts I and 3 of
Article 85, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 497 (1982). Unlike the rule of reason in the United States, the
exemption clause in Article 85(3) requires the Commission and the Court of Justice to take other
factors into account in addition to the effect an agreement has on competition. A restrictive agree-
ment may be exempted if it contributes to improved methods of production or distribution or to
economic progress (provided that the least restrictive means to secure that benefit has been adopted
and that competition will not be eliminated over too wide an area). Such a complex evaluation
creates more uncertainty than does the competition analysis of the American rule of reason.
[I]t embroils the European Court inexorably in weighing economic arguments in a way that the
American courts have always sought to avoid as inappropriate for courts of law. It also greatly
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analyzed under these flexible rules, the value of legal precedent is
reduced.
In each of the above situations, a business is exposed to a variety of
risks if it decides to implement its proposed agreement or practice. If a
suit is brought against it and is not dismissed, the business will be forced
to choose between either engaging in expensive, time-consuming litiga-
tion or abandoning or modifying its conduct, thereby perhaps sacrificing
or diminishing the value of its investment. Even if it chooses to do the
latter, the business may have to pay a damage settlement if the suit is a
private action, or a fine if the action is brought by the European Commis-
sion.18 If it chooses to litigate, it faces the risk that its conduct may be
temporarily enjoined and that it ultimately may lose. Even if it ulti-
mately prevails, the expense and inconvenience of the litigation impose a
heavy burden on the business. In the United States, sanctions for anti-
trust violations can be quite severe: automatic treble damages and litiga-
tion costs in private suits; 9 fines, actual damages and criminal sanctions
in government suits;20 and permanent injunctions or forced dissolution of
a merger or joint venture in both private and government suits.21 In the
EEC, sanctions can also be harsh: the Commission can impose fines
amounting to as much as ten percent of the defendant's worldwide an-
nual turnover and it can order a business to abandon or modify the activ-
ity, with a threat of periodic fines for noncompliance with its order;22 and
affects the enforcement process, because no agreement can be characterized as in a strict sense
illegal per se such that defendant's own lawyers will say unequivocally that they must be aban-
doned... As there is no clear guidance in industrial economics for quantifying such [eco-
nomic] effects and expert witnesses would frequently disagree, [the type of balancing test in
Article 85(3)] does indeed seem, as the American courts have always insisted, an inappropriate
basis for legal decisions and one that is likely to render the law unpredictable.
A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, supra note 12, at 476, 483. Commission officials stress that exemption
decisions do not serve as reliable precedent upon which other businesses in similar circumstances
rely since the particular facts of each agreement are so important to the exemption decision that even
a slight deviation could preclude an exemption. Interview with Commission officials, supra note 1.
18 See infra note 22.
19 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
20 Under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, antitrust violations are punishable "by a fine not
exceeding one million dollars ifa corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). Under § 4(a) of the Clayton Act, the Justice Department may
bring an action for actual damages sustained by the government in its business or property. 15
U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
21 The FTC itself can issue cease and desist or divestiture orders without the assistance of a
court. Federal Trade Commission Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982); Clayton Act § 11(b), 15
U.S.C. § 21(b) (1982). The Government may also seek injunctive relief for violations of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982); Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1982),
and the courts interpret these provisions as allowing them to order divestiture or dissolution. See,
ag., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1911).
22 Article 15(2) of Regulation 17/62. The Commission does not hesitate to impose heavy fines in
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in private actions in member state courts, actual damages, litigation
costs, injunctions, dissolution orders, or automatic nonenforceability of
the agreement are possible sanctions.23
In both the United States and the EEC, the unfairness which uncer-
tainty poses for businesses has been recognized and widely criticized.24
Persistent efforts have been made to reduce this uncertainty and its ac-
companying risks. These efforts have taken three general forms: (1) ad-
ditional legislation clarifying the existing antitrust laws; 25 (2) guidelines,
notices, speeches, articles and other non-legislative statements issued by
the antitrust agencies which expound on the law or agency enforcement
policies; 26 and (3) clearance procedures.
The first two methods of reducing uncertainty have one major ad-
appropriate cases. In Moet et Chandon (London) Ltd. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 166 (1982), the Com-
mission imposed a fine of 1,100,000 European Currency Units (approximately $1,000,000) because
of the seriousness of the infringement (an export ban) and because the violation was intentional.
Under Article 16 of Regulation 17/63, the Commission may also impose periodic penalty fines of 50
to 1000 European Currency Units per day to compel a defendant to comply with its decision. For a
thorough examination of this sanction, see C. KIRsE, supra note 5 at Chapter 7.
23 Nonenforceability is the only sanction available to member state courts which is explicitly
provided for by the Treaty. See Article 85(2). Most actions in member state courts raising EEC
antitrust law involve one of the parties to an agreement using the nonenforceability claim as a
"shield," ie., as a defense to its breach of the agreement. Few actions are brought by third parties
using Articles 85 and 86 offensively. Damage awards, injunctions and other remedies are not pro-
vided for in any Community law, but some member state courts are beginning to impose these
sanctions under their own laws on the theory that the directly applicable community antitrust laws
are part of the member state legal order and violations should be punished accordingly. See, eg.,
Garden Cottage Foods v. Milk Marketing Board, [1983] 2 All ER 770, [1984] AC 130. The increased
availability of these sanctions could increase the number of third party actions in member state
courts. See Lang, Community Antitrust Law - Competition and Enforcement, 18 COMMON Mr. L.
REV. 335, 337-45 (1981).
24 See supra note 5; Korah, Comfort Letters - Reflections on the Perfume Cases, 6 EuR. L. R. 14,
38 (1981) ("The parties need to know that contractual protection from competition can be relied
upon before they commit themselves to investment, not the prospect of a gamble in the courts");
Dixon, Federal Trade Commission Advisory Opinions, 18 AD. L.REv. 65, 68 (1965) (The FTC
adopted guides and its advisory opinion procedure because of its concern "with the need of the
individual, particularly the individual businessman, for such advice before he embarks upon a course
which is likely to involve him in legal difficulties if he guesses wrong as to the law").
25 In the United States, such legislation is rare. One only recent example is Title IV of the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982), which goes beyond clarifying the law
and which itself has created some uncertainty. In the EEC, further legislation has taken the form of
group exemptions, which spell out in detail circumstances under which certain types of vertical
arrangements will automatically qualify for exemption under Article 85(3). See, eg., Regulation
1984/83 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agree-
ments, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C172) 7 (July 10, 1982).
26 In both the United States and the EEC, the antitrust agencies issue official guides and notices
containing the agencies' views about what is and is not legal under the antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977), re-
printed in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (1977), and TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) No. 266, pt. 11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTTrmuST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
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vantage over clearance procedures. Because both methods require no as-
sessment of individual circumstances by the government, businesses are
spared the administrative burden, expense, delay and other problems as-
sociated with individual clearance procedures.27 Moreover, the antitrust
agencies are able to devote their scarce resources to prosecuting serious
antitrust violations.
Because of their efficiency, additional clarifying legislation and
agency enforcement statements are to be welcomed, but these methods of
reducing antitrust uncertainty do not eliminate the need for an individual
clearance in many cases.28 Both legislation and agency statements have
an inherent limitation which prevents them in many instances from pro-
viding the certainty which businesses seek: neither takes individual cir-
cumstances into account.29 Unless each system is willing to sacrifice its
rules of reason and expand its use of per se rules, or enact legislation or
guidelines specifying in detail what facts will result in antitrust liability,
uncertainty will persist in many individual cases.
To compensate for this lack of certainty, both the United States and
the EEC have adopted clearance procedures which can be utilized by
businesses when they face an unacceptable level of uncertainty. Unfortu-
nately, each system's clearance programs suffer from problems which
discourage businesses from using them in cases of serious uncertainty.30
This article will compare and evaluate United States and EEC clear-
ance procedures in order to suggest needed reforms which could assist
these clearance programs in fulfilling their goal of providing applicants
the certainty they desire at an acceptable cost to both applicants and the
antitrust agencies. It will begin by describing and critiquing the various
TIONS]; and the European Commission's notice concerning Agreements of Minor Importance, O.J.
EUR. CoMM. (No. C313) 3 (Dec. 19, 1977).
27 See infra text accompanying notes 163-266.
28 This has been acknowledged by the antitrust agencies themselves. For example, the Depart-
ment of Justice's guides emphasize the continuing value of the Business Review Program. See, ag.,
AnTrrRusr GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 26, at 1. The EEC group ex-
emptions note that the clearance procedure of Regulation 17/62 is available to those businesses
which are uncertain whether they qualify under the group exemption. See, eg., Regulation 1984/83,
supra note 25, preamble consideration 14.
29 See Dixon, supra note 24, at 70:
[Guides and additional legislation] are extremely valuable in the [FTC's] efforts to clarify and
elaborate upon the law as it applies to particular industries in the language of that industry. But
they are universal in their application and do not fulfill the need of the individual member of
any industry for authoritative advice as to his own peculiar problems...
See also Reinsch, supra note 13, at 106.
30 Such disadvantages include expense, delay, lack of confidentiality for information submitted
with the clearance application, and a lack of binding effect of government clearances. See infra text
accompanying notes 163-266 and 404-519.
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clearance programs and procedures of the United States31 and the
EEC.32 It will then advance specifie, detailed suggestions for remedying
the drawbacks of current clearance programs.33 Finally, it will conclude
by assessing the possible impact of the proposed changes if they would be
adopted.34
II. AN EVALUATION OF CURRENT CLEARANCE PROGRAMS
A. United States Clearance Programs
1. Three Independent Programs
As is true with the enforcement of United States antitrust laws, sev-
eral agencies are involved in the clearance process. Three United States
agencies administer three independent clearance programs.35 Each of the
two major antitrust agencies, the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission) ("FTC"), operates its own independent, non-statu-
tory program under which any type of business activity, both foreign and
domestic, can be reviewed. 36 A third program, recently enacted by Con-
gress and limited to export-related activities, is administered by the De-
partment of Commerce with the concurrence of the Department of
Justice.3 7
31 See infra notes 35-258 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 263-519 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 527-635 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 635-39 and accompanying text.
35 There are two additional statutory programs which have some of the attributes of clearance
programs but which are beyond the scope of this paper. First, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982), requires proposed mergers and acquisitions of a
certain size to be notified to the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. If
neither agency opposes the merger or acquisition, it may go forward. Unlike the clearance programs
examined in this article, this program was enacted primarily for the benefit of the FTC and the
Department of Justice and not for the benefit of businesses. Its purpose is to give those agencies
advance notice of and information about proposed mergers and acquisitions so that such actions can
be enjoined before consummation. S. KANwrr, FTC § 17.07 (Nov. 1979). Moreover, it is not a
voluntary procedure, and the Act expressly provides that a decision not to oppose the merger or
acquisition does not bar a subsequent challenge by the FTC or the Department of Justice. 15 U.S.C.
§ 18(a)(i)(1) (1982). In practice, however, a decision by the agencies not to challenge the merger or
acquisition does have a limited clearance effect, since courts would not look kindly upon a govern-
ment action against a merger or acquisition which the government could have prevented. See gener-
ally S. AxiNN, B. FOGG & N. STOLL, AcQuIsrTION UNDER THE HART-ScOTr-RODINo ANTrraUsT
IMPROVEMENTS Acr (1980).
A second program which has some characteristics of a clearance program is the Webb-Pomerene
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982), which provides an exemption for export associations which meet
certain requirements and register with the FTC. Unlike the clearance programs being examined in
this paper, the antitrust agency does not review the association's activities and give or withhold its
approval. In other words, it is a registration program, not a clearance program.
36 See infra notes 38-98 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 98-162 and accompanying text.
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a The Department of Justice Business Review Program
Although the Justice Department is, and prefers to remain,3 8 pri-
marily an antitrust law enforcer, it has for many years voluntarily played
a limited regulatory role through its administration of a non-statutory
clearance program. Under its Business Review Program,39 the Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division examines proposed courses of business conduct
and expresses its present enforcement intention, Le., whether it would
prosecute the applicant if the proposal were put into effect.
A request for a business review letter must be submitted in writing
to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division.40
The regulations do not provide for formal pre-filing counseling to discuss
the information which will be required, but in practice such an opportu-
nity exists.4 ' There are no standardized application forms or detailed
38 Many Department of Justice lawyers would rather prosecute antitrust violations than investi-
gate clearance requests. Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
25-26, 1984). For example, the Department officially opposed playing a leading role in the certifica-
tion procedure of the Export Trading Company Act, see infra notes 98-162 and accompanying text.
As a letter from Sherman E. Unger, General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, and William
F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Senator John Heinz (Sept. 29, 1982)
(on file at the Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business) stated:
The Antitrust Division . . . is structured as a law enforcement agency which exercises
prosecutorial discretion in undertaking investigations of violations of antitrust standards and
instituting enforcement actions in the courts. The certificate of review provisions of the House-
passed bill would fundamentally alter that role with respect to export trading companies by
assigning to the Department of Justice the regulatory task of rendering decisions of binding
legal force on applications presented to it.
In practice, however, the Department has attempted to become heavily involved in the Certification
Program, much to the dismay of the Commerce Department See 46 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REGU-
LATION REP. (BNA) 204 (Feb. 2, 1984) (interview with Donald Zarin, formerly of the Commerce
Department's Office of General Counsel). The Department of Justice also opposes a proposed certi-
fication program for research and development joint ventures. See infra note 64.
39 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1984). The early forerunner of the Business Review Program was the "rail-
road release" letter, first issued in 1939, which expressed the Department's criminal enforcement
intentions with regard to proposed conduct by the railroads. The program was subsequently ex-
panded to include mergers and acquisitions generally. In 1968, the Department announced its cur-
rent program. See ANTrrRusr DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
DIVISION MANUAL 111-74 (1979). The original regulations governing the Program were issued on
February 1, 1968 (30 Fed. Reg. 2422 (1968)) and have been amended twice, on December 19, 1973
(38 Fed. Reg. 34804 (1973)), and on March 1, 1977 (42 Fed. Reg. 11831 (1977)).
40 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(1) (1984).
41 This opportunity is rarely taken, largely because it is not publicized. Interviews with Depart-
ment of Justice lawyers, supra note 38. Businesses contemplating such pre-filing counseling should
be aware that any advice rendered generally will be limited to answering questions about procedures
and the types of information which will be required. Id. The regulations state that no oral clearance
or any other binding advice will be given, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(6) (1984) and most Department officials
abide by this prohibition. Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38. Therefore,
the Department is unwilling to discuss the antitrust merits of a particular course of conduct before a
filing, although in some cases the Department may point a potential applicant to relevant cases,
Department guidelines or other enforcement policy statements. Id.
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guidelines pinpointing the information which must be submitted with the
request. The Department's regulations simply state in broad terms that
the request must be accompanied "by all relevant data, including back-
ground information, complete copies of all operative documents and de-
tailed statements of all collateral or oral understandings."'4 2 As a result
of this lack of guidance, the Department cannot rely on the information
provided in the application but instead must make supplemental infor-
mation requests 3 in the vast majority of cases.
The most striking feature of the Business Review Program proce-
dure is its lack of uniformity.' The regulations provide almost no gui-
dance as to how requests are to be investigated. Moreover, no special
Department office or section with its own internal regulations is routinely
assigned the task of processing and investigating requests.45 Instead, a
request is assigned to the section or field office having commodity or geo-
graphic jurisdiction over the product or service involved,46 and each sec-
tion or field office is free to determine itself how it will investigate the
request.47
A request usually is assigned by the section or field office chief to a
single staff member who adds the assignment to his enforcement activi-
ties. Usually working under the loose supervision of a superior, the staff
member largely decides for himself how to investigate the request.48
Normally, neither the staff member nor his supervisor has much experi-
ence with business review investigations, and, consequently, investiga-
42 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(5) (1984).
43 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
44 There is a uniform procedure for handling all requests when they are first received. A request
is first passed to the Office of Operations, which will determine if the request is appropriate for
consideration. The Office has the discretion to reject any request, 28 C.F.R § 50.6(3) (1984), but it
will do so only if the request is too vague, concerns on-going conduct, deals with issues under consid-
eration, or becomes moot. J. ATwoOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINEss
ABROAD 185-86 (2d ed. 1981). If the request is accepted, the Office will set in motion a liaison
procedure with the FTC to determine whether the latter has any objection to the Department han-
dling the request. For an explanation and evaluation of the liaison procedure, see Roll, Dual En-
forcement of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and the FTC The Liaison Procedure,
31 Bus. LAW. 2075 (1976). If no objection is made, and it rarely is, the request is then assigned to a
section or a field office for investigation. It is during the investigation phase that uniformity is tem-
porarily suspended. Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
45 The program is so decentralized that the author had difficulty locating officials at the Justice
Department who knew much about the actual functioning of the program. No "expert" on the
program exists, and the author had to interview a number of officials to obtain an overall picture of
the program.
46 If the applicant has had pre-filing contact with a particular section or field office, the request
may note this and the file normally will be referred to that section or field office. Interviews with
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tions often are run inefficiently because each investigator must learn how
to conduct a business review investigation.4 9
This lack of uniformity often makes it impossible for an applicant to
determine in advance what will be required of it during the investigation.
Invariably, the applicant must submit additional information. The ex-
tent and burdensome nature of the additional information request de-
pends on the complexity of the proposed conduct and on the zealousness
of the particular staff member and his inexperience with the Program.50
In most cases, the staff member will conduct independent inquiries and
market analyses.5 In some cases the staff member will negotiate with
the applicant about modifying certain aspects of the proposal objected to
by the staff member or his superiors, while in other cases the proposal
will be approved or condemned as originally presented.52
With the exception of export-related requests,53 the staff is under no
official or self-imposed time restrictions in processing the request.5 The
time needed by the Department to respond to a request varies considera-
bly, and while often it responds in six to eight weeks, in many cases it
takes considerably longer. Every applicant has the right to withdraw its
application if it finds this procedure too lengthy or burdensome, but the
Department expressly reserves the otherwise implicit right to take any
49 Id.
50 Id. This inexperience is a result of the high turnover of staff attorneys at the Department and
the fact that so few requests are received each year that a particular section or field office is assigned
few, if any, of those requests. Id. A Department official and a private attorney complained during
the interviews that too often an overzealous staff member will investigate a business review request
on the assumption that the applicant is trying to "sneak" something by the Department. As a result,
supplementary information requests are unduly burdensome and time consuming, and the applicant
is faced with the heavy burden of convincing the staff member that it has no anti-competitive inten-
tions. Id.; interview with a private antitrust lawyer, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 24, 1984).
51 There is no official provision for third-party comment, but staff members often contact com-
petitors, customers, consumers and other third parties for information and comments. Interviews
with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38. All information supplied by third parties is given
on a voluntary basis. Id.
52 Id.
53 Export-related requests must be answered within 30 days from the date the Department re-
ceived all relevant data. Department of Justice Press Release (Dec. 6, 1978). There is, however, no
deadline for deciding whether all necessary information has been supplied. Since it might take quite
some time to satisfy the staff member that all the necessary information has been assembled, this
deadline may not prevent a long wait for an answer. In fact, since the Department often responds
within 30 days after receiving all relevant data anyway, this deadline makes little difference in most
cases. It is the investigative phase which is so time consuming. See Schwechter & Shepard, supra
note 12, at 526.
54 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38. The complexity of the matter,
the time needed to collect the relevant information, the zealousness of the particular staff member,
and the crush of other business all impact on the response time. Id. Staff members have other
assignments, and usually those tasks will be viewed as more urgent than a "regulatory" assignment.
Most Department lawyers want to prosecute violators, not regulate business activities. Id.
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action it feels is necessary and to retain the information submitted."
Once the investigation is finished, the staff member prepares a draft
business review letter and a supporting memorandum. These are care-
fully reviewed at several levels, including by the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, and changes may be made or more information may be required.5 6
The final letter can give three possible responses to the request:57 that
the Department (1) does not presently intend to bring an enforcement
action if the proposed conduct is implemented;58 (2) declines to state its
enforcement intention; or (3) will bring an enforcement action if the pro-
posed conduct is put into effect.
The regulations do not prescribe the exact content of the letter. In
practice, some letters simply state the procedural history of the request,
the facts upon which the letter is based, the Department's enforcement
intention, and a description of the Department's procedures in making
public the information in the file. Other letters also give detailed legal
reasoning to support the Department's position. A favorable letter may
attach conditions or set forth the assumptions upon which it is based, but
it imposes no expiration date or reporting requirements. Both the letter
and the information supplied to support the request are placed in a pub-
licly available file in the Antitrust Division's Legal Procedure Unit.59
The Department issues approximately twenty business review letters in
an average year.6°
Despite criticism of the Program by the bar and business commu-
nity,61 there are no plans at this time to change the Program.62 The De-
55 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(11) (1984).
56 FTC approval is not required. Id.
57 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(8) (1984).
58 At one time the Department only expressed its criminal enforcement intention unless the
request involved a proposed merger or acquisition. See the original version of the regulations, 33
Fed. Reg. 2422 (1968). Although later versions of the regulations do not specify that the clearance
pertains only to the Department's criminal enforcement intentions, no one at the Department is sure
if this policy has been officially changed. Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note
38. This confusion is another result of the lack of a central authority in charge of the program. In
practice, however, a business review letter has always provided protection from civil actions by the
Department as well. Id.
59 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(10) (1984). The letter is placed in a file and is made available to the public,
and the supporting information is placed in the fie within 30 days, where it remains for one year.
Thereafter, the information is either returned to the applicant "or otherwise disposed of, at the
discretion of the Antitrust Division." The Department recently released a Digest of Antitrust Divi-
sion's Business Review Letters, 1968 to 1982, 45 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Special
Supp. No. 1124 (July 21, 1983), which contains capsule summaries of all the business review letters
issued between 1968 and 1982.
60 Id.
61 See infra notes 155-258 and accompanying text.
62 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
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partment is content to play a very minor regulatory role,63 and some
officials fear that improving the Program could bring a flood of applica-
tions which would divert the Department's limited enforcement
resources. 64
b. FTC Advisory Opinion Program
Like the Department of Justice, the FTC has long recognized the
utility of a clearance program, and in 1962 it formally adopted its own
non-statutory clearance program. Under the FTC's Advisory Opinion
Program, 66 a business may seek advice67 from the FTC about the anti-
trust legality of a proposed or on-going course of conduct.
Unlike the Business Review Program, the FTC Program provides
three levels of clearance:68  formal Commission advisory opinions, staff
63 Id.
64 Id. Pressures from the business community and the bar to reform the program were relieved
to an extent by the enactment of the certification procedure for export-related activities contained in
the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, discussed infra notes 98-162 and accompanying text. A
certification procedure is also being considered by Congress for research and development joint ven-
tures. See, eg., National Association of Manufacturers' Proposed Legislation, 46 ANTrrrusT &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 208-09 (Feb. 2, 1984). Once again, the Justice Department strongly op-
poses legislation creating a new certification procedure. See Statement of William F. Baxter, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate (July
29, 1983). The Department instead has proposed a bill that would prevent research and develop-
ment joint ventures from being condemned as aperse violation. The bill further provides a registra-
tion procedure whereby any research and development joint venture "fully disclosed" to the FTC
and Justice Department may be liable only for actual damages, not treble damages, plus prejudg-
ment interest. See S. 1841 and HR. 3878, 45 ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 366.
65 FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (1984); 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 9801. Before 1962, the FTC issued informal staff opinion letters. Since the creation of the
FTC in 1914, there has been periodic debate as to whether the FTC has the authority to issue
advisory opinions and, if so, whether it should exercise that power. See Kronstein & Volhard, Bran-
deis Before the FTC in 1915: Should Advisory Opinions Be Given? 24 FED. BJ. 609 (1964). In 1978,
this debate rekindled and led to major changes in procedure. See remarks of Albert A. Foer, "FTC
Antitrust Advisory Opinions," before the A.B.A. National Institute Program on Antitrust Counsel-
ing and the Marketing Process 7-8 (June 13, 1980).
66 Enforcing the antitrust laws is but one of the FTC's duties, and FTC Advisory Opinions are
also issued for other activities falling under the FTC's responsibility. For example, the FTC issues
advisory opinions concerning the prohibition against unfair advertising contained in § 5 of the FTC
Act.
67 According to the FTC, this "advice" differs from a business review letter, since the latter
is addressed solely to the issue of whether the Department intends on the day of the letter to
initiate proceedings if the course of conduct is pursued. In contrast, the Commission advisory
opinion undertakes to discuss in a meaningful way the interpretation of specific legal principles
and their application to the fact situation presented, or points out why the Commission is un-
able to render a decision, eg., insufficient information concerning the probable competition
effect or impact of such course of conduct.
FTC OPERAMTNG MANuAL 4.8.1. In practice, however, some business review letters do provide
detailed legal reasoning. See supra note 58.
68 The FTC's reasons for adopting different types of clearances are similar to the European
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opinion letters signed by the Director of the Bureau of Competition, and
staff opinion letters signed by the staff member who prepares the opinion.
The first and most valuable type of advisory opinion is rendered by the
Commission itself. Requests for a formal Commission advisory opinion
will only be considered if (1) the matter involves a substantial or novel
question of fact or law and there is no clear Commission or court prece-
dent; (2) the matter is of significant public interest; or (3) a proposed
merger or acquisition is involved.6 9 Moreover, the Commission is un-
likely to issue a formal advisory opinion as to ongoing conduct, although
a staff opinion may be given.7 0
In practice, the Commission renders very few formal advisory opin-
ions on antitrust matters. The staff in the Bureau of Competition re-
sponds to the rest of the requests in opinion letters.71 An applicant can
express a preference for a staff opinion letter.72 There are two types of
staff opinion letters, which are the second and third levels of FTC clear-
ance. One type is signed by the Director of the Bureau of Competition
and has more morally binding effect on the Commission than the other
type which is signed only by the staff member who prepared it.7 3
A request for an advisory opinion must be made in writing to the
Secretary of the FTC74 or, if informal contact has already been made
Commission's reasons for creating comfort letters: (1) to expedite answers to the majority of re-
quests by avoiding the long, burdensome procedure necessary for a formal opinion; and (2) to enable
the FTC to reserve its formal opinions to answer novel or important questions. See 44 Fed. Reg.
1753 (1979).
69 16 C.F.R. § 1.1(a) (1984).
70 Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note 1.
71 16 C.F.R. § 1.l(b) (1984). Prior to 1979, the Rules did not provide for staff letters, although
in practice they were given in the vast majority of cases. See 44 Fed. Reg. 1753 (1979). Before 1979,
the Commission only averaged about 16 advisory opinions per year. See 44 Fed. Reg. 21624 (1979).
Many of those concerned the other statutory provisions enforced by the FTC and were not related to
antitrust. Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note 1. After amendments to the Rules in 1979 which
made staff letters an official form of clearance, even fewer formal opinions have been issued each
year. For example, between April, 1979 and June, 1980, the Commission did not issue a single
advisory opinion, and the staff issued only five antitrust advisory letters. See Foer, supra note 65, at
5. Between July 29, 1981 and July 20, 1984, the Commission issued only fourteen formal advisory
opinions. Letter from Carl Hevener to the author, dated July 20, 1984. In contrast, the Department
of Justice issues on average about 20 business review letters per year. See supra note 60 and accom-
panying text.
72 An applicant can also request a formal advisory opinion, but this preference carries little
weight, unlike a preference for a staff opinion, which is usually granted. Interview with Carl
Hevener, supra note 1.
73 Id. Unlike a Commission advisory opinion, neither type of staff letter is formally binding on
the Commission. However, both have a morally binding effect, especially the letter signed by the
Director of the Bureau of Competition because of his authoritative position. Id. The Commission
has never taken action against any activity cleared by either type of staff letter. Id.
74 16 C.F.R. § 1.2(a) (1984).
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with the Bureau of Competition, the written request may be sent directly
there.75 As with the Business Review Program, there is no standard ap-
plication or set of guidelines specifying the precise information which
should be submitted,76 and this lack of guidance often leads to the same
result:77 most requests do not contain enough of the necessary informa-
tion, and the FrC must request supplemental information.7 Although
the Rules do not provide for it, pre-filing counseling is available and
encouraged.7 9
As with the Business Review Program,"0 there are few formal guide-
lines for processing and investigating a request for an FTC antitrust advi-
sory opinion.8' There also is no central office in the FTC's Bureau of
Competition which processes and investigates all applications. 82 A re-
quest raising an antitrust issue is handled first by the Correspondence
Section, which in turn assigns the request to a staff attorney in the Bu-
reau of Competition's Office of Evaluation, who decides whether the re-
75 Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note 1.
76 16 C.F.R. § 1.2(a) (1984) merely provides that the request should "(1) state clearly the ques-
tion(s) that the applicant wishes resolved; (2) cite the provision of law under which the question
arises; and (3) state all the facts which the applicant believes to be material. In addition, the identity
of the companies and other persons involved should be disclosed."
77 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
78 Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note 1.
79 Id. In contrast to the Department of Justice, see supra note 41, the FTC does not restrict its
advice to specifying the types of information necessary or to explaining how the procedure works.
The Bureau's Office of Evaluation is willing to discuss the merits of the proposal as well. These
conferences also enable an applicant to clarify written material, to convey its good faith to the Com-
mission, to determine in advance the information which will be required and the probable course of
the proceeding, and to get its points across in a manner often impossible in written materials. VON
KAiNowsmi, supra note 7, at 126. These informal contacts often result in a formal application not
being filed, such as when the potential applicant discovers it has no real reason for its antitrust
concern; where the conduct is objectionable and the potential applicant is not willing to modify it; or
where the information requirements are considered too burdensome. Interview with Carl Hevener,
supra note 1.
80 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
81 The FTC OPERATING MANUAL's chapter on Industry Guidance provided some guidance
about procedure, but the MANUAL has not been updated since the 1979 amendments which shifted
the administration of the Program from the General Counsel's office to the various enforcement
bureaus, such as the Bureau of Competition. The procedures described in the MANUAL are, there-
fore, obsolete to a large extent.
82 Before 1979, the Office of the General Counsel of the FTC was in charge of the Program. It
would contact the Bureau of Competition for its advice when an application presented an antitrust
issue. If the General Counsel and the Bureau Director disagreed as to the advice which should be
given, the Commission would decide the matter. See FTC OPERATING MANUAL 8.4.9.1-2, 8.4.10.1.
In order to streamline the procedure, the Program was taken out of the Office of the General Coun-
sel and given solely to antitrust experts in the Bureau of Competition. No special section or group of
staff members in the Bureau are in charge of all applications. Interview with Carl Hevener, supra
note 1.
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quest is appropriate for further consideration. 3 Often the staff attorney
will answer the request himself, particularly if the question presented is
easily answered.14 In fact, very few requests ever receive a formal Com-
mission advisory opinion or staff opinion letter. Most requests are so
informal that they do not even meet the simple requirements for a re-
quest to be considered. Unless a faulty request clearly merits further
consideration, the staff attorney will inform the applicant that the Com-
mission cannot respond to the deficient request. However, the staff attor-
ney will, on a purely informal basis, add helpful information or analysis,
if possible. 5
If a request is not answered at this stage, it is assigned to the appro-
priate Assistant Director of the Bureau. The Assistant Director first de-
termines whether the request should be answered by a Commission or
staff advisory opinion. 6 If a staff letter is in order, the Assistant Director
then decides which type of staff letter will be issued. Whichever type of
response is chosen, the request is then assigned to one or more staff attor-
neys to conduct the investigation and draft the opinion. The depth of the
investigation and the amount of review the draft opinion receives are
much greater if the Commission itself will consider the request, and an
extensive supporting memorandum must be submitted with the draft to
the Commission. If either type of staff opinion letter is to be issued, the
investigation is likely to be less intensive, and the opinion letter receives
little internal review unless it will be signed by the Bureau Director. In
no case does the FTC formally elicit third party comments, although the
staff often informally contacts competitors and customers of the appli-
cant for information.87 The Bureau is under no time constraints to re-
spond to applications.
The Program's lack of formal guidance and centralization results to
83 Hypothetical questions will not be answered, and ordinarily no advice will be given when
"(1) the same or substantially the same course of action is under investigation or is or has been the
subject of a current proceeding involving the Commission or another governmental agency, or (2) an
informed opinion cannot be made or could be made only after extensive investigation, clinical study,
testing, or collateral inquiry." 16 C.F.R. § 1.1(b) (1984). Few requests are rejected in practice. In-
terview with Carl Hevener, supra note I.
84 If the staff attorney answers the request himself, an answer can be given in as little as one
month from the receipt of the request (including a delay of approximately two weeks before the
Correspondence Office assigns the request to the Office of Evaluation). Id.
85 Id; letter from Carl Hevener, supra note 71.
86 The liaison procedure with the Department of Justice, see supra note 44, will only be used if
the request is considered for a formal Commission advisory opinion. Foer, supra note 65, at 8.
Despite the fact that the FTC does not clear its handling of the request with the Department of
Justice, the Department of Justice has never challenged activity authorized by an FTC staff letter.
Id.
87 Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note 1.
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some extent in a lack of uniformity and hence inefficiency and unpredict-
ability. Much depends on the particular staff member to whom the appli-
cation is assigned. The staff members have very little formal guidance
about conducting the investigation, and hence to a large extent they are
free to investigate the request as they wish.88 As is the case with the
Business Review Program,89 the zealousness of the staff members, the
extent to which they bring an "enforcer" attitude to the investigation,
and their understanding of the Program's purpose will determine the ex-
tensiveness and tone of the investigation. Moreover, the staff members
often have little experience in handling advisory opinion requests. Few
applications are received each year, and those few applications are par-
celled out to the various sections of the Bureau of Competition. There-
fore, with the exception of the senior staff attorney in the Office of
Evaluation, staff members have little opportunity to gain experience with
the Program.
The content of all three types of advisory opinions is prescribed to a
much greater degree than the content of business review letters.90 Unlike
some business review letters, a formal Commission advisory opinion al-
ways contains extensive legal analysis and an application of that analysis
to the facts.91 In addition, a Commission opinion
may state which features of the conduct are likely to result in a violation of
law, and it may recommend specific changes which, if adopted, will elimi-
nate the likelihood of a law violation. The opinion may state, or clearly
imply, whether the Commission will or will not undertake enforcement ac-
tion if the course of conduct is pursued in the manner outlined in the advi-
sory opinion. Instead of drawing a legal conclusion, the opinion may
provide a statement or explanation about why the Commission does not
intend to bring any legal action as a matter of enforcement policy, Le., the
practice described may involve a technical law violation but the Commis-
sion does not feel that enforcement action would be warranted in the inter-
est of the public. 9
2
Similarly, both types of staff opinions usually recite every material fact
upon which the advice is based, discuss critical issues of legal interpreta-
tion and application, and indicate whether the staff would recommend an
enforcement action to the Commission if the activity is pursued.93 The
critical difference between the Commission and the two types of staff ad-
visory opinions is that the latter specifically warn the recipient that they
88 Id.
89 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
92 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, at 8.4.8.1.
93 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, at 8.4.8.2.
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are legally non-binding on the Commission or the staff.94 Formal Com-
mission opinions, in contrast, promise that notice of revocation will be
given and no action will be taken with respect to activities undertaken in
good faith reliance on the advisory opinion. 9 5
Neither the Commission nor staff advisory opinions are subject to an
expiration date or reporting requirements, and there is no formal proce-
dure for amending them. The opinion, the application, and any support-
ing materials are placed on the public record immediately after the
opinion is issued.96
At present, there are no plans to change the Advisory Opinion Pro-
gram. The Commission believes that the several types of clearance can
accommodate the needs of all applicants seeking increased certainty from
the FTC.9 7
c. The Department of Commerce Export Certification Program
In response to claims that the uncertain application of United States
antitrust law to export activities has significantly deterred those activities
and that the FTC and Justice Department clearance procedures and the
Webb-Pomerene Act have not relieved that uncertainty,98 Congress en-
acted a new clearance procedure especially for export-related activities.
Title III of the Export Trading Company Act of 198299 (ETCA) estab-
lished a certification program whereby a business can obtain an antitrust
law exemption for proposed or on-going export-related activities if the
conduct meets certain criteria. 1°°
A written application for certification must be filed with the Depart-
ment of Commerce's newly created Office of Export Trading Company
Affairs. 10 1 In contrast to the other clearance procedures previously dis-
cussed, there is a standard application form and detailed regulations
specifying the exact information which should be submitted.10 2 There is
also a formal provision for pre-filing counseling,10 3 and the Commerce
94 Id. at 8.4.4; 16 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1984).
95 Id. at 8.4.3; 16 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1984).
96 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, at 8.4.11.1; 16 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1984).
97 Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note 1.
98 See, e-g., Zarin, The Export Trading Company Act: Reducing Antitrust Uncertainty in Export
Trade, 17 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 297, 300, 316-17 (1983). The legislation does not
amend or abolish the Webb-Pomerene Act, nor does it prevent exporters from using the FTC or
Justice Department clearance programs.
99 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982).
100 15 U.S.C. § 4016 (1982); 15 C.F.R. § 325.4(b) (1984).
101 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(a) (1984).
102 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(b) (1984).
103 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(c) (1984).
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and Justice Departments have been publicizing this option. 04 Many ap-
plicants have taken advantage of the opportunity, I05 and a majority of
those businesses decided not to apply, because, among other reasons,
they discovered that their proposed conduct raised no significant anti-
trust problem or they were unwilling to supply the required
information.10
6
Although the Commerce Department is in charge of administering
the program, the Justice Department also plays a major role. The ETCA
provides that the Attorney General must concur with the Commerce De-
partment's draft certificate before the certificate is issued, 10 7 and the reg-
ulations specify the procedure for obtaining this concurrence. 08 In
practice, this procedure is unnecessary because the two Departments cur-
rently work closely together during the investigation of the application
and the drafting of the certificate. 10 9
Applications are handled in a much more uniform and efficient
manner than under the Business Review or Advisory Opinion Programs.
Upon receipt of an application, the Commerce Department has five days
to determine whether the application contains the required information
and is in proper form. 110 Incomplete applications are returned for more
information or clarification. 11 Once complete, however, every applica-
104 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, staff attorneys, Office of Export Trading
Company Affairs, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, in Washington,
D.C. (Jan. 23, 1984). See also address by Irvin P. Margulies, Acting General Counsel, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, "The Department of Commerce View of the Export Trading Company Act,"
before the World Trade Institute Seminar on Advanced International Antitrust 15-16 (Dec. 5-6,
1983); remarks by Craig W. Conrath, Assistant Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice, "A Few Early Observations on the Export Trading Company Act
of 1982," before the International Committee and the Antitrust Committee of the Business Law
Section of the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis 6-7 (Oct. 13, 1983). Many applicants have
utilized this opportunity. Counseling can be done over the phone, but officials at Commerce believe
a meeting in person is more helpful for applicants. Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray,
supra. They suggest that the applicant and its attorney first prepare a draft application and bring it
with them to the meeting. Id. A financial analyst, a senior antitrust economist and an attorney from
the office of the Assistant General Counsel for Export Trading Companies attend the meeting. The
applicant is instructed as to how to prepare a complete, well-framed application, and the merits of
the application are also discussed. Id.
105 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
106 Id.
107 15 U.S.C. § 4013(b) (1982). The Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division ad-
ministers the Program for the Justice Department.
108 15 C.F.R. § 325.4(c) (1984).
109 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104. Therefore, although the
Justice Department did not want to play a major role in this "regulatory" program, it appears to be
doing just that. See supra note 38.
110 C.F.R. § 325.3(d) (1984).
111 As of January 1984, about half of the applicants had been returned.
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tion must be processed. The Commerce Department has no discretion in
accepting and rejecting requests for certification.' 12
Once the application is "deemed submitted," the Commerce De-
partment must comply with a series of deadlines, the most important of
which are: (1) within 7 days, a copy of the application and all supporting
materials must be given to the Justice Department;' 13 (2) within 10 days,
notice of the application must be published in the Federal Register, invit-
ing third party comment to be submitted within 20 days to Commerce;114
and (3) within 90 days, a final decision must be rendered.115 With the
concurrence of the applicant, this deadline for a final decision may be
extended by as many as 30 days. 116 Applicants may also request expe-
dited handling of their requests and, if granted, an answer must be given
within 45 days.117 In addition, the clock will be suspended if the appli-
cant consents to supplying additional information requested by either
Department. 118
At the Commerce Department, a small group of staff attorneys is
responsible for handling applications. These attorneys are gradually de-
veloping expertise in processing applications." 9 They do not have anti-
trust enforcement responsibilities. They are guided in their efforts by
detailed regulations specifying how applications are to be processed,
what information is necessary, and how certificates are to be drafted.
The result of this centralization and guidance is that applications are
processed, investigated, and drafted according to a procedure which is
becoming increasingly streamlined and uniform, and businesses can bet-
ter anticipate what will be required of them during the process before
they apply.
A major impediment to the efficiency and predictability of the pro-
cedure, however, is the fact that the Justice Department is also heavily
involved in the process. Multi-agency review is inherently less efficient
than when a single agency administers a program, and that inefficiency is
112 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
113 15 C.F.R. § 325.4(c) (1984).
114 15 C.F.R. § 325.5 (1984). As of January 1984, no comments had been received. Interview
with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
115 15 C.F.R. § 325.4(a) (1984).
116 Id.
117 15 C.F.R. § 325.7 (1984).
118 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(0 (1984).
119 As of January 1984, three staff attorneys in the Office of Export Trading Company Affairs
currently work on the applications. Each is assisted by a staff economist and a staff financial analyst.
Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
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exacerbated when the agencies involved have diverse goals.'20 The Com-
merce Department's primary objective is to promote United States ex-
ports,'2 1 while the Justice Department is charged with the promotion of
competition.' 22 Thus far, there has been a considerable amount of dupli-
cation of effort by the two Departments. 2 3 Since the Justice Department
is not comfortable relying on the conclusions of the Commerce Depart-
ment,' 24 each department conducts its own independent antitrust investi-
gation and analysis for each application. Applicants are burdened
unnecessarily by this duplication.125
Furthermore, many people, including Commerce Department offi-
cials, have complained that the Justice Department has been too rigid
and demanding in its investigation and in what it will agree to certify. 12 6
The Commerce Department has negotiated with the Justice Department
to protect businesses from these allegedly unreasonable demands, and, as
a result, there have been major disagreements between the Departments
over several issues. First, the Justice Department generally has argued
that in order to protect competition, the scope of certificates should be as
narrow as possible, covering only that conduct which is specifically pro-
posed by the applicant.'27 The Commerce Department, on the other
hand, generally believes that certificates should be more broadly worded
to allow the applicant some leeway to engage in activities which are not
specifically proposed in the original applications so that the applicant
120 Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1, 26
(1982).
121 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982).
122 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). As one author warned before the passage of the E.T.C.A., "[h]istory
has shown that trade promotion agencies are generally insensitive to the fundamental goals of anti-
trust, and also that the tension between bodies charged with enforcement and those charged with
promotion can result in extraordinary regulatory complexity and delay." Garvey, supra note 120, at
26.
123 See Margulies, supra note 104, at 20.
124 Id.; interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; interviews with Depart-
ment of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
125 Margulies, supra note 104, at 20.
126 Id.
The process involved in obtaining the concurrence of the Department of Justice in our proposed
certificates of review is presently more serious than we had expected... the time and energy
invested by the Department of Justice in its review of some early certificates of review which we
have proposed is totally inappropriate to the size of the applicants involved and the conduct
they propose to have covered by the certificates.
Id. Sylvester, Is There a New Tool in Antitrust? National Law Journal, Dec. 19, 1983, at 8, col. 2-3.
127 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; interviews with Department
of Justice lawyers, supra note 38. See Conrath, supra note 104, at 7-9. Mr. Conrath argues that
specificity is in the best interests of (1) the applicant because a too general certificate may be held not
to cover particular activities, and (2) the correct application of the antitrust laws, since conduct not
intended to be covered might be held by a court to be immunized. Id. at 9.
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will not be forced to return for re-certification every time its business
plans change.128 In addition, the Commerce Department is generally
more willing to certify conduct Which poses potential, not actual, anti-
trust problems on the theory that mandatory periodic information re-
porting by the applicant 12 9 and the Department's power to revoke or
amend certificates 130 provide adequate assurances that any certification
mistakes can be rectified relatively quickly.13 1
In practice, the Departments have compromised. 132  The Depart-
ment of Justice has agreed to allow relatively broad certificates to be is-
sued which do allow conduct raising potential antitrust concerns,
provided that certain modifications are made, and that the certificates
require strict information reports and impose other terms and conditions
which will minimize the possibility that anticompetitive activity will be
immunized. 133  As of January 1984, no application had been denied,
although most proposals were substantially modified before a certificate
was granted.
134
A second major point of disagreement between the Departments
concerns the amount and types of supplemental information applicants
must submit.135  The Department of Justice wants to make more de-
manding supplemental information requests than the Commerce Depart-
ment, 136 but even the Commerce Department's more moderate requests
have been criticized by applicants and by the Commerce Department it-
128 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
129 See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
130 See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
131 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
132 Thus far, compromises have been reached by the staff members of the respective departments
without having to refer disputes to higher officials. Id.; interviews with Department of Justice law-
yers, supra note 38.
133 Id. A good example of such a compromise is the export certificate issued in U.S. Farm-Raised
Fish Trading Company, Ina, No. 83-00004, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,035 (1983) (Summary of Application)
[hereinafter cited as Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co.]. At first, the Department of Justice balked at
allowing the applicants, major domestic competitors in the catfish industry, to cooperate in export
trade, because it feared that the collusion might "spill-over" into the domestic market. Strict terms
and conditions designed to prevent domestic "spill-overs," as well as detailed annual reporting re-
quirements and the reservation by the Departments of the right to request information at any time,
induced the Department of Justice to assent to a certificate which, much to the applicant's pleasant
surprise, was broader than the one it had originally requested. See interview with Arthur Aronoff
and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38;
interview with R. Anthony Rodgers, partner, Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Jan. 26, 1984). The applicants, however, were not as pleased with the requirement to
update information. Id. See also Sylvester, supra note 126, at 8, col. 2 (statement of Dennis
Unkovic).
134 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
135 Interviews in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984).
136 Id. Department officials justify their requests by pointing out that certificates are legally bind-
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self as often unduly burdensome and beyond the information specified by
the regulations.137 The regulations theoretically protect applicants from
burdensome and irrelevant information requests by providing that appli-
cants need not provide such information.1 38  However, the Departments
may disagree with the applicant's position and deny the certificate. Con-
vincing the Departments that their requests have been overly burden-
some and irrelevant has been a difficult and only partially successful
effort by applicants. 139
These disagreements between the Departments are more common
and difficult to resolve when the Foreign Commerce Section of the Anti-
trust Division delegates applications to other sections having expertise in
the subject matter of the application."4 As is the case with the Business
Review Program,14 x the staff members in the other sections assigned to
the application often have little familiarity with the procedure for investi-
gating applications and drafting certificates. 42 Furthermore, these staff
members often do not keep in mind that the goal of the Program is to
facilitate exports, and hence they may be more demanding in their infor-
mation requests and more reluctant to grant broad certificates than are
the staff members in the Foreign Commerce Section.' 43
ing, and therefore the Department must be very cautious, even more so than under the Business
Review Program. Interviews with Department of Justice awyers, supra note 38.
137 Sylvester, supra note 126, at 8, col. 2-3; Margulies, supra note 104, at 21 ("At times, we appear
to be searching for documentary evidence of anticompetitive intent. . . [and] some applicants have
received extremely burdensome supplementary information requests that are inappropriate to their
size and the conduct they propose to certify."). Applicants are usually not aware that the Justice
Department wants more information than the Commerce Department until after they apply, because
the Justice Department does not send a representative to the pre-filing counseling session. Inter-
views with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
138 15 C.F.R. § 325.3(b) (1984).
139 Sylvester, supra note 126, at 8, col. 3; interviews in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 1984). If an
applicant finds the information demands or required modifications unacceptable, or if it appears the
application will be denied or if, for any other reason, it wishes to terminate its application, it may do
so and receive back all information it submitted. 15 C.F.R. §§ 325.3(e), .11(a) (1984).
140 The Foreign Commerce Section is forced to delegate these applications due to its scarce man-
power resources. Until recently, about half of the applications were delegated to other sections. 46
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 204. There are only 11 attorneys in the Section, and the
staff has many enforcement responsibilities to fulfill in addition to examining export certificate appli-
cations. The Section does exercise loose supervision over the delegated certificates. Interviews with
Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38. To alleviate this problem, the Foreign Commerce
Section recently hired an attorney with previous experience at Commerce to supervise ETC work. It
is hoped that the Section will delegate fewer applications to other sections and that the Section will
be able to exercise greater supervision of those applications which are delegated. Letter from Spen-
cer Waller to the author, dated Nov. 5, 1984.
141 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
142 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; interviews with Department
of Justice lawyers, supra note 38; 46 ATrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 204.
143 Id.
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Fortunately for applicants, the two Departments are beginning to
coordinate and streamline their efforts. They now make supplemental
information requests in a joint letter, and officials in both Departments
state that their requests are becoming much less burdensome as they ac-
quire experience with the Program."4 Officials from both Departments
also attend post-application meetings with applicants.1 4 1 In addition, the
Departments are developing standard language ("boilerplate") for the
certificates thereby reducing inter-Departmental disputes over the scope
and content of every certificate.' 46
Once the staff members of the two Departments agree on the lan-
guage of the certificate, the draft and a supporting memorandum usually
are reviewed by two or three higher level officials in each Department
before the final certificate is issued. 47 A summary of the certificate or an
announcement that the certificate application has been denied must be
published in the Federal Register.'48 If a certificate is granted, it must
specify the export trade, export trade activities, methods of operation,
and all persons protected from antitrust liability and the extent of that
protection. 49 The certificate contains no legal analysis and none is re-
quired. 150 It does not set an expiration date.' However, detailed annual
reports are required and the applicant must report promptly any relevant
changes in its export activities or any material fact upon which the certif-
icate was issued.152
Both Departments reserve the right to request information if they
suspect that the certified conduct no longer meets the ETCA's stan-
144 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; interviews with Department
of Justice lawyers, supra note 38; Margulies, supra note 104, at 21.
145 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
146 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; interviews with Department
of Justice lawyers, supra note 38; Margulies, supra note 104, at 20; Sylvester, supra note 126, at 7,
col. 4, and 8, col. 3.
147 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; interviews with Department
of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
148 15 C.F.R. § 325.5(c) (1984).
149 15 C.F.R. § 325.4(d) (1984).
150 See, e.g., Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co., supra note 133.
151 Id. The Justice Department would prefer to impose an expiration date on certificates. See
Remarks of Craig W. Conrath, Assistant Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division,
"Early Experience under the Export Trading Company Act of 1982," before the Pennsylvania Bar
Institute Seminar on the Export Trading Company Act 11-12 (Nov. 2, 1983); interview with Craig
W. Conrath in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 25, 1984). The Department is uneasy about granting open-
ended certificates but, in a compromise with the Commerce Department, it will settle for extensive
annual reporting and the power to request information at any time. Id.; interview with Arthur
Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
152 15 C.F.R. § 325.13 (1984); E.T.C.A. § 304(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(1)(A) (1982).
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dards. 153 Certificates also state that conduct not specified in the certifi-
cate is not necessarily illegal but instead is subject to the normal
application of the antitrust laws. 154 Finally, the certificate sets forth a
disclaimer that the United States government is endorsing neither the
commercial viability and quality of the conduct or products, nor the le-
gality of the conduct under United States laws other than the antitrust
laws or under the laws of foreign countries.155
Third parties have thirty days to bring an action in federal court to
set aside the certificate as "erroneous". 156 Thereafter, private parties are
barred from bringing an antitrust suit except under certain limited cir-
cumstances.1 57 Indeed, Government agencies are barred absolutely from
bringing antitrust suits until the certificate is revoked or modified with
adequate notice. 158 Certificate holders can also apply for amendments to
their certificates, and if granted the modified exemption dates from the
date upon which the amendment was requested.159
If the Commerce Department plans to deny an application in whole
or part, or if it wants to modify or revoke a certificate, it must notify the
applicant or certificate holder of its intention and give detailed reasons
for its action. 60 The applicant or certificate holder is then entitled to
present its arguments against the adverse action.161 If the Commerce De-
partment denies, revokes or modifies a certificate, the applicant or certifi-
cate holder may appeal the action to a federal court, claiming that the
Department's determination is "erroneous" under the ETCA's
standards. 162
2. Alleged Drawbacks of Existing Clearance Programs
Neither the Business Review nor the Advisory Opinion Program is
considered much of a success.163 The two programs are infrequently em-
ployed164 and many private attorneys allegedly only apply for a clearance
153 15 C.F.R. § 325.9(b) (1984).
154 See, eg., Farm-Raised Fish Trading Co., supra note 133.
155 Id.
156 15 C.F.R. § 325.10(a) (1984).
157 See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
158 See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
159 15 C.F.R. § 325.6 (1984).
160 15 C.F.R. §§ 325.8, .9 (1984).
161 15 C.F.1L § 325.9 (1984).
162 15 C.F.R. § 325.10(a) (1984).
163 Foer, supra note 65, at 3; interviews with private antitrust lawyers in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
23-26, 1984).
164 See supra notes 60 and 71 and accompanying text.
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when unusual circumstances force them to do so.
165
Despite the fact that the Export Certification Program adopted
many features intended to make it more attractive to businesses in need
of increased certainty, many lawyers believe it will suffer the same lack of
success. 166 Early experience under the Program indicates that this pessi-
mism may be well-founded. For example, despite the enormous publicity
given to the Program, the number of applicants averaged only about five
per month during the first year, and most of those applications did not
raise serious antitrust problems but instead appeared motivated by the
desire for publicity or the overseas marketing advantage of having the
U.S. government's "seal of approval."16 7 In other words, antitrust un-
certainty often has not been the main reason for applications.
Numerous explanations have been advanced for the private bar's re-
luctance to utilize government clearance programs, including the
following:
a. Government conservatism
Many private antitrust lawyers believe that antitrust officials will
only clear conduct which is almost certainly legal. In cases which raise
antitrust uncertainties, and especially in so-called "close cases," antitrust
officials allegedly are reluctant to grant clearances. In other words, it is
claimed that although businesses confronted with antitrust uncertainty
can obtain greater certainty by applying to the government for clearance,
the answer they receive to their application is almost always negative or
165 See, e.g., Warnke, Risk Reduction: the Value of Clearance, 44 ANTrrRUST L.J. 387 (1975)
("[w]hen it comes to the question of antitrust clearance, don't do it unless you have to and usually
not even then."). Some private attorneys believe clearances should only be requested when:
(1) clearance is indispensable, such as when your client, another party, an outstanding
court order, or lender demands it;
(2) government disapproval is useful, such as when a deal is probably illegal, but your
client or the other party is not convinced;
(3) the deal is very large, and even a small amount of uncertainty is unacceptable, or
(4) the deal probably will be investigated by the government anyway, and a request for
clearance will enable your client to plead its case before the government forms a negative
opinion.
Interviews with private antitrust lawyers in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984). See also Warnke,
supra, note 165 at 390.
166 See, e.g., Bruce & Pierce, Understanding the Export Trading Company Act and Using (or
Avoiding) its Antitrust Exemptions, 38 Bus. LAW. 975, 1015 (1983). Many private attorneys and
some Department of Justice officials are skeptical about the future of the Certification Program, and
they believe it would be a mistake to extend it to domestic activities because of all the problems
facing applicants under the Business Review and Advisory Opinion Programs. Interviews with pri-
vate antitrust lawyers, supra note 165; interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
167 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; Sylvester, supra note 126, at
8, col. 1-2; 46 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 205.
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highly qualified and useless.16
Assessing the validity of this charge is a difficult task. The author
was unable to elicit a concrete example of such conservatism during in-
terviews with private antitrust lawyers. The antitrust agencies publicly
deny being unduly conservative, 6 9 and they point to statistics which
show that most requests are cleared. 170 Private lawyers contend these
statistics prove nothing, since the high percentage of clearances may
merely reflect the fact that the majority of requests are not close cases. 17 1
Antitrust officials also claim that a certain amount of "caution" is justi-
fied, but that such caution is not the same as being "unduly conserva-
tive."' 172 It is difficult, however, to determine at what point "justifiable
caution" becomes "undue conservatism."
The truth probably lies somewhere between these conflicting claims.
On the one hand, since the task of handling clearance requests is par-
celled out to so many different antitrust officials, 173 the clearance decision
often depends on the conservatism of the particular official assigned to
the case. Therefore, it is probably unfair to generalize that the agency as
a whole is unduly conservative. On the other hand, negative answers
undoubtedly are justified in some cases, but a negative answer may seem
"conservative" to the individual applicant who usually believes its re-
quest deserves a clearance. Whether justified or not, negative answers
are likely to receive more attention by the antitrust bar than positive an-
swers given in close cases since bad news usually attracts more attention
than good news. 174
Therefore, many businesses are afraid to apply for a clearance be-
168 See, eg., Warnke, supra note 165, at 390-91 (Antitrust officials "are not paid to be permis-
sive."); KANWrr FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 25-3 (Nov. 1979) ("Since the FTC is likely to be
conservative in its advice if the practice involved is truly controversial, requests often deal with
practices which are not truly ambiguous."); J. ATwOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at 186
("the temptation will always be to say no or to be very qualified in the response"); Bruce & Pierce,
supra note 166, at 1016 ("Questionable conduct will not be certified. No one who really needs a
certificate is likely to get it."); GRIFFIN, THE EXPORT TRADING COMPANY AcT OF 1982 23 (1982)
("It is clear from past practice under the [other clearance programs] that you never get cleared for
conduct that's dicey or in a gray area.").
169 See, eg., Baker, supra note 5 at 350; address by Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Antitrust Division, to the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 24, 1973).
170 Id. See also Digest of Antitrust Division's Business Review Letters, supra note 59, which indi-
cates, for example, that in 1982, 19 out of 22 business review letter requests were granted. Two were
denied, and in two cases the Department declined to state its enforcement intentions.
171 See, eg., Warnke, supra note 165, at 390.
172 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
173 See supra notes 45, 82, and 140 and accompanying text. This is not true for the Export
Certification Program when the Foreign Commerce Section does not delegate applications to other
sections. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
174 Negative responses to applications are announced in a press release under the Business Re-
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cause they cannot be assured of a non-conservative answer. Because an-
titrust officials are unduly conservative in at least some cases, applying
for a clearance appears to potential applicants to be something of a gam-
ble. Moreover, implementing a course of conduct after a clearance has
been denied likely would result in a government antitrust suit. 175
There are several possible causes of government conservatism under
the Business Review and Advisory Opinion Programs. One likely cause
is that clearance requests are handled by staff lawyers who are not accus-
tomed to telling businesses that their conduct raises no antitrust
problems. These lawyers normally only prosecute businesses for anti-
trust violations, and they often have an "enforcement" mentality. It is
often asking too much for them to suspend their "enforcement" outlook
temporarily while they handle a clearance request. 176 The Export Certifi-
cation Program partially remedies this problem by entrusting the han-
dling of a request to a group of lawyers at the Department of Commerce
who are not antitrust enforcers. 177 However, the Department of Justice
lawyers involved in the process are primarily antitrust law enforcers, 171 a
fact of which the bar is well aware. 179
A second possible cause of conservatism under the FTC and Justice
Department programs is that negative answers are not expected by, those
agencies to undergo judicial review.'1 0 In practice the government's an-
swer is second-guessed only when an applicant is given a clearance, since
in the vast majority of cases only cleared requests have been implemented
and open to challenge by third parties. An applicant has no cause of
action against the government for a negative response. Therefore, an an-
titrust official may feel it is safer to deny the clearance.181 The Export
Certification Program resolves this problem by making both negative and
positive answers judicially reviewable. 182 Hence, a negative answer must
be just as well-supported as a positive one.'83
view and Advisory Opinion Programs, and in the Federal Register under the Export Certification
Program.
175 Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note 1; interviews with Department of Justice lawyers,
supra note 38.
176 Interviews with government and private antitrust lawyers in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26,
1984).
177 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 140.
179 There has been much publicity alleging that the Department of Justice is being unduly con-
servative in this program. See eg., Sylvester, supra note 126 at 8, col. 2-3.
180 In theory, negative determinations also would be reviewable if a disappointed applicant would
implement the proposal despite the government's disapproval.
181 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984).
182 See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
183 See Margulies, supra note 104, at 9.
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A third alleged cause of conservatism is that the lack of a legislative
mandate for the Business Review and Advisory Opinion might make
some antitrust officials "squeamish" about clearing close cases.184 The
Export Certification Program not only provides this mandate, but it also
creates a presumption of legality should the certificate be challenged in
court. 
185
A fourth possible source of conservatism is the antitrust official's
"natural worry that time will not permit adequate investigation, and that
imagination is not reliable enough to permit the self-assurance necessary
to give a firm commitment for the kind of transaction to which assurance
is important." '186 Afraid that he might be clearing conduct which is or
might become anticompetitive, the antitrust official may choose to err on
the side of caution and deny the request. The fact that business review
letters and advisory opinions have no legally binding effect on the anti-
trust agencies or private parties,18 7 however, should do much to relieve
this fear, because any mistake can be easily corrected. Applicants can
also allay the agency's fear by making a full, detailed disclosure of the
relevant information. 8 Although the Export Certification Program
does have a legally binding effect on the agencies, private parties, and the
courts,18 9 the Program helps relieve the tendency of the antitrust official
to be conservative both by giving the agency the right to revoke or mod-
ify the certificate if the conduct turns out to be anticompetitive' 90 and by
imposing stringent reporting requirements on certificate holders.191 Still,
Justice Department officials say they are more "cautious" under this Pro-
gram than under the Business Review Program because of the export
certificate's significant legally binding effect." 2
b. Lack of binding effect
Antitrust lawyers often complain that even when a clearance is
granted under the Business Review or Advisory Opinion Program, it
lacks the binding effect which would make it worth the effort. 193 A busi-
184 See Kobak, supra note 8, at 67.
185 E.T.C.A. § 306(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(3) (1982).
186 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at 185; Handler, supra note 10, at 381; Kron-
stein & Volhard, supra note 65, at 611-12; Warnke, supra note 165 at 387.
187 See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
188 See VON KALINOWSIU, supra note 7, at 126.
189 See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
192 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
193 See, e.g., Reinsch, supra note 13, at 106-07; Schwechter & Shepard, supra note 12, at 526-27;
interviews with private antitrust lawyers in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984).
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ness review letter only states the Justice Department's present enforce-
ment intention, and the Department "remains completely free to bring
whatever action or proceeding it subsequently comes to believe is re-
quired by the public interest." 19 4 An FTC staff opinion is likewise not
legally binding on the Commission or the staff and can be revoked with-
out notice, and even a formal Commission opinion can be revoked or
modified at any time after reasonable notice is given to the parties. 95 In
addition, none of these clearances legally binds the other antitrust agen-
cies, private parties or the courts. 196 Finally, neither a business review
letter nor an advisory opinion provides protection if full disclosure of all
the facts has not been made by the applicant or if the facts upon which
the clearance was granted materially change. 97 Of course, conduct
outside the scope of the clearance is not protected' 9
Although business review letters and advisory opinions have no le-
gally binding effect, in practice these clearances all have a substantial
morally binding effect on the issuing agency. Both agencies have rarely
taken action against cleared conduct.' 99 Officials of both the FrC and
the Justice Department also insist that no business would be prosecuted
for past actions taken in good faith reliance on a clearance." ° In addi-
tion, neither agency has ever prosecuted conduct cleared by the other, °"
and clearances by both agencies likely have a powerful deterrent effect on
private plaintiffs.2"2 If cleared conduct were ever challenged in court by
either the issuing agency, another agency, or a private party, it is very
likely that good faith reliance on the clearance would influence the court
and at least mitigate sanctions.2 03
194 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(9) (1984).
195 16 C.F.R. § 1.3(b), (c) (1984).
196 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38; interview with Carl Hevener,
supra note 1; Schwechter & Shepard, supra note 12, at 526. See also 43 Fed. Reg. 33,340, 33,505
(1978) (the FTC "has never felt itself legally bound by Business Review Letters issued by the Anti-
trust Division," and the FTC recognizes that the "Antitrust Division has not believed that its ability
to challenge an acquisition was restricted by a Commission Advisory Opinion").
197 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38; interview with Carl Hevener,
supra note 1.
198 Id.
199 Id. The FTC has never brought suit against activities cleared by a staff advisory opinion, but
it has rescinded formal advisory opinions on a few occasions. However, it only did so after giving
the businesses affected ample notice and an opportunity to cease the objectionable activity. Inter-
view with Carl Hevener, supra note 1. See also Foer, supra note 65, at 6.
200 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38; interview with Carl Hevener,
supra note 1.
201 Id.
202 J. ATwoOD & K. BREWsTER, supra note 44, at 185; Foer, supra note 65, at 6.
203 J. ATwoOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at 185; interviews with Department of Justice
lawyers, supra note 38. In one of the rare cases involving a challenge to conduct cleared by a busi-
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Therefore, business review letters and advisory opinions provide re-
cipients with a significant degree of protection. The business and legal
communities' concern is largely unfounded. Absolute certainty and un-
limited protection regardless of the circumstances are unrealistic de-
mands.2 "4 Still, since many businesses consider private actions to be the
most serious antitrust risk,20 5 the lack of any legally binding protection
against those suits diminishes the value of antitrust clearances in the eyes
of the business community.
2 0 6
One probable explanation for the business community's mispercep-
tion that business review letters and advisory opinions provide little pro-
tection from antitrust liability is the agencies' repeated emphasis in their
regulations, business review letters, advisory opinions, and public state-
ments that the clearances are not legally binding.2"7 Moreover, the agen-
cies have failed, except in the case of formal Commission advisory
opinions, to assure the business community that reasonable notice of rev-
ocation will be given and that good faith reliance on an opinion will pre-
vent any government suits. Unfortunately, both agencies "have fallen
victim to the bureaucratic tendency of being institutionally reluctant to
make an absolute commitment about anything.1208
In contrast to the Business Review and Advisory Opinion Pro-
grams, the Export Certification Program does provide the assurance of a
ness review letter, the court was not impressed with the persuasive value of business review letters.
Blue Cross of Virginia v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 176 S.E.2d 439, 211 Va. 180 (1970).
204 As an FTC attorney involved with the Advisory Opinion remarked:
[To demand the complete elimination of [all possibilities that a clearance will be rescinded]
constitutes a juvenile quest for absolute certainty. In the complex society... no person can be
assured that no one will ever at any time and under any circumstances question the approval he
has received. Because the procedure leaves some element of risk does not mean that it therefore
contains no merit. In the great majority of cases, the requesting party will find that the opinion
protects him against adverse action for his past actions taken in reliance upon the opinion and
more than this he cannot fairly ask.
Dixon, supra note 24, at 74.
205 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984).
206 Id.; Schwechter & Shepard, supra note 12, at 526-27.
207 Schwechter & Shepard, supra note 12, at 526; Kobak, supra note 8, at 55. See, eg., Baker, To
Indict or Not to Indict; Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REv.
405, 416 (1978) ("I would not feel bound by a prior business review letter---especially an old one-
when the letter was based on what now would be regarded as incorrect analysis or policy.") (Baker is
former head of the Antitrust Division). See also the Department of Justice Motion to Dismiss, in
Holly Farms Poultry Industries, Inc. v. Kleindienst, Civil No. Cl-151-W-72 (D.M.D. N.C. ified May
22, 1972), filed in August, 1972. The action was brought against the Justice Department to force it
to grant a business review clearance for the plaintiff's proposed conduct. The Department argued
that the court could not force the Department to grant a clearance since a business review letter is
merely "a statement of present enforcement intention made in part on the basis of assumed facts, for
the convenience of [the applicant], in accordance with a procedure voluntarily made available, and is
not binding upon [the recipient], upon this Court, or even upon the Attorney General."
208 Reinsch, supra note 193, at 107.
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legally binding effect which many businesses and antitrust lawyers desire.
The export conduct certified is exempt from both federal and state anti-
trust laws,20 9 and no lawsuit may be instituted against the certified con-
duct by government or private parties unless the certificate is revoked,
with one exception: private parties injured by the certified conduct may
bring a suit for actual, not treble, damages, injunctive relief and costs if
the conduct certified does not meet the four statutory eligibility
standards.210
Besides being limited to actual damages, the ETCA deters private
actions in several other ways. First, there is a legal presumption in court
that the certified conduct does comply with the eligibility standards.211
Second, there is a much shorter statute of limitations than in other anti-
trust actions. 212  Finally, a losing plaintiff must pay the certificate
holder's defense costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.2" 3
Like business review letters and advisory opinions, an export certifi-
cate does not protect conduct falling outside its scope, and it may be
revoked or modified if material facts change.214 These limitations are
reasonable since the government should only confer protection to those
activities presented for clearance and upon the present or foreseeable
facts. Conduct outside any of these clearances or changed material facts
would not necessarily result in antitrust liability, since the government or
private plaintiff still would have to demonstrate that the antitrust laws
have been violated. As a means to protect itself against these uncertain-
ties, an export certificate holder can easily apply for an amendment to its
certificate.215 Indeed, under the Business Review and Advisory Opinion
Programs businesses can approach the agencies for a new clearance even
though no formal amendment procedure exists. This option may be
somewhat inconvenient and expensive, but it is a reasonable and neces-
sary requirement.
The fact that the absence of full disclosure of material facts at the
time a business review letter or advisory opinion is granted will nullify
the protection of the clearance retroactively is a possible deterrent to us-
209 E.T.C.A. § 306(a), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(a) (1982).
210 E.T.C.A. § 306(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(1) (1982).
211 E.T.C.A. § 306(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(3) (1982).
212 E.T.C.A. § 306(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(2) (1982). The statute of limitations is two years
from the date the plaintiff has notice of the certificate's failure to comply with the standards of the
ETCA, and in no event longer than four years. In other antitrust actions, the period is four years
regardless of when the plaintiff receives notice. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982).
213 E.T.C.A. § 306(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(4) (1982).
214 See Commerce Department Guidelines for Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review
(Apr. 8, 1983), reprinted in 44 ANTITRusT & TRADE REa. REP. (BNA) 816, 817 (Apr. 14, 1983).
215 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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ing those clearance procedures. Some applicants are concerned that the
determination of what constitutes "full disclosure" and which facts are
"material" lies with the antitrust agencies or the courts and that informa-
tion which was inadvertently not disclosed or which is relevant only with
the benefit of hindsight will deprive them of the protection of the clear-
ance. 16 No applicant has yet been prosecuted under these circum-
stances,217 but the fact that it could happen does create some anxiety for
businesses. The Export Certification Program removes this possibility by
specifying that the protection of the certificate will only be invalidated
retroactively if the factual omission was fraudulent.2 18
Finally, the fact that business review letters and FTC staff advisory
opinions do not formally guarantee adequate notice of revocation and
protection for good faith reliance creates a perception of uncertainty,
even though in practice those clearances do provide such protection.
The Export Certification Program explicitly guarantees such
protection.21
c. Administrative burden and delay
Some amount of compliance costs and delay are inevitable in any
individual clearance program regardless of how well it is run. Many law-
yers and businesses, however, complain that much of the burden and
delay is unnecessary in the clearance program. They also complain that
the delay is so long that it often results in lost business opportunities.2
This charge appears to be well-founded with regard to the Business
Review and Advisory Opinion Programs. Neither of those programs has
a standardized application form or any guidelines indicating what type of
information must be submitted,2 1 and, as a result, much time and effort
216 See, ag., Warnke, supra note 165, at 388.
217 Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note 1; interviews with Department of Justice lawyers,
supra note 38.
218 15 C.F.R. § 325.4(e) (1984).
219 15 C.F.R. § 325.9(c) (1984). The Commerce Department must first notify the certificate
holder in writing of its intention to revoke or modify the certificate, and the certificate holder has 30
days to respond. If thereafter the certificate is revoked or modified, the effective date can be no
earlier than 30 days after the revocation or modification decision. Some businesses and lawyers,
however, contend that even these limitations do not provide adequate protection since the "sword of
Danmacles" is not totally removed. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 120, at 37. Such demands for
absolute and perpetual protection are unreasonable.
220 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at 187; Baker, supra note 5, at 344-50; Garvey,
supra note 120, at 26-27; Golden & Kolb, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: An American
Response to Foreign Competition, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 743, 771-72 (1983); Schwechter & Shep-
ard, supra note 112, at 524-26; interviews with private antitrust attorneys, in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
23-26, 1984).
221 See supra notes 42 and 76 and accompanying text.
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are expended during the investigation when the agencies must make sup-
plemental information requests. 222 Pre-filing counseling can help, 223 but
it is not often used.224 Zealous staff members may ask for an enormous
amount of information not relevant to the application.225 Moreover,
with the exception of export activities under the Business Review Pro-
gram,226 the agencies face no deadline for responding.227 The time the
agencies take to respond varies greatly,228 but most applicants must wait
at least four to five months for a business review letter 2 9 or formal FTC
advisory opinion, and two to five months for an informal FTC staff opin-
ion unless a relatively simple matter is presented which can be handled
promptly by the Office of Evaluation.230
The Export Certification Program represents an improvement over
the Justice Department and FTC programs in many respects. Its stan-
dard application and detailed guidelines make it more likely that the in-
formation in the initial application will be complete or at least that




225 See supra notes 50 and 89 and accompanying text.
226 See supra note 53.
227 See supra notes 54 and 87 and accompanying text. See also Schwechter & Shepard, supra note
12, at 542-25:
While the Justice Department, in certain cases, is prepared to work with requesting companies
to provide them with a Business Review Procedure statement within an appropriate period of
time so that business opportunities will not be lost, without a more consistently streamlined
procedure, the business community has continued to perceive the usually extensive time in-
volved in receiving a response to be a significant disincentive to making use of the Business
Review Procedure.
228 The Justice Department took over five months to respond to a recent business review letter
request by United Technologies Corporation, see Department of Justice Press Release (Oct. 27,
1983). But it took over 19 months to respond to a request by the National Egg Price System Study
Committee and Urner Barry Publications, see Department of Justice Press Release (Sept. 9, 1983).
The FrC's response time also varies considerably. For example, the FTC took only three months to
answer a request for a staff opinion letter submitted by Herbert J. Messita, see the Advisory Opinion
File in the FTC's Public Reference Branch, Room 130 [hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinion File];
in contrast, a staff opinion letter to the American Podiatry Association signed by the Director of the
Bureau of Competition took five months to process, see FTC Press Release (Aug. 19, 1983) (actual
letter on file in the Advisory Opinion File, supra). Similarly, a formal Commission advisory opinion
was issued to the Phosphate Rock Export Association in a little more than four months, see Advi-
sory Opinion File, supra, while another issued to Procter & Gamble took ten months. See Advisory
Opinion File, supra.
229 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
230 Interview with Carl Hevener, supra note I. Under the FTC Program, it often takes two weeks
or more simply for the FTC's Correspondence Section to assign an application to the Bureau of
Competition. Since July 29, 1981, the average time for a formal Commission opinion has been seven
months. Letter from Carl Hevener, supra note 71.
231 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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that much of the information required is too demanding and unnecessary
in many cases and often goes beyond the limitations of the regulations.232
The opportunity under the ETCA for pre-filing counseling, which is
being publicized and is being taken advantage of with increasing fre-
quency, allows an applicant and the Commerce Department to tailor the
information requirements to the individual application.233 However, the
absence of a Department of Justice representative at this pre-filing meet-
ing often results in major supplemental requests, since the Justice De-
partment normally requires much more information than does the
Commerce Department.234 Post-filing conferences provide the applicant
with an opportunity to convince the agencies that information requests
are irrelevant and overly burdensome.235
The ETCA also imposes deadlines on the two Departments, thereby
avoiding the often long delays which detract from the utility of the other
clearance programs.236 However, some businesses and lawyers complain
that the deadlines are still too long in many cases where time is of the
essence.
237
Unlike under the Business Review or Advisory Opinion Programs,
the prospects for reducing administrative delay and burden are very
promising under the Export Certification Program because the Program
is more centralized and structured. Both the Commerce and Justice De-
partments believe that as they gain experience with the processing of ap-
plications and as standardized language is developed, information
requests will become less demanding and the time needed to process ap-
plications will decrease significantly. 3 8 Some private antitrust lawyers
agree with this optimistic view.2 39
Nevertheless, a certain amount of delay and inefficiency is unavoida-
ble under the Program since it involves two agencies which often dupli-
cate each other's efforts.2" In addition, after a certificate is issued,
232 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
235 See Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
236 See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
237 See, eg., Garvey, supra note 120, at 27.
238 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104; interviews with Department
of Justice lawyers, supra note 38; Margulies, supra note 104, at 213. For the first eleven certificates,
it took from three to five months between acceptance of the application and actual issuance. The
Commerce Department hopes to reduce this period to 60-70 days. 46 ANTTrrRuSr & TRADE REP.
(BNA) 205.
239 See Sylvester, supra note 126, at 8, col. 3; interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984).
240 See supra note 123 and accompanying text
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reporting requirements make the certificate holder subject to continued
administrative oversight.241
d. No assurance of confidentiality
An application for a business review letter or an advisory opinion,
the agency's response, and any information submitted in support of an
application by the applicant or by third parties, is placed in a file open to
the public.2 42 Moreover, any information not placed in the file is subject
to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.243 Therefore, many
applicants and third parties volunteering information fear that sensitive
business information may be acquired by their competitors by examining
the file or through a FOIA request.2 44
The burden is on the party submitting information to request confi-
dentiality and to justify that request to the agency receiving the informa-
tion.245 Even if the agency grants the request and the information is
withheld from the file, third parties may fie an FOIA request. Then the
submitting party and the agency must go through each document to re-
move only that information which is protected by the Act's business
secrets exemption,246 and the burden of proof is on the agency resisting
disclosure.24 7
Although the agencies claim they can protect truly sensitive infor-
241 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 59 and 96 and accompanying text.
243 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982). The Act requires administrative agencies to make available for
public inspection and copying any identifiable record, including private documents held by govern-
ment agencies. See Comment, Administrative Disclosure of Private Business Records Under the Free-
dom of Information Act: An Analysis ofAlternative Methods of Review, 28 SYRACUSE L.R. 923, 927
n.13 (1977).
244 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984). See also
VON KALiNOWSKJ, supra note 7, at 126-17-19; Baker, supra note 5, at 349; Warnke, supra note 165,
at 391.
245 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(10)(c) (1984), which provides that a party seeking confidential treatment
from the Justice Department must:
(1) specify precisely the documents or parts thereof that he asks not be made public; (2) state
the minimum period of time during which nondisclosure if considered necessary; and (3) justify
the request for nondisclosure, both as to content and time, by showing that disclosure would
have a detrimental effect upon the requesting party's operations or relationships with actual or
potential customers, employees, suppliers (including suppliers of credit), stockholders, or com-
petitors. The Department of Justice, in its discretion, shall make the final determination as to
whether good cause for nondisclosure has been shown.
See also 15 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1984), in which the FTC states that a request for confidentiality of informa-
tion submitted in connection with the questions should be made separately.
246 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982). The exemption is contained in § 552(b)(4). Both agencies' regula-
tions provide that their discretion to withhold information from the public is subject to statutory
restrictions. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(10)(e) (1984); 15 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1984).
247 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982).
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mation,24 8 applicants and third parties have no assurance that the agency
will be successful. Moreover, businesses fear that the agencies may not
agree with them in the first place that a certain piece of information is
confidential. 24 9  Finally, the process of removing the sensitive informa-
tion from each document if a third party files an FOIA request is time-
consuming and expensive.25 0
Once again, the Export Certification Program has adopted measures
to alleviate this problem which has inhibited the use of the other clear-
ance programs. Under the ETCA, only the final certificate itself is
placed in the public file, not the information submitted in support of the
application. The application and information submitted in support
thereof by the applicant and third parties are exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act.2 5 ' Moreover, the government is
prohibited from releasing confidential information if such disclosure
would cause harm to the person who submitted it except in certain lim-
ited circumstances and usually subject to a protective order.252 The sub-
mitter is also warned of any request for the information in a judicial or
administrative proceeding, and the Commerce or Justice Department
must seek or support an appropriate protective order if it releases infor-
mation in such instances.253 Since the Commerce Department is eager to
encourage businesses to apply for certificates, it claims it will do every-
thing it can to protect sensitive information.2 54
While these safeguards do provide more assurance of confidentiality,
248 See, e-g., ANTIrRUST DIVISION MANuAL m-77 (1979), which states the Department's belief
that most information which it would not disclose as a matter of discretion under 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.6(10)(c) (1984), would be within one of the Freedom of Information Act's exemptions.
249 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984). See also
Warnke, supra note 165 at 391.
250 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38.
251 E.T.C.A. § 309(a), 15 U.S.C. § 4019(a) (1982); 51 C.F.R. § 325.14(a) (1984). Information
submitted to the Commerce Department before the official filing of an application, such as disclo-
sures made at the pre-filing counseling meeting, is subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Mar-
gulies, supra note 104, at 9-10; interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104. The
Department warns potential applicants of this danger and generally returns the information as soon
as possible. Id.
252 E.T.C.A. § 309(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 4019(b)(1) (1982); 15 C.F.R. § 325.14(b)(1) (1984). Under
E.T.C.A. § 309(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 4019(b)(2) (1982), and 15 C.F.R. § 325.14(b)(3) (1984), the Com-
merce Department may disclose such information (A) upon a request made by the Congress or any
committee of the Congress, (B) in a judicial or administrative proceeding, subject to appropriate
protective orders, (C) with the written consent of the person who submitted the information,
(D) when the Commerce Department considers the disclosure to be necessary for determining
whether or not to issue, amend or revoke a certificate and the person who submitted the information
is warned and has an opportunity to advise the Department of the potential harm disclosure may
cause, or (E) in accordance with any U.S. statutory requirement.
253 15 C.F.R. § 325.14(c) (1984).
254 Interview with Arthur Aronoff and Phillip Ray, supra note 104.
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there is still no assurance of total confidentiality. Furthermore, some
businesses and lawyers are concerned that the Federal Register notice
may contain confidential information, and that the actual certificate itself
which is not protected from disclosure may contain confidential
information.2 5 5
e. Publicity
For some applicants, a strong disincentive for applying under all
three clearance programs, including the Export Certification Program, is
the publicity which will be given to their conduct.25 6 They fear that this
publicity will inform competitors of their plans or encourage litigation by
private parties.2 57
Under the Business Review and Advisory Opinion Programs, pub-
licity about an application is delayed until the clearance decision is actu-
ally made. There is no public notice of the filing of an application. This
delay, however, may provide little comfort since potential plaintiffs and
competitors may still be alerted before or shortly after the proposal is put
into effect if, as is usually the case, the applicant postpones implementa-
tion of its proposal until after it receives a response. In fact, many of
them will be alerted during the agency's investigation when approached
for information and for their reaction to the applicant's proposal. The
Export Certification Program is even less attractive in this respect, be-
cause not only is a summary of the granted certificate published, but also
a summary of the application is published only ten days after the applica-
tion is initially filed.2 58
f Government scrutiny
Some applicants fear that an application for clearance will invite
close government scrutiny of all their activities, both present and future,
255 48 Fed. Reg. 10,598 (1983). The certificate is not published, but it is made available to the
public at the Commerce Department. The Department has asked for public comments on whether
confidential information should be deleted from publicly available certificates. Id. at 10599.
256 Each agency issues press releases announcing the factual background of the request, the
agency's response, and a summary of the agency's legal reasoning (except for those business review
letters which do not always contain such reasoning). At one time, the FTC published summaries of
formal Commission advisory opinions, but it no longer does so. See 16 C.F.R. Part 15 (1984).
257 See, eg., VON KALINOWSI, supra note 7, at 126-19; Bruce & Pierce, supra note 166, at 1016;
GRInFiN, supra note 168, at 23.
258 See supra notes 115 and 148 and accompanying text. Commerce Department officials believe,
however, that the potential damage of this publicity can be reduced by the fact that under 15 C.F.R.
325.3(b)(15) (1984), the applicant itself drafts the Federal Register notice. Margulies, supra note
104, at 17. While this opportunity may enable the applicant to protect confidential information, it
cannot prevent alerting third parties about the basic facts of the applicant's conduct.
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and that this scrutiny will reveal antitrust violations or other illegal activ-
ity.2" 9 Hence, it is allegedly safer not to bring this attention and continu-
ing oversight to one's activities.
Unless the potential applicant is concerned that it may be engaging
in some illegal conduct, however, this fear appears largely irrational. Ac-
cording to the agencies, no file is created on the applicant, and there is no
follow-up on the applicant's activities except in the case of export certifi-
cates, and in those cases the scrutiny is limited only to the certified con-
duct and does not examine the business's overall operations.260  The
agencies do admit, however, that information about a former applicant
which appears in the press and which is relevant to the application will
quite naturally be noticed by those agency lawyers who worked on the
application.261
Some businesses also fear that an application will bring the govern-
ment's attention to conduct it otherwise might not have noticed or might
not have prosecuted even if it had noticed.262 This fear may be correct in
some cases, but this possibility is part of the risk evaluation each business
must make when determining whether to apply. The fact that the gov-
ernment might not notice or might not prosecute does not mean, how-
ever, that private parties will not bring suit.
g. Lack ofjudicial review of denied applications
Some businesses and lawyers complain that under the Business Re-
view and Advisory Opinion Programs, the applicant has no standing to
appeal a denial of a clearance request to a court since the letter is merely
"advice" or an expression of present enforcement intention.263 Standing
can only be attained if the applicant gambles by going ahead with the
activity and is sued by the government. 264 Understandably, businesses
would prefer not to take such a gamble in the hope that it would ulti-
mately be vindicated in court.265 The Export Certification Program rem-
edies this disadvantage by allowing the applicant to seek judicial review
259 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984). See also
VoN KANowsmI, supra note 7, at 126-6, S. KANwrr, supra note 168, at 25-3, Schwechter &
Shepard, supra note 12, at 524.
260 Interviews with government antitrust officials, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984).
261 Id.
262 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984). See also J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at 187; VON KAuNowsI, supra note 7, at 126-6.
263 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984). See also
VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 7, at 126-27. For an examination as to why denials of clearance
requests are not judicially reviewable, see Dixon, supra note 24, at 75-78.
264 See VON KALiNOWSKI, supra note 7, at 126-27.
265 Id.
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of an application denied in whole or part.266
B. The EEC Clearance Program
1. A Single Program with Several Types of Clearance
In contrast to the United States, the EEC has only one clearance
program. The Program is administered by the only Community antitrust
agency,267 the European Commission.268  The origin of the EEC clear-
ance program is found within the Treaty of Rome which created the
EEC. Article 85(3) of the Treaty provides for an exemption from the
Prohibition of Article 85(1)269 if certain conditions are met. It was not
until five years after the creation of the EEC, however, that the Council
of Ministers enacted legislation to provide a procedure for obtaining an
exemption. That legislation, Regulation 17,270 also created an additional
type of clearance, the negative clearance,27 1 not provided for in the
Treaty. Since then, a third type of clearance, the so-called "comfort let-
ter,"272 has been adopted by the Commission without a legislative man-
date. A fourth type of clearance, a non-opposition procedure, 273 has
been adopted by the Commission in the drafts of its three latest group
exemptions. All of these clearances require that the same application
form (Form A/B) 2 74 be submitted to the Commission, and all can be
266 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
267 Under Article 88 of the Treaty, the antitrust agencies of the member states are also authorized
to enforce the EEC competition laws, but in practice they have not done so since the Commission
began enforcing those laws in 1962 after the enactment of Regulation 17/62. See Temple Lang,
supra note 23, at 356. The courts of the ten member states are also empowered to give effect to the
EEC's competition laws when those laws are raised before them.
268 Directorate-General IV (DG-Iv) is the division within the Commission responsible for com-
petition law matters, including the administration of the clearance program. The Legal Service of
the Commission also plays a major reviewing role in the clearance program. See infra, note 334 and
accompanying text. The Commission plays the leading role in shaping EEC antitrust law. The
member state courts and the EEC Court of Justice usually follow its views. Moreover, the Commis-
sion acts as an administrative court of first instance when it files its own complaints, and its decisions
stand unless overturned on appeal to the Court of Justice, which does not happen often. Interviews
with Commission and private antitrust lawyers, in Brussels and London (Jan. 2-12, 1984).
269 Somewhat similar to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Article 85(1) prohibits "all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition within the common market."
270 Regulation 17/62, J.O. 204/62; O.J. (Special Edition 1959-62), p. 57, came into force on
March 13, 1962.
271 See infra notes 267-75 and accompanying text.
272 See infra notes 312-48 and accompanying text.
273 See infra notes 333-48 and accompanying text.
274 For a detailed analysis of the function and content of Form A/B, see C. KERSE, EEC ANTI-
TRUST PROCEDURE 45-50 (1981). Comfort letters are not legislatively sanctioned, and there is no
official provision for them in Form A/B. Nevertheless, Form A/B serves as the unofficial applica-
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granted for on-going as well as proposed conduct.27 5
a. Negative clearances
Under Article 2 of Regulation 17, "undertakings or associations of
undertakings" may apply to the Commission to have it "certify that, on
the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no grounds under Article
85(1) or Article 86276 of the Treaty for action on its part in respect of an
agreement, decision or practice. '2 7 7 The Commission's answer to this
request takes the form of an official decision issued by the Commission as
a collegial body. The decision is normally lengthy and resembles a judi-
cial decision which, in effect, it is. Each decision recites in detail the facts
upon which it is based, and a legal analysis follows explaining why the
particular conduct does or does not deserve a negative clearance.2 7 This
decision can be appealed by the applicant or affected third parties within
two months to the Court of Justice.2 7 9
Negative clearances are not subject to an expiration date or any con-
ditions or obligations, such as reporting requirements. 280 However, the
clearance is limited to the facts within the Commission's possession,
which are set forth in the decision, and a material change in those facts
may invalidate the clearance.281 There is no special procedure for either
revoking the clearance or amending it to take changed circumstances
into account. If the Commission would ever decide that a previously
cleared agreement or practice no longer is legal under Articles 85(1) or
86, it would first negotiate informally with the business to remove the
objectionable aspects of the conduct before formally instituting proceed-
tion form for comfort letters as well. Although the same form is used for both negative clearance
and exemption requests, the text of Regulation 17 formally distinguishes between "applying for" a
negative clearance and "notifying" an agreement for an exception. For the sake of convenience, this
paper will not make such a formal distinction in terminology since in most instances the two types of
clearance will be considered together. Both terms will be used interchangeably for both types of
clearance.
275 Exemptions granted for ongoing conduct, however, can only have retroactive effect in most
cases to the date the agreement was notified to the Commission. See Regulation 17/62, Article 6 of
the Treaty of Rome.
276 Article 86 is similar to Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It prohibits an "abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it."
277 A negative clearance cannot be granted for conduct which is illegal but against which the
Commission has decided not to act. C. KERSE, supra note 274. As is the case with U.S. antitrust
law, to establish a violation of EEC antitrust law it must be shown that the anti-competitive activity
affects interstate trade.
278 For an example of a recent negative clearance decision, see GEMA Statutes, 25 O.J. EuR.
COMM. (No. L94) 12 (1982); 34 Common Mkt. L.R. 482 (1982).
279 Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome.
280 Interviews with Commission officials, in Brussels (Jan. 12, 1984).
281 Temple Lang, supra note 23, at 343.
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ings.28 The business itself may initiate contact with the Commission to
request a new negative clearance to cover the changed circumstances.283
The Commission only issues one or two negative clearances each
year.284 Because the procedure for taking a decision is so burdensome
and time-consuming, 285 the Commission and many applicants prefer in-
stead to receive a comfort letter28 6 which can be issued much more
quickly and with much less effort2 8 7 and which provides essentially the
same protection as a negative clearance.2 8 8 Moreover, the Commission
believes its non-binding notices and announcements further eliminate the
need for time-consuming negative clearances since notices and announce-
ments are, in effect, "group negative clearances. 2 89
b. Individual exemptions2 90
Under Article 85(3) of the Treaty, the Commission may declare the
prohibition of Article 85(1)291 to be inapplicable to a notified agreement
if the agreement satisfies the criteria listed in Article 85(3).292 Thus, the
Commission may exempt an otherwise illegal agreement under certain
282 Interviews with Commission officials, in Brussels (Jan. 12, 1984). The Commission normally
initiates such informal negotiations with businesses even when no prior negative clearance has been
granted. In the vast majority of cases these negotiations enable the Commission to avoid the neces-
sity of instituting formal proceedings. Id. See also C. KERSE, supra note 274, at 32. For example, in
1983 the Commission informally settled 343 cases without a formal decision. In that same year, the
Commission took just 15 formal decisions, only one of which was a negative clearance. See EuRo-
PEAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPEITION POLICY (Apr. 1984) at
points 80 and 81 [hereinafter cited as THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETON POLICY].
283 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
284 Id.
285 See infra notes 349-403 and accompanying text.
286 See infta note 476 and accompanying text.
287 See infra notes 385-98.
288 See infra notes 474-82.
289 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. See also C. HARDING, NOTICES AND
GROUP EXEMPTIONS IN EEC COMPETITON LAW 11-12 (1980).
290 For the purposes of this article, group exemptions do not qualify as a clearance procedure.
No application is necessary, and there is no consideration by the Commission of the circumstances of
the particular course of conduct. Rather, businesses determine for themselves whether their conduct
qualifies under these statutory exemptions and hence is legal. The test of whether this determination
is correct comes only if and when the agreement is challenged under Article 85(1).
291 The Commission cannot exempt an agreement or practice in violation of Article 86.
Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co., Inc. v. Commission (Case 6/72), 1973 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973).
292 The four criteria which must be satisfied are (1) the agreement must contribute to improving
the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress; (2) consum-
ers must be allowed a fair share of the resulting benefit; (3) the agreement must not impose on the
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensible to the obtainment of these objec-
tives; and (4) the agreement must not afford the undertakings the possibility of eliminating competi-
tion in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
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prescribed circumstances. The Commission alone has the power to grant
exemptions, and its exercise of that exclusive authority is subject to re-
view only by the Court of Justice.2 93 The Commission can grant exemp-
tions on an individual basis or for a defined category of agreements via a
group exemption.294
Unless an agreement falls within a group exemption29 5 or within one
of the limited exemptions from notification contained in Regulation
17,296 the parties to the agreement first must apply to the Commission in
order for the agreement to be eligible for an exemption.297 Without such
an application, if the Commission or a private party brings an action
against the parties to the agreement, the tribunal hearing the case must
293 Regulation 17/62, Article 9(1) of the Treaty of Rome.
294 The Commission cannot adopt a group exemption without first receiving authorization to do
so from the Counsel of Ministers. The Council has extended such authorization on two occasions.
In 1965, it passed Regulation 19/65, O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. 36/533) (Mar. 6, 1965), which author-
ized group exemptions for bilateral exclusive distribution agreements and bilateral industrial prop-
erty right licensing agreements. In 1971, it enacted Regulation 2821/71, OJ. EuR. Comm. (No.
L285) 46 (Dec. 20, 1971), which authorized group exemptions for agreements concerning specializa-
tion, research and development, and the application of standards and types. There are currently six
group exemptions in effect: Regulation 417/85, O.J. Eur. COMM. (No. L53) 1 (Feb. 22, 1985)
(specialization agreements); Regulation 1983/83, O.J. Euir. COMM. (No. L173) 5 (Jun. 22, 1983)
(exclusive distribution agreements); Regulation 1984/83, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L173) 5 (Jun. 22,
1983) (exclusive supply agreements); Regulation 2349/84 (O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L219) 15 (Jul. 23,
1984) (patent licensing agreements); Regulation 418/85 (OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. L53) 5 (Feb. 22,
1985) (research and development agreements); and Regulation 123/85, (O.J. EuR. COMM.) (No.
L15) 16 (Jan. 18, 1985) (motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements). These regulations
specify in detail the types of agreements which qualify automatically for an exemption without the
need for applying for an individual exemption. Each contains a list of clauses which automatically
disqualify an agreement (the black list) and a list of clauses which may be used in agreements with-
out disqualifying them from coverage (the white list). The Commission also retains the right to
withdraw the exemption from agreements which qualify under the group exemption but which in
fact do not satisfy the criteria of Article 85(3). See, eg., Article 6 of Regulation 1983/83.
295 Two of the primary purposes for the enactment of group exemptions are to relieve the Com-
mission of the enormous burden of processing tens of thousands of individual exemption applica-
tions, C. KERSE, supra note 274, at 38; C. HARDING, supra note 289, at (V); and to provide greater
legal certainty. Id. However, the number and types of agreements covered by the existing and
proposed group exemptions is limited, and many agreements must be notified for an individual ex-
emption. See infra notes 456-58 and accompanying text.
296 Regulation 17/62, Article 4(2) of the Treaty of Rome. The Commission can grant an exemp-
tion even if these agreements were never notified. The four types of agreements which do not have to
be notified were considered by the drafters of Regulation 17 to be the least likely to be harmful to
competition. The major purpose behind this exception to the notification requirement was to reduce
the numbers of applications for clearance in cases least likely to violate Article 85. See V. Korah,
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETIION LAW AND PRACTIcE 28 (2d ed. 1981). These
agreements, however, may be declared void ab initio under Art. 85(2), and they do not enjoy immu-
nity from fines unless and until they are notified. See Barounos, Hall and James, EEC ANTi-TRusT
LAW 258 (1975).
297 Regulation 17/62, Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the Treaty of Rome.
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declare the agreement illegal if it violates Article 85(1).298
The decision granting the exemption is similar to a negative clear-
ance decision.2 99 In addition to setting forth a detailed analysis as to why
the agreement qualifies for an exemption, the decision must first explain
why the agreement violates Article 85(1)."0 The decision must also state
the date from which the exemption shall take effect30' and the period of
time for which the exemption is valid.3 ° 2 Exemptions may not be
granted for an unlimited period of time303 and usually are granted for
seven to ten years.304 They may be subject to conditions and obligations,
such as reporting requirements, 30 5 and they may be revoked or amended
by the Commission under certain defined conditions 306 and under a pre-
scribed procedure,30 7 subject to review by the Court of Justice. 30 8  Ex-
emptions may be renewed indefinitely if the agreement continues to meet
the standards of Article 85(3).309 No special amendment procedure ex-
298 In either case the parties may apply for an exemption after the action has been brought, but
the exemption process is a slow one and only the Commission, not the member state court, may
grant it. Regulation 17/62, Article 9(1) of the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, the exemption does not
cover any period before the date of application and the defendant may be subject to sanctions for
that period of time.
299 See supra notes 276-89 and accompanying text.
300 Consten and Grundig v. Commission (Cases 56 & 58/64) 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 5
Common Mkt. L.R. 418 (1966). For a recent example of an exemption decision, see Langenscheidt/
Hachette, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L39) 25 (1982), 33 Common Mkt. L.R. 181 (1982).
301 Regulation 17/62, Article 6(l) of the Treaty of Rome. The date may not be earlier than the
date of notification.
302 Regulation 17/62, Article 8(1) of the Treaty of Rome.
303 Id
304 In setting the expiration date, the Commission normally determines what amount of time is
needed for the parties to attain their objective. See C. KRSE, supra note 274, at 144.
305 Regulation 17/62 Article 8(1) of the Treaty of Rome. The most common obligation is the
filing of periodic reports providing the Commission with updated information. See C. KIRsF, supra
note 274, at 142. Before conditions or obligations are imposed, the applicant has a right to be heard.
Transocean Marine Point Association v. Commission (Case 17/74), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1063, 13 Common Mkt. L.R. D1 (1974).
306 Regulation 17/62, Article 8(3) of the Treaty of Rome provides that the exemption may be
revoked or modified with retroactive effect if (1) the parties commit a breach of any obligation
attached to the exemption; (2) the exemption was based on incorrect information or was induced by
deceit; or (3) the parties abuse the exemption. The exemption may be revoked or amended, but only
with prospective effect, if there is a change in any of the facts which were basic to the making of the
decision. The burden of proof is on the Commission. See C. KERSE, supra note 274, at 148.
307 Regulation 17/62, Article 19(1) of the Treaty of Rome provides that the Commission must
give the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard.
308 Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome.
309 Regulation 17/62, Article 8(2) of the Treaty of Rome. The procedure for renewing an exemp-
tion is almost identical to that for enacting the original exemption decision. See C. KERsE, supra
note 274, at 145. However, a formal application under Form A/B does not appear necessary for a
renewal. See C. KERSE, EEC ANTITRuST PROCEDURE SUPP. 1984 at 11. A simple letter from the
applicant may be sufficient. Id. at 33. Normally the agreement must be modified at least to some
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ists other than the opportunity for the applicant to request a new exemp-
tion decision covering the changed circumstances or new activities.
Because of the complicated and time-consuming procedure for
granting individual exemptions,31 0 the Commission grants few exemp-
tions each year. Between 1979 and 1982, for example, the Commission
adopted only two exemption decisions each year.311
c. Comfort letters
Because the Commission is able to grant so few negative clearances
and exemptions, the vast majority of clearance applications which are
actually responded to in writing by the Commission are answered with
an informal "comfort letter" which is issued by the Commission's Com-
petition Directorate without the need for a formal Commission deci-
sion.312 The letter informs the applicant that the Commission does not
intend to take action against the notified agreement or practice. The file
is then closed, and except in rare circumstances, no formal Commission
decision is ever taken granting an exemption or negative clearance.313
The basis for the Competition Directorate's decision to close the file
is either that an agreement or practice does not violate Article 85(1) or
Article 86 or that an agreement violating Article 85(1) appears to qualify
for an exemption under Article 85(3). 3'4 In the latter case, the Competi-
tion Directorate concludes either that the agreement falls within a group
exemption or that it would qualify for an individual exemption if the
Commission would take a formal decision on the application.315 The
comfort letter, however, does not qualify as an exemption decision and
hence the applicant does not actually receive an individual exemption.316
degree to qualify for renewal. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. For an example
of a recent decision renewing an exemption, see Sopelem/Vickers, 24 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. 2391) 1
(1981), 35 Common Mkt. L.R. 443 (1982).
310 See infra notes 349-403 and accompanying text.
311 See Written Question No. 2007/82, submitted by Mr. Battersby, Member of the European
Parliament, to the Commission, 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. Cl18) 22 (May 3, 1982). The Commis-
sion refuses to grant an exemption in approximately three cases each year. Id
312 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. See infra notes 394-403 and accompa-
nying text, for a description of the procedure for issuing a comfort letter.
313 Id The Commission normally will only reopen the file if the agreement or practice is chal-
lenged in a member state court or if a third party files a complaint with the Commission. Lang,
supra note 23, at 351. The Commission may also reopen the file on its own initiative if it discovers
material facts not known at the time the file was closed or if material circumstances change. Id at
352.
314 Lang, supra note 23, at 354-55.
315 Id
316 Id See the Perfumes cases, Procureur de la Republique v. Guerlain, v. Parfums Rochas, v.
Lanvin Parfums, and v. Nina Ricci (Cases 253/78, 1-3, 37 and 99-79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2374.
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In theory, the agreements not exempted by a group exemption remain
illegal as a violation of Article 85(1). Moreover, neither third parties nor
the recipient may be able to appeal the closing of the file to the Court of
Justice since the letter does not constitute a "decision" under Article 173
of the Treaty.317
There are no formal rules governing the content of comfort let-
ters.318 Usually the Competition Directorate states in the letter whether
it is closing the file on the basis of a negative clearance or on the basis of
an exemption, but often it simply states it is closing the file and does not
specify the basis for its decision.319 Normally, no legal reasoning or sum-
mary of the facts is included, unlike in a formal decision.320 The Compe-
tition Directorate usually expressly reserves the otherwise implicit right
to reopen the fie "if the factual or legal situation changes in such a way
as to call for a revision of the position set out herein. '32 1 The recipient of
the letter is also assured that it will continue to enjoy immunity from
Commission fines even though the file has been closed.322 The Commis-
sion imposes no expiration date, reporting requirements, or any other
conditions or obligations.323 In addition, there is no formal revocation or
amendment procedure.3 24
The Competition Directorate recently announced a new procedure
to enhance the legal value of the comfort letter in special cases.325 Unlike
with the original type of comfort letter, the Commission publishes a de-
tailed factual summary of the agreement or practice and the basis upon
which it intends to close the file. It also invites third parties to submit
their comments about the Competition Directorate's proposed decision
317 See Korah, supra note 24, at 30-34; Livingston & Sherliker, Comfort Letters and Article 85
and 86: Procedure and Jurisdiction, NEW L.J. 287, 288 (May 12, 1981).
318 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
319 The failure to indicate the basis for the closing of the fie may have unfortunate consequences
for the applicant if the validity of the agreement is subsequently challenged in a member state court.
See infra notes 427-43 and accompanying text.
320 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
321 See, eg., the comfort letter closing the fie on Notification No. IV/30. 477 (Apr. 15, 1983).
322 Id. The issuance of a comfort letter has the incidental effect of terminating the period of
provisional validity accorded from the date of notification to "old" agreements made prior to March
13, 1962. Lancome v. Etos and Albert Heijn Supermart, (Case 99/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2511, 31 Common Mkt. L.R. 164 (1981).
323 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
324 Id.
325 See EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
point 15 (Apr. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY. See also
Notice from the Commission on procedures concerning notifications pursuant to Article 4 of Coun-
cil Regulation No. 17/62,25 O.J. EUR. COMMM. (No. C296) 4 (Nov. 11, 1983); and Notice from the
Commission on procedures concerning applications for negative clearance pursuant to Article 2 of
Council Regulation No. 17/62, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C343) 4 (Dec. 31, 1982).
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to close the file.326 In all other respects, the two types of comfort letters
are identical. Many private lawyers and even many Commission officials,
however, do not believe this new type of letter will be more valuable to
the recipient.327 It is being used only in special circumstances when the
Competition Directorate wants to ensure that the letter is not opposed or
when the Commission would like assistance in gathering information.328
In 1984, for example, the Commission issued only three of this new type
of comfort letter.329 In the vast majority of cases, the Competition Di-
rectorate will issue the original type of comfort letter.330 The Commis-
sion does not publish the content of either type of comfort letter.33'
The Commission has not made publicly available any statistics on
the number of comfort letters the Competition Directory issues each
year. It recently published statistics on the number of applications for a
negative clearance or exemption which were settled without a formal de-
cision being necessary. In 1982, for example, the Competition Director-
ate reached 419 of these informal settlements, while in 1981 the number
was only 73.332 In a large number of those cases a comfort letter was
issued, but in many cases in which a notified agreement or practice was
abandoned or expired, no letter was necessary.333
For a number of reasons, the vast majority of agreements and prac-
tices notified to the Commission since 1962 have never been answered by
either a formal decision or a comfort letter. 34 The Commission was
inundated with nearly 40,000 applications during the first few years after
the adoption of the clearance program in 1962.335 Since then the Com-
mission has received an average of 160 new applications each year.336
Partly because of the Competition Directorate's scarce manpower,337 and
326 Id. See, e.g., Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No. 17/62 concerning notifica-
tion No. IV/30.778-Rovin, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C295) 7 (Nov. 2, 1983); Notice pursuant to
Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17/62 concerning an application for negative clearance No.
IV/30.477-Europages, 25 OJ. EuR. Comm. (No. C343) 5 (Dec. 31, 1982).
327 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers and Commission officials, in Brussels and London
(Jan. 2-12, 1984).
328 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
329 See FouRTEENTH REPORT oN COMF rlON POLICY (April 1985).
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 See Written Question No. 2007/82, supra note 311.
333 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
334 Id
335 Korah, supra note 24, at 15.
336 See Written Question No. 2007/82, supra note 311. In 1973, 1,693 applications were received
after the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark to the EEC. Id
337 In the Competition Directorate, only 30 officials work on applications, and most of those
officials spend much of their time on other matters. The Directorate's first priority is enforcement,
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partly because of the cumbersome procedure for processing applications
and issuing formal decisions,338 an enormous backlog of applications ac-
cumulated during the 1960s.339
To combat the backlog, the Commission has issued a series of group
exemptions which have enabled the Competition Directorate to close
thousands of files without the need for an individual response.3" An in-
creased use of comfort letters has also helped reduce the backlog.341 In
addition, many agreements and practices simply expired or were aban-
doned after an indication from the Commission that no clearance would
be given or that clearance would be given only if modifications unaccept-
able to the applicants would be made.342
The Competition Directorate now disposes of approximately 200
applications each year,343 and hence it does a little better than break even
with the average number of applications it receives each year.3 " As of
the end of 1983, the backlog of applications considered pending had been
reduced to 3,654. The Commission expects the patent licensing group
exemption will drastically reduce that number.34
The Commission intends to continue its heavy reliance on comfort
letters. 347 However, it also plans to implement a more rapid exemption
procedure for those cases which "obviously" satisfy the criteria of Article
85(3). It also plans to use comfort letters in lieu of formal negative
clearances.348
not the administration of the clearance program. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note
282.
338 See infra notes 343-98 and accompanying text.
339 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
340 Id; see supra note 294 and accompanying text.
341 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
342 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282; see also Written Question No. 2007/82,
supra note 311.
343 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
344 Id
345 THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 282, at point 82. Several hun-
dred of these applications are old agreements notified in the years after the enactment of the clear-
ance program in 1962. The Competition Directorate has no plans to respond to these applications
after all these years. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. Since the majority of
these applications concern patent licensing agreements, many will be disposed of informally with the
passage of the patent licensing group exemption. See FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY, supra note 329.
346 See Written Question No. 2007/82, supra note 311. Approximately 63% of the applications
relate to patent licenses. FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 329.
347 See Written Question No. 813/82, submitted by Mr. Prout, Member of the European Parlia-
ment, to the Commission, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C275) 16 (1982).
348 ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 325. Id at 27-8.
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d. The non-opposition exemption
The recently adopted group exemptions for patent licensing agree-
ments, research and development joint venture agreements, and speciali-
zation agreements provide for a simple and accelerated clearance
procedure whereby an agreement "equivalent in [its] nature or effect[s]"
to agreements covered by the group exemption, but which fails to satisfy
the express requirements of the group exemption may nevertheless be
exempted ("assimilated") by the group exemption. 49 The agreement
must be notified to the Commission on Form A/B, and either the notifi-
cation or an accompanying communication must refer to the assimilation
provision of the group exemption.350 If the Commission does not oppose
the notification within six months,351 the agreement automatically falls
within the group exemption's protection without the need for an individ-
ual Commission decision or comfort letter.35 2
As with any agreement falling within a group exemption, the dura-
tion of this exemption terminates when the group exemption itself ex-
pires, and it is automatically renewed if the group exemption is renewed
and the agreement meets the criteria of the renewed group exemption.353
In order to protect against undeserving agreements qualifying under this
procedure, the Commission may revoke the exemption for the agreement
349 See Article 4 of the Patent License Agreement Group Exemption (Jan. 1, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Patent License Agreements]; Article 5 of the Research and Development Joint Ventures
Group Exemption (Jan. 1, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Research and Development]; and Article 4 of
the Specialization Agreements Group Exemption. Some Commission officials would like to have a
non-opposition exemption procedure adopted for all applications, whereby any application not an-
swered within a certain period of time would automatically be deemed compatible with Articles 85
and 86. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
350 Article 4(3), Patent License Group Exemption, Patent License Agreements, supra note 349;
Article 5(2), Research and Development Group Exemption, Research and Development, supra note
349. Article 4(3) of the Specialization Agreements Group Exemption, supra note 349. This non-
opposition clearance is a hybrid. Like an individual exemption, the agreement must be notified to
the Commission, and presumably it will be examined individually. Like a group exemption, how-
ever, there is no need for an individual decision or letter granting the exemption.
351 Article 6(1) of the proposed Research and Development Group Exemption allows this waiting
period to be reduced to 3 months for agreements relating to "important projects of common Euro-
pean interest," Research and Development, supra note 349.
352 Article 4(1), Patent License Group Exemption, Patent License Agreements, supra note 349;
Article 5(1), Research and Development Group Exemption, Research and Development, supra note
349; Article 4(1) of the Specialization Agreements Group Exemption, supra note 349. The Commis-
sion long ago proposed to use this clearance procedure with its other group exemptions, but certain
member states opposed it. That opposition has weakened over the years as businesses have pressured
the member states to adopt this new accelerated and simplified procedure. The member states are
now willing to have this procedure implemented with the new group exemptions, but, as a compro-
mise, the Commission must oppose a particular agreement if any member state so requests within 4
months after notification. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
353 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
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on an individual basis if it finds the agreement does not in fact satisfy
Article 85(3). 354
2. Procedures for Processing Applications 355
Applications for each type of clearance must be made on Form A/B
and contain the information requested therein. 356 Form A/B details the
information which must be submitted. Although pre-filing counseling is
not formally provided for, it is available and many businesses use the
opportunity to tailor their information submissions to their particular
circumstances and to discuss the antitrust merits of their agreement or
practice.357 For the same reasons as applicants using the pre-fiing coun-
seling opportunity under United States programs, many potential appli-
cants do not file applications after this informal exchange.358
Despite the detailed instructions on Form A/B, many applicants
who do not take advantage of pre-filing counseling still submit insuffi-
cient applications, and substantial supplemental information requests
must be made.359 Only in the most egregious cases will an application be
returned to the applicant as incomplete.3 0 The Commission is in the
process of revising Form A/B to provide even clearer instructions and
specifications in order to increase the number of complete, well-framed
applications.361 It also plans to return many more applications if the new
Form A/B is poorly completed.362
In order to maximize the chances that their agreement will be
cleared, most applicants apply for both a negative clearance and an ex-
emption at the same time and on the same Form A/B.363 In addition,
even when an applicant believes its agreement would qualify for a nega-
tive clearance, it applies for an exemption anyway, since only an applica-
354 See, eg., Article 9 of the Patent Licensing Agreement Group Exemption.
355 The Commission prefers not to make public the finer details of these procedures. The
following description, therefore, is very general. For a detailed explanation of the procedure as it
existed in 1973, see Graupner, Commission Decision-Making on Competition Questions, 10 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 291 (1973).
356 Form A/B does not differentiate between the various types of clearances except at the end of
the application, where an applicant must explain why it believes its conduct qualifies for a negative
clearance (Question IV) or why it believes its agreement qualifies for an exemption (Question 'V).





361 See FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 329.
362 Interviews with Commission Officials, supra note 282.
363 Id.; interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Brussels (Jan. 2-5, 1984).
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tion for an exemption protects it from Commission fines.36 Although
Form A/B makes no provision for an applicant to designate a comfort
letter as its preferred type of clearance, the applicant may express that
preference informally to the Commission.365 Upon the adoption of the
non-opposition exemption, the applicant will have to note on Form A/B
or in a separate letter that this is the type of clearance for which it wishes
to be considered.366
Following a reorganization of DG-IV effective 1 October 1984, a
more efficient procedure for processing applications has been adopted.36 7
The application is sent first to Directorate B or C which are responsible
for individual antitrust cases. These directorates are composed of six
divisions, each with a specialized knowledge of a number of business sec-
tors. Applications -are assigned to the appropriate division.
With the exception of the proposed non-opposition exemption, the
Commission is under no time constraints in responding to an application,
and indeed it may never respond.368 The file is assigned to a rapporteur,
who is responsible for preparing a "summary of a new case." After
screening the application, the rapporteur either suggests the type of clear-
ance for which the application should be considered or recommends that
no further action be taken on the application at that time.3 69 If the appli-
cation will be considered for clearance, it is assigned to a team of staff
members, with the original rapporteur still in charge.370 As of 1 October
1984, the same team is responsible for the application throughout the
procedure.371
If the Commission will consider an application for a formal clear-
ance decision, the rapporteur will usually begin an in-depth investigation,
particularly if an exemption rather than a negative clearance is being
contemplated.372 Supplemental information is almost always required
364 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Brussels (Jan. 2-5, 1984). See Article 15(5), Reg-
ulation 17/62.
365 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
366 See supra note 350.
367 Letter from 1K Daofit of DG-IV, to the author, dated 11 February 1985.
368 See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
369 This will be done, for instance, when an agreement clearly falls within a group exemption.
Interviews with Commission Officials, supra note 282.
370 Id
371 Letter from K. Daofit, supra note 367.
372 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. An exemption has a much greater le-
gally binding effect than does a negative clearance, which is not formally binding on either the
Commission or member state courts, and accordingly the Commission is more careful and thorough
in its investigation. Id In addition, the Court of Justice has held that the Commission "may not
confine itself to requiring from undertakings proof of the fulfillment of the requirements for the grant
of the exemption but must, as a matter of good administration, play its part, using the means avail-
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from the applicant, but the exact amount of information requested will
depend on how well Form A/B has been completed.373 Third parties are
also asked for "necessary" information.37 4 The Commission must justify
such third party requests. 375 Third parties are first given an opportunity
to supply the information voluntarily, which they almost always do.376
Formal decisions requiring the requested third party to provide the infor-
mation are possible, and fines may be imposed if the party refuses to
comply.
377
As of 1 October 1984, a new directorate in DG-IV has become in-
volved in the clearance procedure after completion of the inspection
phase.378 It is responsible for coordinating all decision-making and en-
suring coherence among decisions dealing with the same type of anticom-
petitive behavior in different sectors. If the rapporteur finds the
agreement or practice objectionable in part, he will negotiate with the
applicant to remove the obstacles to a favorable decision.3 79 Depending
on the outcome of these negotiations, the rapporteur then prepares a draft
decision either granting or denying the application.380
Next, the draft begins a long review process during which it is ex-
amined by a variety of Commission officials for review.38' If any objec-
tion is raised along the way, the draft is returned to the rapporteur who
must modify the draft in light of the objections made, and the draft be-
gins the review process anew.382 As many as 150 drafts and notes may
pass between the rapporteur and the reviewing officials.38 3 The draft de-
cision is then reviewed on its merits, by the newly created coordinating
able to it, in ascertaining the relevant facts and circumstances." Consten and Grurdig v. E.E.C.
Comm'n., 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 347, 4 Common Mkt. L.R. 418, 477 (1966).
373 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
374 The Commission derives this authority under Regulation 17/62, Article 11 of the Treaty of
Rome. Parties are given six weeks to respond to the request, but an extension of three months is
possible. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
375 Regulation 17/62, Article 11(3) of the Treaty of Rome.
376 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
377 Regulation 17/62, Article 11(5) of the Treaty of Rome.
378 Letter from R. Daofit, supra note 367.
379 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
380 Id.
381 The Legal Service, the Director of Directorate B, the Director-General of the Competition
Directorate, and the Commissioner responsible for competition matters are but a few of the officials
who review the draft. Id.
382 Id. See Graupner, supra note 355, at 297-98, 305 for a detailed description of this complex
procedure.
383 See Graupner, supra note 355, at 305. As of 1973, the average case involved 50-70 such
transmissions. Since each transmission takes up to half a day to pass from one office to another, an
enormous amount of time is required for transmissions alone. Id
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directorate in DG-IV mentioned above.384
Once the draft decision emerges from this laborious process, it is
translated into all the official languages of the EEC.3 5  The draft deci-
sion is then reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Prac-
tices and Monopolies which gives a non-binding but influential
opinion.38 6 The individual Commissioners receive the draft decision to-
gether with a supporting memorandum prepared by the rapporteur and a
copy of the Advisory Committee's report. If no objection is made within
five days, the decision is automatically adopted. If any Commissioner
raises an objection, the Commission votes on the matter at its next oral
session. A majority vote is required for passage. If the draft decision is
rejected, and it rarely is, the whole process begins over again.38 7
If conditions or obligations are to be attached to an exemption, or if
the decision is to be negative, the applicant has a right to be heard.318 If
the decision will grant an exemption or negative clearance, the Commis-
sion publishes a summary of the application and invites interested parties
to submit their observations within a period of not less than one
month.3 9 The applicant is then notified of the outcome and the official
decision is published in the Official Journal.390
This whole process takes a minimum of six months if the application
is given priority, if a very simple case is presented, and Form A/B pro-
vides the requisite information.39' The average case, however, takes from
three to four years.392 In at least one case, the process took fifteen years
384 Letter from R. Daofit, supra note 367.
385 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. Graupner, supra note 355, at 298-99.
386 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. This consultation is required by Regu-
lation 17/62, Article 10(3) of the Treaty of Rome. The Committee is composed of member state
officials competent in antitrust matters. Regulation 17/62, Article 10(4) of the Treaty of Rome.
Article 10(6) requires that the Committee's opinion is not made public. Even the undertakings
concerned are denied access to the opinion. If the Committee opposes the decision, the Commission
will reconsider its decision and perhaps reject it altogether. See House of Lords Select Committee on
the European Communities, Session 1981-82, Eighth Report on Competition Practice, paragraph
143 (Statement of Mr. Bail) [hereinafter House of Lords Report]. See also C. KERsE, supra note
274, at 121-24.
387 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. Graupner, supra note 355, at 298-99.
388 Regulation 17/62, Article 19(1) of the Treaty of Rome. See also Transocean Marine Paint
Ass'n, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1063, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 459.
389 Regulation 17/62, Article 19(3) of the Treaty of Rome. Few third party comments are ever
received. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. The Commission has been criticized
for waiting until this late stage to invite third party comments. Last minute well-founded objections
can cause considerable delays. Eliciting comments immediately after the application is received
would enable these objections to be dealt with at the outset. See ag., House of Lords Report, supra
note 386, at 6-7 (written submission from the Confederation of British Industry).
390 Regulation 17/62, Article 21(1) of the Treaty of Rome.
391 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
392 Graupner, supra note 355 at 304.
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to complete.393
If the Competition Directorate will consider the application for a
comfort letter, this long and laborious procedure is largely circumvented.
The investigation is not as extensive. Most letters are issued on the basis
of the facts disclosed by the applicant.3 94 If modifications are necessary,
however, the rapporteur will negotiate with the applicant, just as he does
in cases considered for a formal decision.3 95 Once the agreement or prac-
tice meets the rapporteur's approval, he prepares a draft letter. Only a
few officials in the Competition Directorate review the draft as opposed
to the long list of officials who review drafts of formal decisions.396
If the letter is one of the new types of comfort letter which the Com-
mission hopes will be more influential in member state courts, the Com-
mission will publish a summary of the application and its intention to
issue a favorable letter, and it will invite third party comments.397 These
letters are also reviewed by the Legal Service and, upon request, by the
Advisory Committee.3 93 Both types of comfort letters are sent out under
the signature of the Director General or another senior official in the
Competition Directorate.39 9 No Commission consideration or decision is
necessary.' The letter itself is not published.
It normally takes the Competition Directorate five to six months to
issue a comfort letter. 4 1 If an application is given priority and if Form
A/B provides the necessary information, the Competition Directorate
can issue a letter in as little as three weeks." 2 In complex cases and in
cases for which the new type of comfort letter is used, however, it may
take over a year.
393 The Agreements of David Campari-Milano SpA, 21 OJ. EuR. Comm. (L70) 69 (1978).
394 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. See also Lang, supra note 23, at 355.
395 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
396 Id
397 See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
398 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. Although it may cause delays, the
Commission is considering ways by which the Advisory Committee will be automatically involved in
the review of these comfort letters. THiRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETrION POLICY, supra note
282, at pt. 72.
399 Id Unlike with the FrC advisory opinions, there is no difference in the legally or morally
binding effect when the Director signs the letter, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
400 See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
401 Interviews with Commission officials, in Brussels (Jan. 2-12, 1984). Interviews with antitrust
lawyers, in London (Jan. 2-12, 1984).
402 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
403 Id See, eg., the comfort letter issued in response to Notification No. IV/30.477-Europages
found in Letter from J.E. Ferry, Director, Commission of the European Communities (Apr. 15,
1983) (The letter was issued Apr. 15, 1983 in response to an application filed on Oct. 26, 1981. This
letter was one of the new types of comfort letters).
EEC Antitrust Clearance Procedures
6:803(1984)
3. Alleged Drawbacks of the Existing Program
If frequency of use were an indicator of success, then it would ap-
pear that the EEC clearance program has been a much greater success
than its U.S. counterparts. On average, the Commission receives approx-
imately 160 new clearance applications each year,' while the Justice
Department and the FTC together receive on average only about thirty
applications annually." 5 And while the Commerce Department received
approximately 50 applications for export certificates in the first eight
months of that program's existence, many applications were not moti-
vated by antitrust uncertainty. 40 6 In contrast, the European Commission
received tens of thousands of applications during the first few years of the
EEC clearance program's existence." 7
These statistics, however, are misleading. In 1962 and for many
years thereafter, there was an enormous amount of uncertainty about
what Articles 85 and 86 prohibited, and that uncertainty undoubtedly
accounted to a very large extent for the early flood of applications."0
The antitrust laws were a new concept for most Europeans, and the total
lack of precedent and experience under those laws, along with immunity
from fines, likely prompted the vast majority of those applications.40 9 As
precedent, Commission notices, and group exemptions gradually re-
moved much of this initial uncertainty, and as experience with the Com-
mission's clearance program and enforcement policies grew, the number
of applications tapered off to the present level of approximately 160 ap-
plications per year. Many of these applications have been also prompted
not by uncertainty but by other factors.41 0
Moreover, the best indication of a successful clearance program is
not the number of applications filed but rather how well the program
relieves antitrust uncertainty. There are many complaints that certain
drawbacks of the EEC program prevent it from being a true success.
a The necessity of applying even in the absence of uncertainty
Special features of the EEC clearance program, not uncertainty, ac-
count in part for the large number of applications filed each year. In
contrast to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Article 85(1) has been inter-
404 See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
405 See supra note 79.
406 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
407 See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
408 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
409 Id
410 See infra pp. 157-60.
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preted almost literally, with a rule of reason type analysis playing only a
very limited role.411 Because there is no balancing of the pro- and an-
ticompetitive effects of the particular agreement, many restrictions which
on balance are not really anticompetitive are caught by Article 85(1)'s
prohibition, and businesses must turn to Article 85(3) for absolution.412
The problem with this arrangement is that regardless of its lack of
serious anticompetitive effect, no agreement violating Article 85(1) is
legal without a formal Commission exemption.4 13 Private lawyers may
believe that a client's agreement meets the criteria set forth in Article
85(3), and despite the absence of significant uncertainty, the agreement
must be notified if it is to be rendered legal. Without an official Commis-
sion exemption, the agreement is illegal and any party to it is exposed to
the possibility of Commission fines and administrative injunctions, claims
of nonenforceability by other parties to the agreement, and private law-
suits by third parties in member state courts. In the latter cases, regard-
less of how innocuous or even pro-competitive an agreement may be, a
member state court does not have the authority to exempt it and must
declare the agreement or, if possible, its severable objectionable parts, to
be null and void under Article 85(2).414 If the agreement has not been
notified for an exemption, the court cannot suspend its proceeding to
request the aid of the Commission or the Court of Justice.
In practice, some lawyers decide to take a chance and not notify
agreements under these circumstances. 415 Notification is purely volun-
tary, and these lawyers simply do not believe it is worth the delay, ex-
pense and other problems associated with the clearance program when
they are reasonably certain that the agreement would qualify for an ex-
emption. 416 They believe that at the present time the risks of not notify-
ing an agreement which likely would qualify for an exemption do not
outweigh the burdens of notification.417 they believe that the Commis-
411 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra, note 363. See also Forrester & Norall, The
Laicization of Community Law: Self-Help and the Rule of Reason." How Competition Law Is and
Could be Applied," 21 COMMON MKT. L. R.av. 11, 12 (1984); Van Houtte, supra note 17, at 499-500;
Korah, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity-The Need for a Rule of Reason in EEC Antitrust, 3
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 320, 354-55 (1981). This formalistic interpretation is similar to that devel-
oped by the German courts under Article 1 of the German Cartel law. I41
412 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. See also Forrester & Norall, supra
note 411, at 12.
413 Regulation 17/62, Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the Treaty of Rome.
414 Van Houtte, supra note 17, at 508. See generally Korah, supra note 411, at 333-34 n.48. Van
Bael, supra note 10, at 10.
415 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. See also Forrester & Norall, supra
note 411, at 16, 35.
416 Forrester & Norall, supra note 411. Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
417 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. According to Forrester and Norall,
EEC Antitrust Clearance Procedures
6:803(1984)
sion is unlikely to bring an action against such an agreement since the
Commission saves its scarce resources to prosecute serious antitrust vio-
lations.418 Furthermore, even if the Commission would bring an action,
they believe fines would be very unlikely against an agreement which
meets the standards of Article 85(3).419 In addition, they reason that at
present there is little risk that a private action would be brought by a
third party against the agreement.42 0 Third party actions are rare, even
against agreements which do not meet the criteria of Article 85(3),421 and
there is even less risk that an agreement which appears to satisfy those
criteria would be challenged.422 If the agreement would be challenged,
the parties to it may notify the agreement to the Commission at that
time, and the mere fact of notification usually carries great weight in
member state courts, especially when the agreement appears to deserve
an exemption.423 Since a member state court likely would be reluctant to
declare an agreement illegal unless it clearly does not qualify for an ex-
emption, the parties to the agreement believe there would be a good
chance that the proceedings would be suspended pending a Commission
decision.4 24
Nevertheless, many applications are filed despite a lack of substan-
tive antitrust uncertainty because of the procedural uncertainty created
by the Commission's monopoly over the exemption process.425
"such an approach entails the realistic acceptance of a substantial but tolerable level of uncertainty a
level with which many businessmen are perfectly willing to live." supra note 411, at 16.
418 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
419 'd The Commission has never imposed, and probably never would impose, fines for agree-
ments which were not notified but would have qualified for exemptions. Forrester & Norall, supra
note 411, at 34.
420 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363; Forrester & Norall, supra note 411,
at 35.
421 Forrester & Norall, supra note 411, at 35. Lang, supra note 23, at 352. Among other reasons,
few private actions are filed because of the absence of treble damages, because discovery is not as far-
reaching as in the United States, and because until 1979 no one was even sure that private damages
actions were possible. Id
422 Forrester & Norall, supra note 411, at 35; interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note
363.
423 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. Forrester & Norall, supra note 411,
at 35. During the period before notification, the parties would be exposed to the possibility of Com-
mission fines and member state sanctions since an exemption cannot be granted for a period earlier
than the date of notification. Regulation 17/62, Article 6(l) of the Treaty of Rome. However, if the
agreement would receive an exemption, it does not seem likely that any sanction would be applied by
the Commission. See supra note 419.
424 Forrester & Norall, supra note 411, at 35; interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note
363.
425 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. Some lawyers reportedly became so
reliant on the notification procedure that they notify agreements which clearly raise no antitrust
problems or which fit squarely within a group exemption. Idr; according to Forrester & Norall,
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Although a failure to apply for an exemption may not involve substantial
risks in a particular case, many lawyers and businesses understandably
want to comply with the law.426 Unfortunately, requiring so many un-
necessary notifications exacerbates many of the problems faced by busi-
nesses which do apply for reasons of uncertainty, and it diverts the
Commission's scarce resources from enforcement.
b. Problems caused by the paucity offormal decisions and delays in
receiving formal decisions
The EEC clearance program would be more attractive to many busi-
nesses if they could be assured of an expeditious decision. When the
system was devised in 1962, it was intended that every applicant would
receive a formal Commission decision on its application within a reason-
able amount of time.427 However, the clearance program has not oper-
ated as planned. Only a few formal decisions granting or denying an
exemption or a negative clearance are issued each year, and those appli-
cants who do receive a formal decision normally must wait years for it.428
The few applications chosen for a formal decision are those which will
help clarify an ambiguous area of the law or enable the Commission to
set or change its enforcement policies, or in which the applicant can
show a great need for a formal decision. 29
Many applicants are quite pleased if their application is never con-
sidered for a formal Commission decision, because they obtain sufficient
certainty merely by applying for a negative clearance or exemption.430 In
fact, some applicants would not apply unless they were fairly certain that
their application would not be considered for a formal decision.431 For
these applicants, the major impetus for applying is to gain immunity
from Commission fines,432 and as long as the Commission does not take
formal negative action433 on their application, the immunity lasts.434
supra 411, at 3: "Mhe Commission's insistence on retaining intellectual control of the assessment
of the validity of agreements tends further to perpetuate the phenomenon of overcentralization in
Brussels. Practitioners may feel they are encouraged to notify and leave the thinking to the experts."
426 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
427 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
428 See supra notes 391-93 and accompanying text.
429 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. See also Lang, supra note 23, at 352.
430 Interviews with private antitrust attorneys, supra note 363. See also Forrester & Norall, supra
note 411 at 16, n.7; Written Question No. 813-82, supra note 347.
431 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
432 Id
433 The Commission may terminate the immunity from fines only through the taking of a formal
decision denying the application or through a "provisional decision" under Regulation 17/62, Arti-
cle 15(6) of the Treaty of Rome. In the latter case, the Commission may suspend the immunity from
fines if "after a preliminary examination it is of the opinion that Article 85(1) of the Treaty applies
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Although a formal negative clearance or exemption would provide more
certainty, they do not view the marginal increase in security to be worth
the burdensome investigation, publicity, possible required modifications,
and other disadvantages which formal decisions usually entail.4" 5
However, the Commission's failure to render few formal decisions
or to issue those decisions it does take within a reasonable time may cre-
ate problems in some cases. First, an applicant and a member state court
may face difficulties if an agreement or practice is challenged in a mem-
ber state court. From the point of view of the applicant, the danger ex-
ists that a member state court might erroneously declare a notified
agreement or practice to be illegal under Article 85 or 86 and, in third
party suits, even award damages.436
Member state courts are obliged to suspend their proceedings and
either refer the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling
under Article 177 of the Treaty437 or allow the parties to elicit the Com-
mission's views.438 However, many member state courts have little or no
familiarity with EEC antitrust law439 and in some cases a member state
court may decline to suspend its proceedings and instead rule that the
agreement or practice is "clearly" illegal and, in the case of an Article
and that application of Article 85(3) is not justified." The procedure followed by the Commission in
adopting a provisional decision is extremely cumbersome and, as a result, the Commission has sus-
pended fine immunity with a provisional decision in only a handful of cases. See Leigh, Resurrection
of the Provisional Decision, 2 EuR. L. REv. 91, 92 (1977). The Commission has not passed a provi-
sional decision for several years. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
434 Regulation 17/62, Article 15(5)(a) of the Treaty of Rome. Until recent years applicants were
fairly well assured that the Commission would not take action on their application for many years,
often even if the agreement clearly did not qualify for an exemption. See Graupner, supra note 355,
at 296. However, notifying a clearly non-exemptable agreement will no longer gain immunity for a
long period of time. Commission officials now screen every application, and such agreements are
given priority. If the applicant will not modify or abandon the agreement, the Commission will
institute formal proceedings and perhaps even take a provisional decision under Regulation 17/62,
Article 15(6) of the Treaty of Rome. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. Appli-
cants which notify an agreement in cases of true uncertainty, Le., when it cannot be predicted what
the Commission's position would be, normally can count on a long period of fine immunity. Even if
theirs is the rare case that is singled out for a formal Commission decision, it normally takes years
for the Commission to pass a decision. Moreover, they cannot be fined for the period during which
the agreement is notified before the Commission's formal action.
435 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
436 Id. See also Van Houtte, supra note 17, at 508-09; Korah, supra note 24, at 24; Van Bael,
supra note 10, at 3.
437 See supra note 9.
438 The Court of Justice has held that the member state court may suspend proceedings and
either refer the question to the Court of Justice under Article 177 or allow the parties to obtain the
Commission's viewpoint. Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 77, 86-87, 12
Common Mkt. L.R. 287, 302-03 (1973). The member state court may rule on the matter itseif if it
finds that the agreement either does not violate Article 85(1) or Article 86.
439 See supra note 401.
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85(1) violation, would not qualify for an exemption, when in fact the
Commission or Court of Justice would find otherwise.' 4 This possibility
is not unlikely considering that on many issues the interpretation of the
prohibitions contained in Articles 85(1) and 86 are not settled' 1 and that
the propriety of an individual exemption under Article 85(3) depends on
a complex and difficult evaluation of the particular facts of the agreement
in question.' 2 A member state court may also be influenced to declare
an agreement or practice illegal without first referring the issue to the
Commission or Court of Justice because of the often long delays involved
in doing so."' On average it takes approximately twelve months to ob-
tain a ruling from the Court of Justice after a reference has been made to
it by a national court under Article 177.44
From the point of view of a member state court, a dilemma may
arise when a plaintiff petitions it to find an agreement or practice in viola-
tion of EEC antitrust law. If it has any doubt about the legality of the
agreement or practice, it may allow one or both parties to seek advice
from the Commission, or it may refer a question to the Court of Justice
under Article 177.14 But in doing so, it knows it probably will be quite
some time, even years, before it gets such help, particularly if it desires a
formal decision of either the Commission or the Court of Justice." 6 In
fact, it has no choice but to suspend its proceedings and wait until the
Commission passes a formal exemption even if it has no doubt that an
agreement deserves an individual exemption, because only the Commis-
sion can grant such an exemption and only by means of a formal deci-
sion.' 7 In either situation, the member state court may have to decide
whether to grant interlocutory relief until it receives a response from the
Commission or the Court of Justice." If it denies interlocutory relief,
the plaintiff may suffer injustice during the often long wait if the agree-
440 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
441 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
442 See supra notes I1 and 17 and accompanying text.
443 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
444 See House of Lords Report, supra note 386, at xix.
445 See supra note 438 and accompanying text. During the early years of the EEC the Commis-
sion was reluctant to render its opinion in cases before national courts. See Forrester and Norall,
supra note 411, at 49. The Commission now welcomes such requests for advice. See THImREENTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 282, at pt. 218.
446 See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
447 See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
448 See Faull & Weiler, Conflicts of Resolution in European Competition Law, 3 EuR. L. REv.
116, 137 (1978); Korah, supra note 411, at 329. The Court of Justice has never ruled upon the extent
of a member state court's authority to grant interlocutory relief when it suspends its proceedings
under these circumstances. Id.
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ment or practice is later found illegal and not exemptable. 49 But grant-
ig such relief may be equally unjust to the defendant if it later prevails.
A second potential problem created by the Commission's inability to
issue formal decisions within a reasonable period of time arises when the
Commission decides to consider an application for a formal decision. If,
as is usually the case,450 an applicant decided not to wait years for a
response and already put the agreement or practice into effect, there is a
very good chance that the Commission will require it to modify or aban-
don its conduct and its investment in it.45" Even if only modifications
rather than total abandonment are required, the modifications may be
highly unfavorable and perhaps render the agreement or practice no
longer economically worthwhile for the parties. 52 In the case of an
agreement, the modifications may fundamentally alter the terms of the
contract and require a renegotiation by the parties. In such cases, it is
quite likely that in the interim the bargaining position of the parties may
have changed, resulting in one of the parties being at a disadvantage.45"
In addition to searching for new ways to streamline its formal deci-
sion-making procedure to increase the number of formal exemptions and
the speed with which they are issued,454 the Commission already has
taken a number of other steps to alleviate the above-mentioned problems.
First, it has promulgated a series of group exemptions, formal notices,
and less formal public statements by Commission officials interpreting
the antitrust laws in an effort to educate both the business community
and member state courts about what the antitrust laws prohibit.455 By
examining these Commission promulgations and statements, member
state courts are assisted in determining whether an agreement or practice
is illegal so that it may avoid suspending its proceedings to seek the
assistance of the Commission or Court of Justice. Moreover, this Com-
mission guidance reduces the chances of an erroneous decision by a
member state court. Group exemptions also save businesses the time,
expense and other problems associated with applying for an individual
exemption, and they enable member state courts to enforce agreements
meeting the criteria of Article 85(3) without the need to suspend its pro-
ceedings to await an individual exemption by the Commission.
However, these measures provide only a partial solution. As al-
449 Faull & Weiler, supra note 448, at 137.
450 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers supra, note 363.
451 d; interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
452 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
453 Id See also Korah, supra note 411, at 351.
454 See ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra note 325, at 15.
455 See supra notes 26 and 295 and accompanying text.
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ready noted,456 group exemptions and Commission notices and an-
nouncements cannot take individual circumstances into account and
hence may provide inadequate guidance to member state courts. More-
over, they only cover a limited field of activities and hence there is no
applicable group exemption or notice covering many types of business
arrangements.457 The coverage of group exemptions is further narrowed
by the fact that the Commission limits group exemptions to agreements
which meet very strict conditions and in some cases to businesses which
do not exceed a certain annual turnover or market share.45 8
To qualify under a particular group exemption, businesses are re-
quired to tailor their agreements to the stringent requirements of the
group exemption, thereby often losing a great deal of flexibility in their
business dealings. Some businesses simply refuse to adhere to these
"codes of conduct" in order to qualify for an automatic exemption.459
Still other businesses are disqualified at the outset because of the number
of parties to the agreement or because of their turnover or market
share. 60 Some businesses and lawyers also complain that if an agree-
ment falls within a general area addressed by a group exemption but the
agreement does not qualify under it, there is a negative inference that the
agreement is illegal.461  Finally, group exemptions and Commission no-
tices are strictly construed by the Commission, and in some cases busi-
nesses feel forced to file for an individual exemption rather than live with
the uncertainty of whether their agreement qualifies under a group
exemption.462
A second step taken by the Commission to relieve some of the diffi-
culties caused by its failure to issue formal decisions efficiently is in some
cases to express its view to member state courts about the applicability of
Article 85(1) or Article 86, or about the likelihood of an individual ex-
456 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
457 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. See also Van Houtte, supra note 17,
at 508. U.S. antitrust agency guidelines are also criticized on this ground. Interviews with private
antitrust lawyers, in Washington (Jan. 23-26, 1984).
458 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. See also Van Houtte, supra note 17,
at 508-09. Van Bael, supra note 10, at 6. Regulation 417/85, supra note 295 for example, provides
both a market share and turnover test in Article 3.
459 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra, note 363. See also Forrester & Norall, supra
note 411, at 5-6; Van Houtte, supra note 17, at 508-09.
460 For example, Regulation 19/65 supra note 295 states that group exemptions must be limited
to bilateral agreements and are not applicable to agreements involving more than two parties.
461 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. See also Forrester & Norall, supra
note 411, at 25.
462 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. See Ferry, supra note 4, at 11
("blanket exemptions and guidelines, being derogations, must be construed strictly").
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emption, before or in lieu of an official decision." 3 This enables a mem-
ber state court to suspend its proceedings for a much shorter period of
time than if it would have to wait for a formal Commission or Court of
Justice decision, unless a formal Commission exemption is necessary. 4
In the latter case, a member state court at least has a good indication
whether it should grant a temporary injunction pending the Commis-
sion's decision since it receives an indication from the Commission as to
whether the defendant will eventually receive an exemption. Unfortu-
nately, although the Commission is contemplating the creation of a for-
mal consultative procedure," at this time it only provides this assistance
on an ad hoc basis and has not announced to the business community or
the member state courts the conditions under which it is willing to render
such informal guidance."6 Furthermore, member state courts some-
times are not content with this informal DG-IV opinion and instead in-
sist on a formal Commission decision." 7
As a third measure, the Commission is willing to provide informal,
non-binding advice to businesses about the antitrust merits of an agree-
ment or practice before they sign an agreement or commit resources to
an agreement or practice.468 In some cases, the parties can alter their
agreement or practice at the outset or forego the activity altogether if the
modifications are unacceptable. This helps avoid the problems which
changes required long after implementation may bring." 9 This advice,
however, may take some time to obtain, particularly in complex cases in
which a fuller investigation and analysis are necessary.47 Moreover, this
informal advice from an official in the Competition Directorate is not
legally binding upon the Commission, and modifications may be required
later.471 Finally, many businesses and lawyers are unaware that such an
opportunity for informal advice is available. 472
A fourth step was the creation of the non-opposition exemption pro-
463 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. See also Faull and Weiler, supra note
448, at 138.
4 6 4 The Competition Directorate may express its view that the agreement or practice does not
violate Articles 85(1) or 86, or it may state that the agreement violates Article 85(1) but does not
qualify for an exemption under Article 85(3) or any relevant group exemption. In neither case is a
formal decision necessary. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
465 THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETrTION POLICY, supra note 282, at pt. 218.
466 Faull & Weiler, supra note 430, at 138; interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
467 Letter from R. Daofit, supra note 367.
468 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
469 Id. See infra notes 427-446 and accompanying text.
470 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
471 Id The "morally" binding effect of this informal advice will be greater if obtained from a high
ranking official in DG-IV. Id
472 I d; interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
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cedure under recent group exemptions.473
c. Disadvantages of comfort letters
A fifth measure taken by the Commission to compensate for the
paucity of formal decisions and the delays in obtaining them was the
creation of a new type of individual clearance, the comfort letter. The
Commission issues a large number of comfort letters each year.474 Ap-
plicants who request and merit a comfort letter normally will receive one
from the Commission.4" Many applicants prefer a comfort letter to a
formal decision476 for three reasons: (1) they are issued much more
quickly than formal decisions,4 7 7 (2) applicants normally have to submit
little if any information beyond that contained in Form A/B,47 and
(3) the applicant does not lose its immunity from Commission fines."7
In spite of these advantages, some businesses and lawyers criticize
comfort letters on a number of grounds. First, they stress that a comfort
letter has no legally binding effect on the Commission itself and that the
Commission may taken action later against the agreement or practice.480
The Commission has acknowledged publicly that comfort letters and
other informal settlements may have "less legal value than a formal deci-
sion," '481 and in a few celebrated cases the Commission has challenged
agreements before the Court of Justice which it had cleared with comfort
letters, arguing that comfort letters are not legally binding upon it as
formal exemptions are.4 82
In practice, however, comfort letters have a significant morally bind-
ing effect on the Commission. Although the Commission has acted in a
few instances contrary to a comfort letter, it has always done so with
good reason, such as when additional material facts emerged, material
facts changed, a decision of the Court of Justice undermined the legal
basis upon which the letter was based, or the actual agreement imple-
473 Seep. 181.
474 There are no publicly available statistics about the precise number.
475 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
476 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
477 See supra note 401 and accompanying text.
478 See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
479 See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
480 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363; Van Bad, supra, note 10, at 5; C.
KERSE, supra, note 274, at 158; House of Lords Report, supra note 386, at p. 9 (submission of the
Joint Working Party of the Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar and the Law Society on Compe-
tition Law).
481 FIrH REPORT ON COMPETITON POLICY 9 (April, 1976).
482 Frubo v. Commission, (Case 71/74), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 563, 15 Common Mkt. L.R.
646 (1975); DeBloos v. Bouyer, (Case 59/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2359, 21 Common Mkt.
L.R. 511 (1978); the Perfumes cases, supra note 316.
EEC Antitrust Clearance Procedures
6:803(1984)
mented differed materially from the one notified.483 While it is true that
the Commission has never revoked a negative clearance or exemption,484
it is also true that the beneficiaries of such formal decisions have to pay a
much dearer price for them in terms of time, expense and administrative
burden. This is particularly true with an exemption, because in return
for its legally binding protection, applicants must endure a long, burden-
some investigation.485 They are also burdened with periodic reporting re-
quirements.486 When viewed in this light, it is no surprise that many
businesses prefer a comfort letter to a negative clearance or even a legally
binding exemption.487
A second criticism of comfort letters is that they do not legally or
morally bind member states courts which are free to declare an agree-
ment or practice cleared by a comfort letter illegal and even award dam-
ages or an injunction.488 However, the Court of Justice has instructed
member state courts to give comfort letters significant weight.489 Because
of this directive, and because of the Commission's unrecognized expertise
and authority in EEC antitrust matters, member state courts have never
acted contrary to the Commission's position taken in a comfort letter.4 90
Third, critics emphasize that if a comfort letter is based on the likeli-
hood of an individual exemption under Article 85(3), a member state
court nevertheless is powerless to enforce the agreement even if it wants
to follow the Commission's view, because only the Commission through
a formal decision can grant an exemption.49' However, in such cases a
member state court can suspend its proceedings to await a formal exemp-
tion without granting interlocutory relief to the plaintiff. No injustice
would be done since the defendant would not be harmed during the wait
regardless of its duration. The agreement would remain valid and en-
forceable. The Commission has expressed its willingness to reopen a fie
483 See C. KERsE, supra note 274, at 160; Lang, supra note 23, at 355. For example, in Camera
Care Ltd. v. Victor Hasselblad AB, 25 O.J Eur. Comm. (No. 161) 18 (1982), 34 Common Mkt. L.R.
233 (1982), the Commission issued a negative decision against an agreement previously cleared by a
comfort letter. However, the agreement actually implemented by the notifying parties "departed in
several particulars from the sole distributorship agreement notified to the Commission." Id, at 238,
point 9.
484 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
485 See supra notes 343-82 and accompanying text.
486 See supra notes 305 and accompanying text.
487 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
488 Id See Van Houtte, supra note 17, at 508; Faull and Weiler, supra note 448.
489 Lancome v. Etos and Albert Heijn, (Case 99/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2511, 2538, 31
Common Mkt. L.R. 164, 179 (1981).
490 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
491 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
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under these circumstances and to proceed with a formal decision.492
Fourth, comfort letters have been criticized for their brevity and fre-
quent ambiguity: not only are the legal and business communities de-
prived of a potentially significant body of precedent and guidance, but
also the persuasive value of the letters may be diminished in member
state court litigation.493 The Competition Directorate acknowledges this
deficiency, but it states that this is a necessary drawback if the Director-
ate is to issue letters quickly and efficiently.494 Since no member state
court has yet acted contrary to a comfort letter, this problem does not
seem to be serious in any event.
Fifth, critics note that while comfort letters may shorten the wait for
a Commission response, they still usually require waiting many months
and in some cases more than a year,495 and hence the problems caused by
delays in waiting for formal exemptions496 are not eliminated. Indeed,
before a comfort letter is issued, a member state court may be faced with
a suit challenging the agreement or practice. However, the length of time
the member state court must wait is normally considerably less than that
involved for formal decisions. Moreover, if a member state court knows
the Commission is about to express its views, it might be less inclined to
decide the matter first,4 97 thereby avoiding the possibility of an inconsis-
tent decision.498 Any injustice caused by the court's decision to either
grant or deny interlocutory relief 99 would also be limited to a shorter
period of time. Although still a potential problem, such a possibility is
raised in any litigation when a court must decide at the outset whether to
grant interlocutory relief.
Other previously discussed potential problems raised by delay, Le.,
modifications required by the Commission after the investment has been
made and, in the case of agreements, the necessity of renegotiation if the
agreement had already been signed," o are also not totally solved by com-
fort letters. However, given the shorter wait for a comfort letter, the
parties may be able to wait for the letter before signing the agreement or
investing any significant sums in the agreement or practice. If the ur-
gency of the matter were explained to the Competition Directorate, it
492 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
493 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
494 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
495 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
496 See supra notes 427-38 and accompanying text.
497 See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
498 See supra note 440 and accompanying text.
499 See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
50 See supra notes 451-53 and accompanying text.
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likely would do its best to expedite the matter." 1
d. Conservatism
Some businesses and lawyers have voiced their concern that the
Commission is too conservative in its evaluation of applications for clear-
ance,5"2 although this complaint does not appear as prevalent as it is
against antitrust officials in the United States.5"' The criticism is not so
much that the Commission is not willing to grant a clearance, but rather
that it too often requires unnecessary modifications before it will grant a
clearance.5 04
Testing the accuracy of this charge is just as difficult as in the
United States and for the same reasons.505 However, the fact that this is
not a frequent complaint indicates it is not a recurring problem. More-
over, because the Commission plays a much greater role than the Ameri-
can antitrust agencies in determining what the law actually is, 50 6
mandatory modifications are usually precisely what the Court of Justice
would require. The complaint, therefore, is directed more at the strict-
ness of the law than at the any undue conservatism in the Commission's
clearance decisions.
Finally, the possible causes of conservatism in United States clear-
ance program507 are not present in the EEC. Unlike under United States
programs, the Court of Justice can review negative Commission deci-
sions,50 ' the EEC clearance program is legislatively mandated, 0 9 the
staff members of the Competition Directorate are accustomed to being
regulators and not just enforcers, 10 and mistakes are easily corrected
except in those few cases receiving formal exemptions.511 The mere fact
that the Commission is often willing to issue comfort letters purely on
the basis of the facts supplied by the applicants512 demonstrates how un-
conservative the Commission is compared with the FTC or especially the
501 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
502 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
503 See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
504 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
505 See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
506 See supra note 268.
507 See supra notes 173-96 and accompanying text.
508 See Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome.
509 See Regulation 17/62 and Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome.
510 For many officials in the Competition Directorate, the processing of clearance requests re-
quires a substantial amount of their time. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
511 Only in the case of exemptions is the Commission required to pass a formal revocation deci-
sion. Id
512 See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
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Justice Department, which usually conduct independent investigations
despite the fact that their clearances are not legally binding. 1 3
e. Administrative burden and expense
The demands placed upon applicants are not overly burdensome in
the vast majority of cases. If the file is never considered for action, the
only burden on the applicant is filling out Form A/B. Even when the
Commission considers an application for a comfort letter, normally only
a moderate amount of information, if any, is required beyond what is
contained in Form A/B.51 4 It is true that in those few cases considered
for a formal decision, and particularly if an exemption rather than a neg-
ative clearance is contemplated, the demands placed on the applicant can
be significant.5"' There are also added burdens after receiving exemp-
tions since those clearances are subject to expiration dates and reporting
obligations.516
However, particularly in the case of an exemption, these demands
normally can be justified. Exemptions have a significant legally binding
effect517 and are extremely difficult to revoke.51 8 Furthermore, in the
case of both exemptions and negative clearances, the Commission often
addresses novel legal issues or clarifies ambiguous issues of the law for
the entire business community;5" 9 and hence a greater degree of caution
is justifiable. The burden, therefore, appears to be proportionate to the
value of these formal clearances.
f Government scrutiny
As in the United States,520 some businesses fear that applying for a
clearance will expose all of their activities to present and future scrutiny
by the Commission as well as by the member state antitrust authorities
which automatically receive a copy of the application and the supporting
513 See supra notes 51 and 87 and accompanying text.
514 See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
515 See supra notes 343-82 and accompanying text.
516 See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
517 Both the Commission and member state courts are legally bound by an exemption until it
expires or is revoked by a formal decision of the Commission. Interviews with Commission officials,
supra note 282.
518 In order to revoke an exemption, the Commission must go through the burdensome process of
passing a formal revocation decision. In practice, the Commission has never revoked an exemption
but instead has allowed them to expire without renewal. Interviews with Commission officials, supra
note 282.
519 See supra note 429 and accompanying text. The Commission stresses that the precedential
value of a clearance is limited to situations in which the facts are nearly identical to the clearance
case. Letter from R. Daofit, supra note 367.
520 See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
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material.521 Unless these businesses believe that their conduct may be
suspect, however, this concern would appear unfounded. Commission
officials contend that there is no basis in fact for such fear of Commission
scrutiny, particularly when one considers how scarce the Commission's
resources are.
522
As in the United States,5 23 many businesses in the EEC believe that
there is a good chance their conduct will never be noticed, or not prose-
cuted even if noticed, because of the Commission's meager antitrust
staff.524 Unlike in the United States,5 2 5 the risk of private causes of ac-
tion by third parties under EEC antitrust law is not significant.5 26 This
risk calculation is one each business must make for itself in deciding
whether to apply. The clearance program is voluntary, and businesses
must decide for themselves whether they will utilize it.
g. Confidentiality
Confidentiality does not appear to be a major concern for most ap-
plicants. Information submitted by applicants and third parties is not
put on public file.527 There is no EEC equivalent of the Freedom of In-
formation Act, and hence third parties do not have easy access to infor-
mation submitted in support of an application.528 In fact, there is no
publicly accessible register of applications, and the Commission consid-
ers the mere act of filing to be confidential.529 If the Commission denies
parties access to this information, it is not a judicially reviewable act.530
Furthermore, the Commission and the member state authorities which
receive this information are obliged not to disclose this data if it is related
to "professional secrecy. ' '531 Finally, in publishing a notice or final deci-
sion the Commission also is obliged to "have regard to the legitimate
interest of the undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. '5 32
521 See Regulation 17/62, Article 10(1) of the Treaty of Rome; interviews with private antitrust
lawyers, supra note 363; Forrester & Norall, supra note 411, at 33.
522 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
523 See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
524 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. Only 30 Competition Directorate
officials spend part of their time on clearance applications. See supra, note 337.
525 See supra note 23.
526 See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
527 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
528 1,1
529 Forrester & Norall, supra note 411, at 48.
530 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
531 Regulation 17/62, Article 20(2) of the Treaty of Rome.
532 Regulation 17/62, Article 19(3) of the Treaty of Rome.
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h. Publicity
Publicity is a potential concern in those few cases selected for a for-
mal decision,533 a special comfort letter,534 or a press release. 535 The vast
majority of applications receive no publicity whatsoever.536 In those
cases which are publicized, the publicity does not occur at the time of the
application but instead comes shortly before (in the case of formal deci-
sions and special comfort letters) or after (in the case of regular comfort
letters) issuance.5 37 In many cases, this publicity does little harm to the
applicant's competitive position since the agreement or practice usually
has already been implemented for a substantial time period at the time of
the publicity.538 During its independent investigation of an application,
the Commission may inform competitors much earlier in some cases,
however.5 39 Furthermore, publicity has little chance of inviting third
party actions since such actions are infrequent, especially when an ex-
emption, negative clearance or comfort letter has been issued.54
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
As the preceding examination of the United States and EEC clear-
ance programs indicates, these programs have serious drawbacks which
detract from their ability in many cases to provide businesses with an
adequate degree of certainty that their conduct will not expose them to
antitrust liability. In order to increase antitrust certainty, each system
could adopt a number of reforms of their existing programs.
A. Improving United States Clearance Programs
Existing United States clearance programs, particularly the Business
Review and Advisory Opinion Programs, are in need of a variety of re-
forms if these programs are to make a significant contribution to cer-
tainty under United States antitrust laws. These programs suffer from a
533 See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
534 See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
535 Even old-fashioned comfort letters are sometimes publicized in a press release, not to elicit
third party comment, but because of their "particular importance, either because of the points of law
raised or because of the economic power of the firms involved.. ." SIXTH REPORT ON COMPaTI-
TION POLICY 11 (April, 1977). See also C. KERSE, supra note 274, at 157-58.
536 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
537 Id
538 Many applicants do not wait for a Commission decision or comfort letter. Id
539 Independent investigations are almost always done when an application is being considered
for a formal decision but not as often when a comfort letter is contemplated. See supra note 394 and
accompanying text.
540 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282; See supra notes 420-22 and accompany-
ing text.
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number of problems, both real and perceived, which have prevented
them from being viewed by most businesses as an acceptable option for
relieving antitrust uncertainty. In fact, these programs are held in such
low esteem by businesses and the bar that they are infrequently em-
ployed541 and, on those occasions when they are employed, relief from
antitrust uncertainty is often not the reason for the application. 42
The following suggested improvements of the United States clear-
ance programs are derived both from the advantageous features of the
EEC program as well as from positive aspects of the three United States
clearance programs themselves, particularly the new Export Certification
Program. Although this paper advances these proposals in the frame-
work of an entirely new clearance program, most of the features of the
proposed program could be used to improve each of the three existing
programs if a single program would not be adopted.
1. A Single Statutory Program Administered by a Special Office
The United States would be well advised to follow the EEC's exam-
ple and adopt a single statutory clearance program administered by a
central office with a staff experienced with the procedure of the program
and attuned to its goals. A single statutory clearance program would
have several advantages over the existing trio of separate and overlapping
programs. First, a single program would enable businesses to obtain a
clearance with an equally binding effect on all of the antitrust enforce-
ment agencies, regardless of whether the conduct in question involves
domestic or export-related activities. Under the Business Review and
Advisory Opinion Programs, businesses are uncertain about the extent to
which a business review letter or advisory opinion binds the other anti-
trust agency not involved in the clearance decision.543 The Export Certi-
fication Program does remedy this drawback by making the certificate
equally binding on all antitrust agencies, 5" but that clearance is limited
to export-related activity.
Second, a unified or single program could remove possible sources of
the undue conservatism which afflicts the Business Review and Advisory
Opinion Programs. 45 By entrusting the program to a select group of
antitrust officials whose sole function is to administer the program, appli-
cants could be more confident that staff members experienced with the
541 See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
542 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
543 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
544 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
545 See supra notes 173-96 and accompanying text.
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program and familiar with the objective of the program would process
their applications. The staffs experience and understanding of the pro-
gram's purpose could reduce the likelihood that a clearance application
would be treated with suspicion.546 Because they would not be involved
with antitrust enforcement, the staff members handling clearance re-
quests would be less likely to have an "enforcer" mentality547 and instead
could be expected to be more objective and less suspicious of applicants
making a good faith effort to comply with the antitrust laws. Moreover,
giving the staff members a clear statutory mandate could reduce their
reluctance to issue clearances in close cases.548
Third, a statutorily mandated clearance program could enhance the
value of the program in the eyes of a skeptical business community. The
security of having a clearance sanctioned by Congress could greatly in-
crease the attractiveness of the program to businesses which now are
wary of the Business Review and Advisory Opinion Programs because
those Programs are not authorized by statute.549 Moreover, businesses
could expect the statutorily mandated clearance to be a more persuasive
authority before a court hearing a challenge of a cleared activity and, as a
result, to be more of a deterrent to private actions. 550
Finally, placing the administration of the program in a central office
could significantly reduce the inefficient handling of requests which now
undermines the attractiveness of the three existing programs.551 Unlike
under the Business Review and Advisory Opinion Programs, 552 the same
group of staff members could handle all requests pursuant to detailed
procedural guidelines. The burden and delay involved in applying would
no longer depend to such a large extent on the inexperience of the partic-
ular staff members assigned to the application.553 Moreover, unlike
under the Export Certification Program,554 only one agency would be
involved, and consequently applicants would not be subjected to duplica-
tive and conflicting requests or be the victims of inter-agency disputes
over the drafting of clearances. Furthermore, as is increasingly the case
with the Export Certification Program,555 the staff of the central office
would likely develop experience, streamlined processing procedures, and
546 See supra note 50.
547 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
548 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
549 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23-26, 1984).
550 Id.
551 See supra notes 41-58, 68-92, and 121-25 and accompanying text.
552 See supra notes 45 and 82, and accompanying text.
553 See supra notes 48 and 89 and accompanying text.
554 See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
555 See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
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standard language (boilerplate) which could reduce the burdens and de-
lays now facing applicants under the Business Review and Advisory
Opinion Programs. 56
A major obstacle to the adoption of this proposal could be the reluc-
tance of the agencies excluded from the program to give up their current
role in their separate clearance programs.5 7 In order to gain passage of
the program, it may be necessary to give each of those agencies some
limited role in processing applications raising issues in their area of ex-
pertise. For example, with regard to export-related requests, the Com-
merce Department might insist on the opportunity to become involved in
the decision-making process. If such a compromise would be necessary,
in order to avoid the duplicative efforts which hinder the efficiency of the
Export Certification Program,55  a clear division of responsibilities be-
tween the agencies could be prescribed, and the agency playing the lesser
role in the process could be required to assign the matter to staff mem-
bers experienced with the program.
2. Two Levels of Clearance
One of the most advantageous features of the EEC and FTC clear-
ance programs is the availability of more than one level of clearance.
Because the processing of the more binding level of clearance requires
more of each agency's scarce resources and is more burdensome and
time-consuming for the applicant, it is reserved in each program only for
those applications which truly need a more binding clearance, or which
can give more certainty to the business community as a whole by clarify-
ing the law or the agency's enforcement policy. 59 The European Com-
mission and the FTC use the second level of clearance for the vast
majority of applications to provide a lesser but reasonable amount of cer-
tainty at a lower cost to the agency and the applicant.5" Neither the
Business Review nor the Export Certification Programs have such an effi-
cient option. In both, only the more resource- and time-consuming level
of clearance is available. 61
The new clearance program could adopt the EEC and FTC ap-
proach and improve on it. Several levels of clearance could be made
556 See supra notes 219-33 and accompanying text.
557 Several government officials involved in the processing of clearance applications under the
current U.S. programs opposed such an idea. See supra note 549.
558 See Margulies, supra note 104, at 20.
559 See supra notes 69 and 429 and accompanying text.
560 See supra notes 197-205, 462-75 and accompanying text.
561 See supra notes 35-67, 93-162 and accompanying text.
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available. As under the EEC and FTC programs, 562 applicants could be
allowed to express a preference for a particular level of clearance, and the
agency could grant that preference unless it is clearly not appropriate
under the circumstances. For example, in cases where the most binding
level of clearance is requested, in order to conserve its resources the
agency could be given the authority to consider the application for a less
binding level of clearance if in the agency's view the applicant does not
really need the more binding clearance. Conversely, if a business prefers
a less binding level of clearance because it would be less burdensome to
acquire, the agency could be allowed to consider the application for a
more binding clearance involving a more extensive investigation and
analysis if the application raises a novel issue or is too complex for a less
intensive evaluation.
The following levels of clearance could be made available:
a. Certification
A level of clearance with a high degree of legally binding effect
could be reserved only for applications (1) in which the applicant demon-
strates a true need for a highly binding level of clearance; (2) which are
so complex that an extensive investigation of the facts and a refined eco-
nomic analysis are required; (3) which present a novel legal issue, the
resolution of which should have the concurrence of the highest antitrust
officials; and/or (4) which present the agency with an opportunity to
clarify existing law or enforcement policy.
This level of clearance could provide protection similar in many re-
spects to that provided by the Export Certification Program.563 This
clearance could insulate the recipient from both federal and state anti-
trust actions by government and private parties, with the following ex-
ception: to protect the rights of third parties affected by the clearance,
those parties could be allowed to appeal the agency's certification deci-
sion to a federal court within a limited period of time. If a court would
overturn the certification decision, the certificate holder could be made
liable for damages only from the date of the court's decision unless the
plaintiff could show that the holder acted in bad faith. As a further mea-
sure of protection for third parties, upon a showing of good cause, a fed-
eral court could have the power to temporarily enjoin the objectionable
aspect of the certified conduct until a final decision is rendered.
Also as under the Export Certification Program,5" conduct clearly
562 See supra notes 72 and 365 and accompanying text.
563 See supra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
564 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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outside the scope of the certificate could be denied protection. Materially
changed circumstances could result in revocation of the certificate and,
absent a showing of bad faith, the certificate holder could be protected
from liability until the date of revocation. Furthermore, formal amend-
ment and revocation procedures could be adopted to protect the certifi-
cate holder, as under the Export Certification Program. 65 A certificate
holder could be allowed to extend its certificate to cover new activities,
and it could be assured of adequate notice and an opportunity to termi-
nate its objectionable activity if the agency would decide to revoke or
modify its certificate.
To better protect certificate holders from frivolous or speculative lit-
igation than does the Export Certification Program, third parties and the
antitrust agencies not in charge of the clearance program could first be
required to file a complaint with the agency in charge of the program.
The complainants could request the agency to revoke or modify the cer-
tificate because of changed circumstances or to declare that the conduct
of the certificate holder which is neither clearly within nor outside the
certificate exceeds the intended scope of the certificate. If, on the other
hand, the agency would refuse this request, the complainant could then
be allowed to appeal to a Federal court, but, as under the Export Certifi-
cation Program, a presumption of legality could be raised in favor of the
agency's decision. If the agency would either revoke the certificate or
find the conduct to be outside the certificate, an action in federal court
could be allowed, but the court could be given the power to limit the
recovery to actual damages if the certificate holder acted in good faith.
Finally, as under the Export Certification Program, a business,
whose application is denied or is approved only upon conditions believed
to be unjustified, could be given the right to appeal the agency's action to
the federal courts. Similarly, a certificate holder could be allowed to
challenge a revocation or modification of its certificate. The right to judi-
cial review could assure those businesses that fear unduly conservative
decisions by the antitrust agencies that those decisions would be subject
to independent review. 66 Judicial review could induce the agency to jus-
tify its negative decisions and thereby remove a source of conservatism
which is alleged to exist under the Business Review and Advisory Opin-
ion Programs.5 6 7
In return for this significant degree of protection from antitrust ac-
tions, the applicant could be required to cooperate in an extensive investi-
565 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
566 See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
567 Id
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gation proportionate to the value of the clearance received. Because the
right of third parties and the government to bring suit would be drasti-
cally curtailed by the certificate, and because of the possible precedent-
setting effect of these decisions, the government justifiably would be cau-
tious in its investigation, analysis and internal review of applications.
Therefore the applicant fairly could be expected to cooperate in supply-
ing information.
Furthermore, in order to facilitate the resolution of potential subse-
quent disputes over the exact scope and legal basis of the certificate or the
denial thereof, and to provide a valuable source of precedent for the busi-
ness community as a whole, the agency's decision could be required to
contain an elaboration of the facts and legal analysis upon which it is
based. 68 Since the agency would issue relatively few of these clearances,
this requirement would not necessarily place an unmanageable burden on
its staff. 69 In order to make the agency less reluctant to issue these bind-
ing certificates and to protect third parties and the public from anticom-
petitive activities, certificates could also be issued under express
conditions and obligations, such as reporting requirements and, in appro-
priate cases, an expiration date. 7°
To further encourage applications from businesses uncomfortable
with dealing with the government, an applicant could be assured that it
could withdraw its application for any reason and receive all copies of
information it submitted, as is the case under the Export Certification
Program. 7 1 This would enable applicants who find information re-
quests, required modifications, or conditions and obligations too onerous,
to withdraw their application without the fear that a file full of their vital
business information would remain with the government.572 Of course,
the government would not be precluded from later bringing suit against
the implemented conduct and obtaining the information through its in-
vestigatory powers if it believed the conduct to be illegal.
One final protection could be extended to applicants to further in-
crease the attractiveness of this clearance program. Since this level of
clearance would normally take a long time to process, deserving appli-
cants could receive some sort of interim protection from damages until
the agency reaches its decision. Such protection could consist of limiting
568 Many private lawyers would welcome such a development. Interviews with private antitrust
lawyers, supra note 549.
569 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
570 Reporting requirements are used under the Export Certification Program for this reason. See
supra note 129 and accompanying text.
571 15 C.F.R. § 325.11 (1984).
572 Id.
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liability to interlocutory relief. However, to safeguard the interests of
third parties and the public from possible abuses of such provisional va-
lidity,573 this protection could be granted only after the agency initially
reviewed the application and found the application merited such tempo-
rary protection. If upon closer examination the agency would decide to
deny the application, the applicant would be subject to antitrust liability
only, if it continued the objectionable conduct. Without provisional pro-
tection, applicants would face the risk of full antitrust liability if they
chose not to wait to implement their conduct and the agency later reject
their application or accept it only after modifications. That risk under
the existing clearance programs deters many potential applicants who do
not want to or cannot wait.574 In fact, under the Business Review Pro-
gram, applicants are required to await a decision of the Justice Depart-
ment since it will not consider ongoing activities for a business review
letter.575
b. Business review letters
A second, less binding level of clearance could be reserved for appli-
cations which the agency feels do not need the certification level of clear-
ance. As with EEC comfort letters and FTC staff advisory opinions,5 76
the intensity of the agency's investigation of the application and its inter-
nal review of the draft-clearance, could be significantly less compared to
that needed for the certification process since the binding effect of this
second level of clearance would be correspondingly less. Consequently,
the burden and delay applicants would endure would also be less. When-
ever possible, the information required could be limited to that contained
in the application unless the application is materially deficient. To en-
courage full disclosure, the protection of the clearance could be limited
to those facts disclosed by the applicant, and penalties could be imposed
for intentional nondisclosure or fraud.
The final clearances could be issued under certain conditions but,
except in clearly appropriate cases, not with the periodic reporting obli-
gations or expiration dates which could be attached to certificates. In-
stead, applicants could be required to inform the agency only if material
changes in circumstances occur. Of course, the agency could be author-
ized to request information later if it reasonably suspected the conduct
573 The protection of provisional validity is available under the EEC clearance program, but only
for "old" agreements. See supra note 322.
574 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
575 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
576 See supra notes 87 and 394 and accompanying text.
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no longer qualified for clearance. As an incentive to the applicant to
provide this information, the clearance could be limited to the facts as
stated in the original application. By reducing the burden and delays
involved with current clearance programs, many more businesses would
be encouraged to apply.
In exchange for this less intensive and burdensome application pro-
cess and reporting requirements, the recipient of this type of clearance
could be given proportionately less protection than it would receive with
certification. Unlike with certification, third parties could remain free to
bring suits against cleared conduct in federal court for damages and/or
an injunction. However, as under the Export Certification Program,577
the defendant could be protected to a greater extent than under the Busi-
ness Review and Advisory Opinion Programs. For example, the plaintiff
could be limited to actual damages and could be required to pay the
defendant's litigation expenses if the defendant prevails. The issuing
agency could also be required to submit a brief to the court explaining in
detail the reasons for the clearance. Such protections would significantly
deter frivolous and speculative litigation, and many more businesses
might find the burden and expense of applying for clearance to be
worthwhile.
With regard to government enforcement actions, the protection af-
forded by this level of clearance could be similar to that provided by
certification. A favorable decision could protect the cleared conduct
from challenge under federal and state antitrust laws by any antitrust
agency until the issuing agency revoked the letter with adequate notice,
and the business could be assured of protection from retroactive liability
if it acted in good faith reliance on the clearance. Although this notice
and protection from retroactive liability are now provided in practice
under all the United States clearance programs, 578 the business commu-
nity might be less reluctant to apply for clearance if formal guarantees
would be given in place of the current practice of the government empha-
sizing the lack of binding effect of business review letters and advisory
opinions.
579
Still other reasonable protections could be afforded applicants with-
out endangering competition. As with the proposed certification clear-
ance, applicants could be allowed to withdraw their application at any
time and receive all information already submitted to the government.
Moreover, a formal amendment procedure could allow businesses to re-
577 See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
578 See supra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
579 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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quest alterations of their clearances to cover new activities or changed
circumstances. Finally, some form of limited provisional validity could
be provided until a final decision is reached.
c. Non-opposition clearances
A third possible type of clearance, similar to the proposed EEC non-
580 ~1 emopposition clearance, could be made available for certain types of ac-
tivities which the government would like to encourage. Under this type
of clearance, an applicant could fully disclose its activities and, if the
agency failed to oppose the activity within a certain period of time, the
conduct could be automatically cleared with a protection similar to that
of the previously proposed business review letter/advisory opinion.
Under this procedure, both the agency and applicants could be spared
the burden involved with the issuance of an individual decision. A pro-
posal somewhat similar to this has been advanced by the Justice Depart-
ment with regard to research and development joint ventures. However,
the Department would limit the protection of this clearance to a guaran-
tee that a rule of reason would be employed if the action would ever be
challenged in court and that damages would be actual, not treble.581
3. A Standard, Detailed Application and Formal
Pre-Filing Counseling
As the Export Certification Program has demonstrated, 8 2 there are
several advantages to providing businesses with a standard, detailed ap-
plication and encouraging them to take advantage of the opportunity for
formal pre-filing counseling. First, businesses could determine before-
hand what would be required of them if they apply. By examining the
application, businesses could discern what types of information would
have to be furnished, and by talking with the agency before filing they
could learn more about how their individual applications would be han-
dled, including how much, if any, supplemental information would have
to be provided. Second, pre-filing counseling would enable businesses to
tailor their information submissions to their particular circumstances,
thereby saving them time and expense in preparing the application.
A third advantage of a detailed application and pre-filing counseling
is the information required by the application would serve not only as a
guide for the agency's staff in its investigation but also as a form of pro-
tection for the applicant. The agency could be required to fully justify,
580 See supra notes 333-49 and accompanying text.
581 See supra note 64.
582 See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
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subject to judicial review, any information requested beyond that re-
quired by the application. Fourth, by utilizing pre-filing counseling, an
applicant could determine whether it should apply at all. During the
counseling session the potential applicant could discover that it has no
cause for concern, or it could learn that it stands little or no chance of
obtaining a clearance, or that it would have to make certain modifica-
tions to its business activity.
Finally, pre-filing counseling could offer applicants an indication as
to whether they should risk implementing their conduct before receiving
a final, definitive decision. Under the new clearance program proposed
in this article, the agency could give some applicants a non-binding indi-
cation of the likelihood of receiving a favorable response and perhaps
even confer limited provisional protection to the applicant if it appears a
favorable decision is likely.
4. Deadlines
Establishing deadlines for responding to applications could en-
courage applications from those businesses for whom time is an impor-
tant factor.583 Determining the maximum amount of time the agency
would have to respond to requests for each type of clearance, however,
could be a difficult task, because the need for a quick response must be
balanced against the need of the agency for sufficient time to conduct a
reasonable examination of the application, particularly in complex situa-
tions.5"' Unrealistically short deadlines could lead to erroneous deci-
sions which could harm competition and which could provide only
temporary protection to the applicant until the mistake is corrected. The
agency might also prefer to be overly cautious and deny applications or
require modifications rather than risk clearing anticompetitive
activities.5 85
One possible solution, currently employed in the Export Certifica-
tion Program, could be to fix relatively short deadlines but provide the
agency with the option, perhaps only with the applicant's consent, to
extend the deadline in necessary cases.58 6 Another possibility could be to
lengthen the deadlines but provide some sort of provisional protection to
applicants which enact their proposals before a final decision is
583 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 549.
584 Interviews with Department of Justice lawyers, supra note 38. See also Foer, supra note 15, at
5.
585 This worry is an alleged cause of conservatism under the Business Review and Advisory Opin-
ion Programs even without the pressure of formal deadlines. See supra notes 184-89 and accompa-
nying text.
586 See supra note 115.
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reached.117 As under the Export Certification Program,5"' the agency
also could agree to accelerated deadlines in deserving cases.
5. Modifications
To further encourage businesses to utilize the program to relieve
their antitrust uncertainty, the agency could formally commit itself to
negotiating with applicants over removal of objectionable aspects of a
proposed activity so that a clearance can be granted. This is already a
regular but unofficial practice of the agencies under all of the existing
clearance programs, although in the Business Review Program it is
sometimes not done.589 Similarly, the agency could promise to negotiate
modifications to on-going, previously cleared activity which no longer
qualifies for clearance. Such an assurance could ease the concerns of
businesses that a major investment might later have to be completely
abandoned,"9 ' but it would not preclude the possibility that businesses
might have to accept modifications they oppose.
6. Confidentiality
To better insure protection of sensitive business information than
under the Business Review and Advisory Opinion Programs, 91 the new
program could follow the EEC's and Export Certification Program's ex-
ample of withholding submitted information from the public, particu-
larly the applicant's competitors, except in limited circumstances.
Simply because a business is trying to comply voluntarily with the anti-
trust laws does not mean that its voluntarily submitted information
should be disclosed to its competitors or possible plaintiffs. Similarly,
third parties submitting information to aid the agency in evaluating an
application should not be deterred from providing information by the
risk of disclosure of their sensitive information.
As with the Export Certification Program,592 the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act could be made inapplicable. The information supplied would
be withheld from public files. The program could also provide assur-
ances that a protective order would be sought if the clearance is chal-
lenged in court and confidential information must be released.5 93
587 See supra note 573 and accompanying text.
588 See supra note 115.
589 See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
590 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 549.
591 See supra notes 234-45 and accompanying text.
592 See supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text.
593 See supra notes 251 and 253 and accompanying text.
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7. Publicity
Since the rights of third parties may be affected by the issuance of a
clearance, those parties could be informed of the government's intention
to grant a clearance. However, the timing of the publicity could be
linked to the potential impact that a particular level of clearance might
have on those third parties' rights. Since third parties' rights to sue are
significantly curtailed under the certification programs, those parties
could be informed in advance of the agency's intention to certify the pro-
posed activity and given an opportunity to comment. With regard to less
binding levels of clearance, however, since the rights of third parties are
not so prejudiced, the agency could withhold publicity until after it has
issued the final decision, just as is the current practice under the Business
Review and Advisory Opinion Programs.594 Unlike under those two
programs, however, applicants could also be allowed to request a post-
ponement of publicity in deserving circumstances, such as when publicity
would alert a competitor who might then seize the business opportunity
for itself before the applicant has the opportunity to implement its
proposal.
B. Improving the EEC Clearance Program
Because of the unique features of the EEC antitrust system, the EEC
clearance program already provides businesses with a considerable
amount of antitrust certainty. A clearance from the Commission, and
often simply an application for clearance, provides many businesses with
sufficient protection from antitrust liability.195 However, the program
does have several drawbacks which cause problems for many applicants,
and those drawbacks could jeopardize the security of an increasing
number of applicants if the number of private actions in member state
courts rises in response to a greater availability of damages and injunc-
tions in those courts against EEC antitrust law violations.59 6
The following suggested improvements were formulated under the
following assumption: Commission competition officials, whose support
is essential for the adoption of any changes in the present program, are
reluctant to sponsor reforms which would require amending Regulation
17/62. They fear that the Council of Ministers would also implement
changes in Regulation 17/62 to weaken the Commission's ability to en-
force the antitrust laws.597 The antitrust laws of the EEC are not very
594 See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
595 See supra note 430 and accompanying text.
596 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
597 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
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popular in many member states,598 so inviting the Council to amend Reg-
ulation 17/62 could open the door to uninvited amendments. Therefore,
the following proposals are improvements which the Commission itself
could implement administratively without the need for Council action.
1. Improving Comfort Letters
The Commission's heavy reliance on comfort letters as a second, less
binding level of clearance has been received favorably by the business
community and antitrust bar 99 and should be continued. Several im-
provements, however, would make comfort letters an even greater suc-
cess. First, the Commission could announce an official policy of
automatically re-opening a file closed by a comfort letter if the agreement
or practice is challenged in a member state court.' °° If the comfort letter
failed to indicate the basis of the Commission's clearance decision, the
Commission could inform the recipient or the member state court di-
rectly whether the comfort letter was based on the likelihood of a nega-
tive clearance or an individual exemption, or on the conformity of the
agreement with the standards of a group exemption. Moreover, the
Commission could indicate what further action it plans to take to assist
the member state court.
If the letter was based on the likelihood that the Commission would
have issued a formal negative clearance if it had processed the applica-
tion for a formal decision, the Commission could simply submit a brief
explaining its reasons for that position. Since member state courts may
declare an agreement or practice to be legal under Articles 85(1) and 86
without the need for a Commission decision," no formal negative clear-
ance would be necessary. If the letter was based on the likelihood of an
individual exemption, however, a formal Commission decision would be
required, and the Commission could ask the member state court to sus-
pend its proceedings to await an expedited Commission exemption deci-
sion. If the Commission no longer believed the agreement or practice
qualified for clearance, it could explain its reasoning and urge the mem-
598 Id Articles 85 and 86 of Regulation 17/62 are viewed by many businesses as impediments to
cooperative ventures and agreements which, it is claimed, would enable community businesses to
compete more effectively with large U.S. and Japanese businesses. Interviews with private antitrust
lawyers, supra note 363.
599 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. Since the business community is
generally satisfied, the Commission intends to continue its heavy reliance on comfort letters. Inter-
views with Commission officials, supra note 282. See also Written Question No. 813/82, supra note
347.
600 The Commission already does this in many cases. Interviews with Commission officials, supra
note 282.
601 Only an exemption requires the intervention of the Commission. Id
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ber state court to take the defendant's good faith reliance on the comfort
letter into account when assessing damages. This formal policy could
replace the Commission's ad hoc approach to this problem," 2 and it
could increase the business community's confidence in the value of the
comfort letters.
Second, the Commission could formally announce to the business
community the limited circumstances under which it would revoke a
comfort letter in order to dispel the misconception that comfort letters
provide scant protection to their recipients.6 "3 In addition, when re-
scinding a comfort letter or taking action against an agreement or prac-
tice cleared by a comfort letter, the Commission could explain in detail
the basis for its action. In cases where businesses relied in good faith on
the comfort letter, the Commission could promise to forego fines.
Third, the Commission could improve and formalize the content of
comfort letters.6" In addition to summarizing the facts upon which the
letter is based, it could indicate whether the letter is founded on the con-
clusion that the conduct falls under a group exemption or would qualify
for a negative clearance or individual exemption. It could also include a
limited amount of legal reasoning in the letter to indicate to recipients,
third parties and member state courts why the conduct was cleared and
under what circumstances the clearance would be invalid. In order to
reduce the time needed to draft legal reasoning for comfort letters, the
Commission could develop standard language (boilerplate).0 5 The in-
clusion of legal analysis could also serve as a valuable indication to the
business community of the Commission's enforcement policy and its in-
terpretation of the antitrust laws. 6
2. Expediting Formal Decisions
The Commission could take steps to reduce the "perfectionism" of
its internal review procedures for draft exemptions and negative clear-
ances60 7 and thereby reduce many of the problems which delays may
cause.60 8 Influential officials in the Competition Directorate would like
to see the following changes implemented:" 9 (1) a significant reduction
602 See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
603 See supra notes 468-82 and accompanying text.
604 See supra notes 483-90 and accompanying text.
605 Commission officials already plan to do this for formal exemption decisions. See infra note
610 and accompanying text.
606 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
607 See supra notes 350-98 and accompanying text.
608 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
609 See supra notes 427-46 and accompanying text.
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in the number of officials who must review draft decisions; (2) a revision
of the procedures for review by the Advisory Committee, whereby draft
decisions would be sent immediately to the individual members of the
Committee who would have a limited time to submit comments, and a
draft would only be considered by the Committee as a whole when one of
the members has an objection; (3) immediate issuance of the decision in
the operative language without waiting for translations into all official
languages of the E.E.C., which would follow later;61 0 (4) the develop-
ment of standardized language (boilerplate) for decisions to eliminate the
time- and resource-consuming process of negotiating the precise scope
and wording of every negative clearance and exemption;6 ' and (5) a sim-
plification of the procedure for revoking negative clearances and exemp-
tions in order to induce Commission officials to grant exemptions and
negative clearances with greater speed and less "perfectionism" since
mistakes could be easily remedied. Under current procedures, the Com-
mission has never revoked an exemption or negative clearance because of
the enormous effort necessary to do so.6 12
3. Intervening in Member State Litigation
If a notified agreement or practice is challenged in a member state
court before the issuance of a formal decision or comfort letter, the Com-
mission could make it an official policy to intervene in the action in much
the same manner previously suggested for comfort letters.6" The Com-
mission could indicate to the court what action it plans to take on the
application. It could ask the court to suspend its proceedings if more
time is needed to investigate the application. In cases where the agree-
ment or practice has already been investigated and in cases where it is
clear and the agreement either is or is not legal, the Commission could
express that view to the court, perhaps also providing a short supporting
memorandum. If it appears that the agreement would qualify for an in-
dividual exemption, the Commission could ask the Court to suspend its
proceedings while the Commission takes an expedited decision.
4. Deadlines
Many Commission officials would like to impose internal deadlines
for issuing formal decisions and comfort letters in order to reduce the
610 This reform would save weeks of time. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 283.
611 This proposal is receiving serious consideration and could be implemented within the next five
years. Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
612 Id.
613 See supra note 600 and accompanying text.
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problems which delays now cause.614 Deciding what time limits are ap-
propriate, however, requires a realistic consideration of the feasibility of
issuing decisions and comfort letters within a specified time period.615
The reasonableness of a deadline in a particular case depends, among
other things, on the Competition Directorate's workload at the time, the
complexity of the matter, and the extent of the Commission's internal
review procedures. Imposing unreasonably short deadlines could result
in erroneous decisions harmful to competition and, as a result, could lead
to cautious answers for fear that a positive answer might allow anti-com-
petitive activities to receive clearance. As under the U.S. Export Certifi-
cation Program, extensions could be available in complex cases, 616 and
applicants could also be allowed to request abbreviated deadlines in de-
serving cases, 617 such as when an agreement or practice has been chal-
lenged in a member state court.
Prescribing deadlines could lead to the processing of applications in
a faster, more efficient manner. Drafts of decisions and comfort letters
would be reviewed more quickly. Indeed, some levels of review likely
would have to be eliminated altogether. Potential applicants could be
assured in most cases of having a decision within a reasonable period of
time and would no longer be faced with the possibility of waiting years
for a response. Assured of a response from the Commission within a
reasonable period of time, member state courts hearing challenges to no-
tified agreements and practices might be less reluctant to suspend their
proceedings temporarily to await the outcome.
However, even before the expiration of the deadline, applicants
could still be faced with problems while awaiting the final decision. If an
614 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. Establishing deadlines would have the
additional consequence of forcing the Commission to respond to every application. Although this
development might deter applicants who hope that the Commission will not take any action on their
application, it would be more desirable from the competitive point of view since presently many
possible anticompetitive agreements remain immune from Commission action and fines because the
Commission is able to adopt only a few negative decisions or provisional decisions withdrawing fine
immunity under its cumbersome internal procedures each year.
At present the Commission disposes slightly more applications then it receives each year. Inter-
views with Commission officials, supra note 282. However, many of the files disposed of are part of
the enormous backlog of applications which originated in the 1960's, and each year many new appli-
cations go unanswered while the Commission processes the backlog of older applications. Id
Forced to answer all new applications in addition to working on the backlog would cause the Com-
mission to either cut back on its efforts to reduce the backlog, to divert valuable resources from
enforcement, to implement further group exemptions or to streamline its internal procedures so that
it could handle more cases each year. Hopefully the Commission would choose the latter two
options.
615 See supra note 584 and accompanying text.
616 See supra note 115.
617 Id.
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applicant would choose to implement the activity in the interim, it could
risk sanctions in member state court litigation, as well as a lost or dam-
aged investment if the Commission later either denies clearance or re-
quires modifications of the proposed conduct. Nevertheless, the shorter
the deadline, the more likely it would be that applicants could wait for a
response before implementing the conduct. Similarly, member state
courts would be more willing to suspend their proceedings pending the
Commission's response to an application.
Many private lawyers and Commission officials also would like re-
turn to the use of provisional validity for new agreements. 18 However,
that measure would require either Council legislation or a reversal by the
Court of Justice of its decision removing provisional validity. With dead-
lines requiring the Commission to respond to applications within a short
period of time, perhaps the Court of Justice no longer would find provi-
sional validity to be objectionable.
5. A General Non-Opposition Exemption
Another possible reform, advocated by many people,619 is an
amendment of Regulation 17/62 and Article 85(2) of the EEC Treaty to
allow an automatic exemption for a notified agreement after the lapse of
a specified period of time.620 Under this proposal, the Commission
would publish a summary of an application for an exemption in the Offi-
cial Journal and invite interested third parties to submit their comments
within thirty days. Unless the Commission would notify an applicant
within ninety days of publication that there are serious doubts about the
applicability of Article 85(3), the agreement would be exempt for a pe-
riod of three years. As under its current practice,62" ' the Commission
also could be allowed to revoke the exemption via a formal decision if it
later found the agreement to be anticompetitive and not deserving of an
exemption, but liability would not be retroactive absent a showing of bad
faith on the part of the applicant. This proposed reform could relieve the
Commission of the burden of issuing individual exemptions for notified
agreements which it believes clearly qualify for an exemption, and it
would also spare applicants the delays and burdens now associated with
the processing of applications.
618 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363; interviews with Commission offi-
cials, supra note 282.
619 Id
620 House of Lords Report, supra note 386, at xvii (recommendation by the Select Committee), 4
(proposal of the Confederation of British Industry).
621 See supra note 294.
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6. Expanding the Rule of Reason Under Article 85(1)
Of all the potential alternatives for reforming the EEC clearance
program, the call for increased use of the rule of reason is the most con-
troversial. Many businesses and private lawyers strongly favor a signifi-
cant expansion of the rule of reason under Article 85(1).622 Many
Commission officials, however, are adamently opposed to such a signifi-
cant expansion.623
Commission officials believe that many lawyers and member state
courts are incapable of applying a rule of reason analysis correctly. Con-
sequently, they fear that many significant anticompetitive activities
would be implemented by businesses and enforced by the member state
courts.624 Moreover, Commission officials fear that the various member
state courts would interpret EEC antitrust law differently and hence im-
pair the uniform interpretation of the antitrust laws.625 These Commis-
sion officials believe that the Commission has been able to avert these
problems through its extensive control of the rule of reason analysis
under Article 85(3).626
Commission officials also argue that an extensive use of a rule of
reason under Article 85(1) would be inconsistent with the intention of
the authors of the Treaty, who reserved that type of analysis for Article
85(3).627 Private lawyers, however, argue that it is not clear that the
authors of the Treaty intended Article 85(1) to be interpreted so
strictly. 628 Commission officials further contend that such a reform
would decrease antitrust certainty for the business community since in
many cases businesses no longer would be sure whether an activity vio-
lates Article 85(1).629 Private lawyers argue, counter, that the uncer-
tainty is simply shifted to the Article 85(3) test, which is highly
unpredictable. Moreover, they point out that the Commission simply
622 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. See Van Bael, supra note 10, at 10;
Korah, supra note 411, at 340; Forrester and Norall, supra note 411, at 38-39; Van Houtte, supra
note 17, at 508-09.
623 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
624 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. See Forrester and Norall, supra note
411, at 13.
625 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282. Private lawyers advocating a greater
role for the rule of reason under Article 85(1) concede this would be a problem. Interviews with
private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363; Forrester and Norall, supra note 411, at 44; Korah, supra
note 24, at 15-16; Korah, supra note 411, at 339; Van Houtte, supra note 17, at 509. These lawyers
argue, however, that such discrepancies in interpretation are preferable to the present unworkable
system. Id
626 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
627 Id
628 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363. See Korah, supra note 24, at 37-38.
629 Interviews with Commission officials, supra note 282.
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does not take many decisions under Article 85(3) and that, as a result,
applicants have the unfortunate certainty that their agreements are illegal
regardless of whether they are significantly anticompetitive or even pro-
competitive.630
In response to the Commission's contentions, some antitrust lawyers
concede that the system created by the Commission's strict interpretation
of Article 85(1) would have many advantages if it actually worked. But
they argue that since the Commission cannot issue enough clearance de-
cisions within a reasonable period of time, some alternative is needed to
solve the numerous problems caused by the Commission's inability to
effectively use its exclusive authority under Article 85(3) to issue exemp-
tions. 631 They further contend that those problems will worsen as the
number of actions in member state courts increases.632
To the extent that the Commission adopts the other reforms previ-
ously suggested, the need for a significant expansion of the rule of reason
under Article 85(1) would be mitigated. However, along with the other
reforms, the Commission could continue to ease its strict interpretation
of Article 85(1) in appropriate cases in order to decrease the number of
clearly competitive agreements which have to be notified.633 To compen-
sate for the resulting loss of control over the interpretation of the anti-
trust laws, the Commission could issue more official notices to assist
businesses and member state courts in applying the rule of reason. The
Commission could also make it a practice to submit comments to aid
member state courts in litigation involving a rule of reason analysis under
Article 85(1).
IV. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL SIDE EFFEcTS OF REFORM
If the foregoing proposed reforms of the United States and EEC
clearance programs would be adopted, some private lawyers and govern-
ment officials believe that a large number of businesses would be en-
couraged to apply for clearance. This development could create a
significant new administrative burden on the antitrust agencies which
currently do not have the manpower resources to handle the additional
workload.634 They fear that even though clearance programs are in-
630 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers, supra note 363.
631 Id
632 Id1
633 The Commission has gradually increased the role of the rule of reason under Article 85(l).
See Van Houtte, supra note 17. One author has argued that the decisions of the Court of Justice do
not preclude member state courts from using a rule of reason analysis under Article 85(1). See
Korah, supra note 411, at 343-48.
634 Interviews in Brussels, London, and Washington, D.C. (Jan. 2-12, 23-24, 1984).
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tended to help businesses reduce antitrust uncertainty, many businesses
without serious antitrust concerns might apply simply as a precaution.
As a result, an increased administrative burden on the antitrust agencies
would impair their efforts both to process the applications of businesses
facing serious uncertainty and to perform their vital antitrust enforce-
ment function.
This concern overlooks the fact that the application for an antitrust
clearance would still involve significant effort and expense, at least some
delay, and other disadvantages for applicants. These are deterrents
which would help minimize the number of "unnecessary" applications.
Furthermore, many businesses are reluctant to deal with the government,
and they likely would avoid applying for clearance in the absence of sig-
nificant antitrust uncertainty. In any event, to the extent that applica-
tions do not raise serious antitrust concerns, they could be processed
quickly and perhaps not answered at all if a non-opposition clearance is
adopted.
Some private lawyers, in contrast, fear that even significant reforms
of the existing programs would not overcome many businesses' aversion
to the administrative burdens, expense, delay and government scrutiny
involved in applying for an antitrust clearance.635 The reforms proposed
in this paper are designed to relieve the unnecessary drawbacks which
deter businesses with significant antitrust concerns from applying, while
at the same time maintaining safeguards against anticompetitive activi-
ties being certified. A certain amount of expense and inconvenience for
applicants are inherent in any clearance program, and each business
must perform its own cost-benefit analysis in reaching its decision about
whether or not to apply.
The reforms proposed in this paper would likely increase the
number of applications under both the United States and EEC programs.
By streamlining the programs as suggested, the workload created by the
increased number of applications would be offset at least to some extent
by increased efficiency. It is quite possible, however, that increased man-
power resources would have to be devoted to the clearance programs.
Hopefully, the United States Congress and the EEC Council of Ministers
would supply funds to hire additional staff to administer the programs.
Increasing antitrust certainty would justify the added expense since it
would benefit individual businesses as well as the economy in general.636
It also would repay some of the added expenditures by saving the system
635 Interviews with private antitrust lawyers in Brussels, London and Washington, D.C. (Jan. 2-5,
23-26, 1984).
636 See supra note 7.
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much time and resources by decreasing litigation.637
Finally, increasing the role of the clearance programs could impact
on each system's reliance on case law as the major method of interpreting
and developing the antitrust laws. 638 This reliance on case law is particu-
larly heavy in the United States. However, such a development could
have the advantage of developing a more uniform and certain interpreta-
tion of the antitrust laws. Reliance on the judicial system, particularly
one as extensive and dispersed as that of the United States, often results
in very divergent and conflicting interpretations of the antitrust laws.639
By creating a unified clearance program administered by a single agency
which can issue reasoned clearance decisions with limited binding effect,
an influential and internally more consistent source of precedent would
develop. The European Commission already provides this beneficial ef-
fect to a large extent through its leading role in the interpretation of the
EEC antitrust laws. By issuing more well-reasoned clearance decisions,
the Commission could strengthen that role.
637 Id
638 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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